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The Sublime and Postmodern Positions 
(Introductory)
At the edge of postmodernism, then, no idea or theory 
or word or even feeling is above suspicion, and whatever 
postmodernism does or says seems to take that fact, 
perhaps only that fact, as given.
Berd Lang, Postmodernism in Philosophy: Nostalgia for the Future, Waiting 
for the Past
In Le Pas au-dela (1973) Maurice Blanchot writes about “time before 
time,” which is “outside of time in time” (hors de temps dans temps').1 
Blanchot’s time is always already past, it withdraws before its beginning and 
becomes “dreadfully ancient,” “always lacking the present.”1 2 Time is as it 
were exterior to itself and there is nowhere to sign on its beginning, there is 
nowhere to assign limits as to make time present, as to represent it. Time’s 
outside inhabits its inside, and thus inhibits its totalization, its becoming 
an object, a fact, a simple and single meaning of the sign “time.” Time’s 
outside-inside inhibits its representation. Facing time we face something 
“dreadfully ancient” not quite in the sense of very old in time, but from 
beyond time, and thus from “before” history, alien to history, to its writings 
which can present ancient times, domesticate them in the form of a coherent 
story, but which cannot domesticate time. Thus Blanchot reads time as 
1 M. Blanchot, “Le Pas au-dela” (Paris: Gallimard 1973), p. 54. Quoted in English in 
Deconstruction in Context. Literature and Philosophy, M. C. Taylor, ed. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 1986), p. 31.
2 Ibid., pp. 23 and 25.
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a threatening outside, as the other of the chronologically safe time constructed 
by history.
This idea of a “dreadfully ancient” time, of time as both dreadful and 
ancient, does not present or represent time but only posits it within the sphere 
of the “nonpresent,” within the sphere which endangers the presence by the 
possibility of its being absent which Blanchot elsewhere calls “the nonabsent 
absence.”3 The feeling of danger, the threat is caused by the paradox that 
something that we are facing, that an object of our interest might simply be not 
what it is, or seems to be, because despite our certainty of its existence it is 
always beyond our grasp, beyond our power to categorize or represent.
For Jean-Francois Lyotard such a threat is a sublime sentiment. Commen­
ting on Kant’s idea of the sublime he writes:
The sublime [...] takes place [...] when the imagination fails to present an object 
which might, if only in principle, come to match a concept. We have the Idea of the 
world (the totality of what is), but we do not have the capacity to show an example 
of it. We have the Idea of the simple (that which cannot be broken down, 
decomposed), but we cannot illustrate it with a sensible object which would be 
a “case” of it. We can conceive the infinitely great, the infinitely powerful, but every 
presentation of an object destined to “make visible” this absolute greatness or power 
appears to us painfully inadequate. Those are Ideas of which no presentation is 
possible. [...] They can be said to be unpresentable.4
The sublime is thus “something” which always evades any adequate sign and it 
is for this reason that the sublime itself cannot be an adequate category, 
a presentable one. In other words, the sublime as the fear of the “painfully 
inadequate” caused by the unpresentable is equally unpresentable as the cause 
of this fear cannot be presented either. Just as there is no adequate sign of 
time, there is no adequate sign of the sublime, and it is for this reason, it seems, 
that, in Lyotard, the “sublime sentiment” takes place rather than “is.” If it 
takes place in the face of a nonabsent absence, in the face of something whose 
presence cannot be made present, it does not only “take place,” but it also as 
it were “takes time,” that is to say, is posited, as nonpresent (or nonabsent, for 
that matter), in the space of time which transgresses presence, which goes 
beyond the “now” of the present and “takes time” outside the chronological 
order of presentable facts, as a nothingness, an ‘object’ without a ‘where’ or 
‘when.’
Nothingness is of course a ‘thing’ whose presentation is hardly possible 
and, at least in the Kantian sense, it is also sublime. Although Saussure, to 
take the example of one of the ‘fathers’ of structuralism, explicitly mentions 
3 Cf. M. Blanchot, “The Absence of the Book,” in Deconstruction..., p. 391.
4 J.-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. G. Bennington 
and B. Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1984), p. 78.
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difference as constitutive of presence, this difference is simultaneously 
rendered as a nothingness through the postulate of the priority of the 
synchronic description which renders difference actually alien to being written 
about. Difference, like the Kantian sublime, cannot be an object of (syn­
chronic) description, be it linguistic or historical. What seems to be making 
poststructuralism poststructuralism (or postmodernism postmodernism), on 
the other hand, is an attempt at writing down what cannot be written, an 
attempt at postulating a paradoxical epistemology of the sublime supplemen­
ting the aesthetic of the sublime which Lyotard regards as the instituting 
gesture of modernism.5
In the case of post-structuralism one can hardly talk about aesthetics pure 
and simple at all. Lyotard seems to be implying this when he writes that 
a “postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a philosopher: the text he 
writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by preestablished 
rules, and they cannot be judged according to a determining judgement, by 
applying familiar categories to the text or to the work.”6 If a postmodern 
writer is a philosopher, a poststructuralist philosopher is a writer, and thus 
it is impossible to distinguish between, say, creative and factual writing. 
The poststructural condition is the condition of what I have called the 
epistemology of the sublime, of what Lyotard calls putting forward the 
unpresentable in the presentation itself. Such a ‘putting forward,’ or writing, is 
obviously alien to factographic historicality because its temporality is equally 
paradoxical as its ‘teleology without a telos,’ to use Wojciech Kalaga’s 
phrase a little out of context.7 As an attempt to write the nonpresent, 
and in some paradoxical sense to write nothing, a post-structuralist writer 
(or critic), like Lyotard’s postmodern one, has to write what “would have 
to be understood according to the paradox of the future (post) anterior 
(modo).”8 9
It is in the wake of this paradox that the idea of difference (which in de 
Saussure was constitutive of language simultaneously remaining outside the 
scope of serious linguistic interest) becomes, for Derrida, for instance, a sphere 
of exploration within the unpresentable meaning of the word differance, the 
errant word in which “a” replaces “e,” and whose irreducible polysemy 
(differ/defer) makes any positive identification of this word unthinkable. Such 
a word marks “a past that has never been present,” says Derrida quoting 
Levinas in an essay on differance? “Differance (with an a) [...] can refer 
s Ibid., p. 81.
6 Ibid.
1 Cf. W. Kalaga, “Teleology without a Telos,” Znakolog, 1992.
8 J.-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern..., p. 81.
9 J. Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. A. Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 
1982), p. 21.
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simultaneously to the entire configuration of its meanings.”10 11Unlike Saus- 
sure’s difference, différance neither simply causes presence nor is it simply 
present itself. As a past that has never been present it is a mark, a trace of the 
present which itself can never be complete, which cannot be totalized into 
a unity. Différance is thus also unpresentable in terms of the temporality of the 
present, which is the temporality of history, and as such it is a also the sign of 
time which questions the presence of the present.
The postmodern sublime is thus a non-category of sorts in which the 
questioning of the present finds a provisional epistemological ground which 
enables thinkers like Lyotard to talk about the presentation of unpresentable. 
The ‘revival’ of the sublime in the postmodern age, which is also the age of 
science and technology, provides a space for a counter-discourse which, 
paradoxical as it may sound, protects the present by questioning it, by 
engaging itself in the problems of the materiality of language, in the paradoxes 
of reflection.
The age of science and technology is also the age productive of what one 
might call virtual realities, of the realities which translate the world into 
mathematical-logical formulae constituting the ‘more real’ reality systematical­
ly underlying our less orderly wanderings of experience. If the postmodern 
consists in putting forward the unpresentable, the sublime, in presentation 
itself, as Lyotard has it, it puts it as a veil of sorts upon the experientially 
inaccessible virtual projections of the world revealing the inevitable “dance of 
iteration,” as Noel Gray puts it, inscribed within the very possibility of 
virtualizing reality:
However, as virtual reality must constantly return to so-called ordinary experience 
for its impetus and in some senses its validation, may we not then say that the 
endless march of science discloses itself as a dance of iteration — the return that is 
forever beginning in an immediate virtual ending'!11
Regardless of the cybernetic claims that materiality has at last been overcome 
giving way to some “Cyberspace,”12 it is the materiality of the signifier which, 
in the hands of Derrida, for instance, begins the dance of iteration over the 
cyberspace of the mathematical truth whose orderly infinity is thinkable only 
in the infinity of the virtual worlds it can produce. If Derrida, for instance, 
“activates, for some people in the world today, the emotions waiting in a gulf 
10 Ibid., p. 8.
11 N. Gray, “Seeing Nature. The Mathematization of Experience in Virtual Realities,” 
unpublished paper presented at the ISSEI conference (European Integration and the European 
Mind: Cultural Hegemony or Dialogue of Cultures), Aalborg, August 1992, p. 6 of the 
manuscript.
12 Cf. Cyberspace: First Steps, B. Michael, ed. (Massachusetts: MIT Press 1991).
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of Chaos,” as William Kerrigan puts it, by disturbing the intimate presup­
positions of individual existence, by disturbing our distinctness,13 it is exactly 
because this distinctness has been removed from the surface, or materiality, of 
the world to some virtual world of distinct mathematical categories. The 
presentation of the unpresentable, of the sublime, is thus an attempt, however 
paradoxical, let us repeat, at representing ‘unpresentability’ of the present, 
an attempt at a protection of the materiality against the approaches of the 
infinity of mathematical-logical formulae which virtualize the world thus 
making it presentable, though, perhaps, nonexistent. The sublime reappears 
at the end of the twentieth century not as a threatening other, but actually as 
a warning against the virtualizing discourse and language which remove, 
or at least attempt at removing, the materiality of the social space we live 
in, the ordinary experience of reading and writing, for instance, to an already 
overcome sphere which actually, or virtually, exists somewhere else. Such an 
overcoming of materiality actually means mastery over infinity, a universal 
law which now, objectively, from the position of the absolute objectivity of 
mathematics, can legitimately actualize its virtual worlds, manufacture 
a (human) nature no longer threatened by the approaches of the chaos of 
materiality, of the unrepresentable which Derrida, for instance, puts forward 
in presentation.
It is from this (or that) paradoxical, uncertain, unpresentable position(s) 
of the postmodern epistemology of the sublime, of the unpresentable, 
that I want to look back at yet another ‘revival’ of the sublime in the 
eighteenth-century aesthethics, philosophy and literature. In other words, 
from the position which questions the idea of presentation I will look at 
some texts in which the presentation of the sublime is, implicitly or explicitly, 
at stake. It is for this reason that the question of what the sublime really 
is will be left mostly unanswered throughout these pages. What will be 
indicated in this reading of the eighteenth-century sublime, however, is that 
the question of presenting the unpresentable is not an oxymoronic pun upon 
which deconstructive quibbling feeds thus contaminating Academia with 
a discourse which undermines its (Academia’s) foundation of the presentable 
truth, but rather that it is the question which, remaining unresolved (unless one 
is really serious saying that he or she has at last overcome and explained the 
world), motivates and in fact establishes the position of the discursing subject 
not only epistemologically, but also politically within a particular social 
structure whose truth or truths come from within rather than from a virtual, 
13 W. Kerrigan, “Atoms Again: The Deaths of Individualism,” in Taking Chances: Derrida, 
Psychoanalysis, and Literature, J. H. Smith and W. Kerrigan, eds. (Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press 1984), p. 104.
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external, impersonal (objective) system of living whose rules we, imperfect 
beings, constantly violate.
Descartes, let’s be simplistic for a while, doubted whether he existed, 
his doubt undermining not only Academia, but also the meaning of the verb 
“to be” which he saved by translating it into “I think” thus depriving “being” 
of the possibility of impersonal, objective, existence. The question of presen­
ting the unpresentable lurks in the Cartesian text in a very Derridean manner, 
Ralph Flores notices, as his “Cogito is staged both as naked thought and 
dressed in language.”14 What saves Cartesian discourse and makes it clas­
sifiable as philosophical is exactly his doubt in writing, his declared hatred of 
“the profession of bookmaking” which relegates the truth of his “I” to his 
mind, to the sphere of the unpresentable without questioning the presence of 
the “I.”
Descartes’ withdrawal from representation, his phenomenological reduc­
tion of the presentable world posits a sphere of the unpresentable which 
simultaneously, as it were, longs for some sort of presentation. The eighteenth 
century, without quite denying the Cartesian method, will concentrate on the 
improvement of representation, on the rendition of the unpresentable as 
presentable. The category of the sublime in the eighteenth century, as I see it, 
is an idea which ‘classical’ discourse ‘revives’ via rewriting Longinus’ rhetorical 
device (hypsos) and translates it into a background category against which it 
wants to define nature (along with human nature) as the sphere of the visible, 
of the presentable, or at least of the sensible. Hence, for instance, Locke’s 
translation of personal identity to a writing commemorated upon a slate, 
the foregrounding of taste as the crucial category of social coexistence or, 
however vain, attempts at making music visible so that the deaf might “see the 
music of the ears” as was the case with Bertrand’s colour organ exhibited in 
London in 1775.15 Rather than withdrawing, like Descartes, from the visible 
to unpresentable, the Enlightenment brings a torch to all the dark places of the 
world, to quote Conrad a little out of context, simultaneously rendering those 
things to which light cannot be brought, which cannot be brought into light, 
as inhuman, wild, purely horrible. Hence also, as we shall see, attempts at 
domesticating the sublime within the social space as an aesthetic category 
which, as such, is partially presentable, accessible to senses as a pleasurable 
horror. It is this gesture of translating unpresentable into presentable which 
seems to characterise the search for reason in the Age of Reason. This gesture 
simultaneously reduces the very idea of perception of the unpresentable, 
14 R. Flores, The Rhetoric of Doubtful Authority. Deconstructive Readings of Self-Ques­
tioning Narratives, St. Augustine to Faulkner (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 1984), 
p. 73.
15 The Context of English Literature. The Eighteenth Century, P. Rogers, ed. (London: 
Methuen 1978), p. 197.
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of the infinite (both in time and in space) to a nothingness of sorts, and those 
who perceive it as madmen or enthusiasts unworthy of the name of man.
The space proper for man in the eighteenth century is thus through and 
through social space, a home of perceptible, ‘tasteful’ objects and shared 
sensations, feelings, sentiments readable from human faces and gestures where 
infinity is kept at a distance and its approaches are left to the heated 
imaginations of speculative philosophers who themselves, like Hume, would 
rather not philosophise because, as we shall see, philosophising approaches the 
spheres of infinity and is productive of uncertainty and horror of the sublime, 
of the unpresentable.
Interestingly, unlike in the case of projecting ‘cyberspaces’ in the modern 
science, the, say, ‘premodern’ discourse does not project virtual models of the 
world through “replicating nature,” as Noel Gray phrases it.16 Rather, it sees 
order as already hidden within nature, and sees it as a finite order of finite 
things which can be mathematically expressed, but which cannot be math­
ematically created. Instead of overcoming materiality, it wants to improve it, 
diminish to human scope within the human locality of society. Hence the fear 
of the infinite, of the approaches of infinity which are discernible both 
in the mountainous landscapes of the Alps, for instance, and in the infinite 
creations, or productions, of reason. Reason, being reasonable, actually means 
constant improvement ofc reasoning in experience, rather than an ultimate, 
formulaic explanation of the ways of the world. Hence also the search for the 
expression of the inexpressible, for the presentation of the unpresentable in 
quite different a sense than in Lyotard. The eighteenth century searches for 
rules and principles of the order of the world whose expression always already 
smacks of being a production of reason, of an artifice, or even a dictate, which 
does not come from nature. Hence also the centrality of taste and common 
sense as naturally reasonable mechanisms justifying what Terry Eagleton calls 
our “biological insertion into the world.”
Taste is not, of course, a precise category as it is always associated with 
subjectivity, with being subjective, and in its generalization there is always 
involved a necessity of theorising it and thus making it a category of reason. 
Without a dint of reason taste is too subjective, and as a govering principle of 
the society it leaves too much individual freedom of, exactly, doing what one 
likes. Taste made reasonable takes thus the form of common sense, of a sense 
negotiable only upon some social space as a compromise between the bodily 
and the reasonable.
Perhaps in reaction to the Cartesian, theoretical, reduction of the world to 
a thinking “I,” the irresistible, though doubtful, presence of the world outside 
this thinking commenced “the body’s long inarticulate rebellion against 
16 W. Kerrigan, “Atoms...”, p. 2.
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the tyranny of the theoretical,” as Eagleton phrases it.17 Yet unaware of 
cybernetics, rather than suggesting virtual realities, classical discourse had to 
find a somehow more material sphere of exploration, a kind of new world, 
such as would be agreeable to all, which all would accept without a Cartesian 
doubt. If Descartes philosophised with his eyes closed, seeing and visibility of 
the world, as I have already said, become predominant in the eighteenth 
century.
What follows is thus, in a way, about seeing. And it is exactly the sense of 
taste with which human eyes, human vision, become endowed in order to be 
able to distinguish, without doubt, between the human and the non-human. 
The sphere of vision which is thus created is an extension of the Cartesian “I,” 
a going out of oneself towards the regions which Descartes found dangerous 
and misleading, and which in the eighteenth century become endowed with 
security through the “aesthetization” of those regions, through rendering them 
as pleasurable and agreeable with human nature.
The ultimate borderline of those regions is the sublime, the sphere 
productive of terror which naturally warns us against itself with its vastness, 
infinity or eternity which human eye cannot grasp and transpose into an 
image, a picture, a representation. Man can securely function only upon 
a territory which he has mapped by himself, reproduced, as it were, into 
a readable (or readerly) space where there is no room for any epistemology of 
the sublime (as is the case with the postmodern) because such an epistemology 
is in fact dangerous to ontological security, to the security of being. The 
eighteenth-century philosophers and thinkers do go out of Descartes’s cham­
ber of meditation, they go for various kinds of both actual and speculative 
tours, but they do it with a guidebook of taste in their minds.
The theme of life as a tour, as a journey, is obviously a universal one, but 
the eighteenth-century traveller hardly encounters any monsters on his way, 
perhaps with the notable and ironic exception of Swift’s Yahoos, of men 
themselves. Life is a history of agreeable events, of events one can represent as 
facts, and it is in this possibility of representation that the facts are always 
already rendered as natural events. The defence against the unpresentable, 
against the anti-social terror without a pleasure finds its expression in such 
categories as sentiment or ‘genius of the place,’ for instance, which, as we shall 
see, translate the world, naturally, into what it should be like, into a better, 
more natural world whose epitome is the English landscape garden.
Hence the recurrent theme of correction of nature in these pages, of its 
naturalization. This correction frequently consists in the desublimation of the 
world (a not quite distant equivalent of the Saussurean differentiation) 
through the paradoxical denial of the sublime by pointing to it, even by 
17 T. Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1990), p. 13.
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attempts at theorizing it, in order to show that the sublime is a natural thing 
only provided that we keep away from it, constantly step back from it and 
travel in the domesticated space of the already familiar and agreeable where 
the approaches of infinity are mapped as dangerous regions without roads 
leading to them.
There will be, as ever, those who will try to map those dangerous regions, 
go outside the map, as it were, and discover new worlds within this one. 
In what follows, I read Swedenborg, Blake and Godwin as the transgressors of 
the sublime who, inevitably, had to posit themselves away from the social 
simultaneously positing alternative natures without any finitude.
All the above themes the Reader will encounter in the readings of a few 
texts which I find important and representative for the epoch. There are, of 
course, many others. Themes are not, again of course, the secure roads of 
history, and they may occasionally lead one elsewhere. Where infinity is at 
stake, however, one cannot really write a history of its representations, since it, 
as yet, has not been quite represented. Approaches of infinity which find their 
expression in the vagueness of the category of the sublime are not facts, they 
are not an object of exploration of this or that writer, but, exactly, a theme, 
frequently implicit, which motivates the social practices, such as writing, for 
instance, and which links such seemingly distant “fields” as philosophical 
speculations with the ways one can design one’s garden. It is such links, which 
might be called intertextual, that I attempt to hint at in what follows, the 
outgrowths of the texts which I have read, or re-read, not in order to 
eventually unveil the truth of the Sublime, for instance, but rather in order to 
problematize its “transparent” readings as an aesthetic category pure and 
simple so as to bring to the fore certain uncertainties as regards the 
eighteenth-century readings of the world in the face of the approaches of 
infinity one of whose aspects is, again of course, what I have earlier called the 
‘revival’ of the sublime.
II
Spheres of Infinity 
(On Addison and His Pleasures)
... but that the soul 
Remembering how she felt, but what she felt 
Remembering not, retains an obscure sense 
Of possible sublimity...
(Wordsworth, The Prelude)
The revival of the notion of the sublime in the eighteenth century is 
frequently regarded as derived from Longinus’ Peri Hupsous although, as 
Samuel Monk notices, “there was a general opinion that Peri Hupsous was 
inadequate in its methods of analyzing the aesthetic experience.”1 It was not 
only inadequate in its methods but also, as it seems, in its subject as the 
sublimity with which the English writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries were concerned could hardly be called a rhetorical category sig­
nifying “a certain distinction and excellence of expression, that distinction and 
excellence by which authors have been enabled to win immortal fame,”1 2 as 
T.S. Dorsch, the modern translator of the famous treatise in Greek by an 
author known as Longinus, defines the meaning of the word hypsos simul­
taneously adding that there “appears to be no single English word which fully 
conveys all this.”3
Some hundred and fifty years earlier than Dorsch, in Analytical Inquiry 
into the Principles of Taste (1805), Richard Payne Knight, explicitly referring 
1 S. H. Monk, The Sublime (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press 1960), p. 84.
2 Classical Literary Criticism (Penguin Books 1965), p. 24.
3 Ibid., p. 25.
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to the “principles of Longinus,” says that “In grasping the infinity the mind 
exercises the powers of multiplying without end; and, in so doing, it expands 
and exalts itself, by which means its feelings and sentiments become sublime.”*  
From the context of rhetoric and poetry, the concept of the sublime has thus 
gone very far towards “grasping the infinity,” it has become a category closer 
to the ontology of the infinite than to a rhetorical device that makes for the 
production of the sublime.
Something which is infinite, which forces the mind to an endless multi­
plication is hardly compatible with Longinus’ postulate of the sublime object’s 
ineffaceable existence in memory.
For a piece is truly great only if it can stand up to repeated examination, and if it is 
difficult, or, rather, impossible to resist its appeal, and it remains firmly and 
ineflaceably in the memory. As a generalization, you may take it that sublimity in all 
its truth and beauty exists in such works as please all men at all times?
Longinus’ sublime is thus a category which is both true and beautiful, but 
which is simultaneously inevitably historical, an irresistible fact about which 
one can hardly forget. It is thus also in a way static, and, as such, an object 
for whose creation or production certain rules can be designed. In Knight’s 
vision of the sublime, on the other hand, no finality seems to be possible and 
the endlessly multiplying mind can be rightly called a mind in the state of 
constant convolutions, as it were, in no state at all.
Samuel Monk sees this turn from the rhetorical sublime of Longinus’ to 
what he calls “the pathetic sublime” in early eighteenth-century theoreticians 
(Addison, Hume, Bailie) of emotions whose ideas can be traced back to Peri 
Hupsous in the fact that they regarded the emotions which the sublime 
awakened as “an end in themselves, rather than as a means to an end” thus 
making possible an aesthetic theory. “The sublime came,” says Monk,
as a justifiable category into which could be grouped the stronger emotions and the 
more irrational elements of art. The speed with which theorists assimilated under the 
Longinian sublime the emotion of terror, horror, and ecstasy, and the vast and more 
overwhelming aspects of the natural world bears witness to the need which was felt 
for a method of making respectable the more un-neo-classical elements of art?
Although early eighteenth-century theorists would hardly propagate the idea 
of an endlessly multiplying mind, for some reason it became necessary to 
implant some elements of unreason into the discourse of reason. All sorts 
4 R. P. Knight, An Analytical Inquiry into the Principles of Taste (London 1805), p. 36.
5 Longinus, “On the Sublime,” trans. T. S. Dorsch, in Aristotle/Horace/Longinus, Classical 
Literary Criticism (Penguin Books 1965), p. 107.
• S. H. Monk, The Sublime..., p. 85.
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of enthusiastic and ecstatic feelings were generally suspicious to the neo­
classical eye and Pope, for instance, placed an inspired poet claiming to 
have any access to some less mundane spheres than those demarcated 
by the principle of concordia discors in Bedlam (cf. The Dunciad). Yet such 
spheres, the spheres of, say, after Knight, the infinite, the spheres which 
could not be reduced to the classical classes governed by pre-established, 
natural rules had to be somehow coped with, made respectable, as Monk 
phrases it. The paradox of basing “the more un-neo-classical” aspects 
of art on the classical writings of Longinus is but an example of this mak­
ing respectable the things which are not quite respectable, that are not 
acceptable, an example of domesticating the areas otherwise regarded as 
transgressive.
Joseph Addison, frequently referred to as a theoretician of the sublime7 
(mainly on the basis of essays “On the Pleasures of Imagination” published in 
The Spectator in 1712), hardly uses the word “sublime” there. According to 
Andrew Wilson he “manages to cover most of the ground trodden by 
subsequent writers”8 and Paul Crowther claims that many of Kant’s ideas on 
the sublime “are also to be found in Addison’s Spectator essays.”9 The role of 
these essays derives, it seems, not only from the use of the oxymoronic 
expressions of the type of the “pleasing kind of Horrour” or “pleasing 
astonishment,” so typical for the later writers (like Burke, for instance), but 
also from his positing of the sphere of the infinite as the object of a potential 
visualization by imagination. What Addison performs in the essays is a certain 
rationalization of imagination which eventually is rendered as inferior to 
reason not because it is unreasonable, but because it is incapable of “keeping 
pace”with it.
In essay No. 419 Addison writes about the entertainment of readers’ 
imagination by “the Poet [who] quite loses sight of Nature” and tries to 
present “such Persons as have many of them no Existence, but what he 
bestows on them.”10 Such persons are, among others, fairies, demons, ghosts 
and spirits. The loss of the sight of nature in such poets is not complete, 
however, because such nonexistent objects still have some link with nature as, 
exactly, persons, that is to say, as objects which human imagination can still 
visualize, though read them as strange or novel.
7 Cf. e.g. S. H. Monk, The Sublime...; A. Wilson, Turner and the Sublime (London: British 
Museum Publications 1980); P. Crowther, The Kantian Sublime. From Morality to Art (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 1989).
8 A. Wilson, Turner and..., p. 10.
9 P. Crowther, The Kantian..., p. 12.
10 Addison and Steele. Selections from ‘The Taller' and 'The Spectator,' R. J. Allen, ed. (New 
York: Holt Rinehart and Winston 1961), p. 213.
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These Descriptions raise a pleasing kind of Horrour in the Mind of the Reader, 
and amuse his Imagination with the Strangeness and Novelty of the Persons who are 
represented in them.11
Though the descriptions of ghosts and spirits are horribly pleasing, Addison is 
not quite in favor of them as the source or object which causes the, say, 
sublime feelings as the origin of such imaginative creations of which the 
Ancients did not have much to say, reaches back to “the Darkness and 
Superstition of later Ages, when pious Frauds were made use of to amuse 
Mankind and frighten them into a Sense of Duty.”11 2
What is dangerous about such descriptions is the possibility of creating 
parallel, alternative worlds of sorts, worlds governed by a different order than 
that of man and nature.
Poetry addresses it self to the Imagination, as it has not only the whole Circle of 
Nature for its Province, but makes new Worlds of its own, shews us Persons who are 
not to be found in Being, and represents even the Faculties of the Soul [...] in 
a sensible Shape and Character.13 14
The use of the word “province” in this context seems to be suggesting that 
“the whole Circle of Nature” is endangered by the possibility of being, 
something ‘more than it is,’ and what such poetry does is not an enlarge­
ment of the sphere of the real, but, rather, it supplements it with some other 
sphere, or, better, with the sphere of the Other, like the sphere of ghosts, for 
instance.
Addison hints more explicitly at this danger of the existence of nonexistent 
objects when he writes about the “noble Extravagance of Fancy” in Shakes­
peare’s presentation of ghosts and witches in whose speeches there is 
“something so wild and yet so solemn
[...] that we cannot forbear thinking them natural, tho’ we have no Rule by which 
to judge of them, and must confess, if there are such Beings in the World, it looks 
highly probable they should talk and act as he has represented them.”1“1
What is at stake seems to be simply the danger of taking the unreal for the 
real. In the regulated ‘classical’ world what cannot be regulated and explained, 
plainly displayed in a table, has the status of nonexistence whose affirming 
comes dangerously close to madness. In the classical age, Foucault notices, 
madness does not designate
11 Ibid., p. 214.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., pp. 215 216.
14 Ibid., p. 215.
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so much a specific change in the mind or in the body, as the existence, under the 
body’s alterations, under the oddity of conduct and conversation, of a delirious 
discourse.15
Delirium becomes thus a key to the definition of classical madness as an 
articulation of something which from the position of the discourse of reason 
does not exist. In this sense it is also a transgression, a withdrawal outside the 
tabulated space of the properly present to the sphere of a certain absence or 
nothingness, as Foucault puts it, whose paradox consists in the fact that in 
order to manifest itself as madness this “nothing” must be capable of 
reappearing within the order of reason. The movement away from the path of 
reason is already coded in the word delirium which, according to Robert James 
(an eighteenth-century physician whom Foucault quotes in his book), “is 
derived from lira, a furrow; so that deliro actually means to move out of the 
furrow, away from the proper path of reason.”16
Addison’s criticism of the poetic production of “supernatural” beings is 
grounded upon the possibility of producing a belief that ghosts and fairies 
might be granted some reality within a different order of things. Imagination 
can be innocent of unreason in Addison only if it does not openly and 
explicitly claim its own reality and truth, it must be rooted in the real which, 
for Addison, seems to be synonymous with the natural. Monstrosity is still an 
object of our admiration because it is an example of something unusual and 
uncommon in nature and it is this strangeness that “bestows Charms on 
a Monster, and makes even the Imperfections of Nature please us.”17 The 
admiration of something which has no links with nature, which is neither 
nature nor its representation, is dangerously close to malady or madness. 
In The Spectator, No. 44 Addison admits that “there is nothing which delights 
and terrifies our English Theatre so much as a Ghost, especially when he 
appears in a bloody Shirt,”18 ascribing later this penchant for the supernatural 
to the fact that
the English are naturally Fanciful, and very often disposed by that gloominess and 
Melanchoily of Temper, which is so frequent in our Nation, to many wild Notions 
and Visions, to which others are so liable.19
15 M. Foucault, Madness and Civilization. A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, trans. 
R. Howard (New York: Vintage Books 1973), p. 99.
16 Quoted in M. Foucault, Madness..., pp. 99—100.
17 Addison and Steele. Selections..., p. 210.
18 Ibid., p. 91.
19 Ibid., p. 215.
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It is, as it seems, another way of saying that at least a part of the English 
people, those endowed with the “Vulgar” kind of imagination,20 those who are 
not capable of receiving pleasure offered by nature, have gone mad (the idea 
which Pope much less politely explores in The Dunciad).
“Madness,” according to Michel Foucault, “will begin only in the act 
which gives the value of truth to the image. [...] Madness is thus beyond 
imagination, and yet it is profoundly rooted in it; for it consists merely in 
allowing the image a spontaneous value, total and absolute truth.”21 In 
Addison’s reading, admiration of ghosts and spirits is productive of the 
spheres which are severed from the natural world but still endowed with some 
reality. In The Spectator, No. 215 he asks the following question, or at least, 
writes a sentence which ends with a question mark:
We are pleased with surveying the different Habits and Behaviours of Foreign 
Countries, how much more must we be delighted and surprised when we are lead, 
as it were, into a new Creation, and see the Persons and Manners of another 
Species?22
In other words, Addison seems to be asking here if it is possible to have an 
access to another world populated by “another species” in the way one can 
travel and admire other, mundane, countries. If so, then the pleasures of 
visiting the alternative worlds should be even greater. If one (unlike “men of 
cold fancies and Philosophical Dispositions” who object to this kind of poetry) 
argues that “there are many intellectual Beings in the World besides ourselves, 
and several species of spirits,”23 the pleasures he gains by admiring their 
images is but a delusion.
There is one more aspect to this possibility of there being another natural 
world besides the real one. This possibility actually makes the already 
mentioned province of “the whole Circle of Nature” confined and limited to its 
own species thus making it finite and restrained by itself. Things strange and 
uncommon can be simply classified as belonging to another species, equally 
confined to their own world, and thus domesticated and, as it were, naturalized 
in it. Then, there would be nothing uncommon within the uncommon and the 
really sublime pleasures of imagination would be, in fact, unthinkable. There 
would be no space for infinity in such a world and the eye of the beholder 
would perceive already classified objects none of which could in fact be strange 
or surprising.
20 Cf. ibid., p. 207.
21 M. Foucault, Madness..., p. 94.
22 Addison and... (R. J. Alien, ed.), p. 215.
23 Ibid., p. 214.
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Paradoxically, however, the very notion of the “whole Circle of Nature” 
has some sort of confinement inscribed within it. Nature is total, complete 
and, in fact “methodiz’d,” as Pope would have it, by the rules governing 
geometry. Nature is thus available to both observation and speculation. 
As regards observation, pleasures of imagination which arise from “the actual 
View and Survey [...] all proceed from the Sight of what is Great, Uncommon, 
or Beautiful.”24 Spheres of infinity do not quite belong to the observable 
categories in Addison because the latter must always be whole and complete.
By Greatness, Ido not only mean the Bulk of any single Object, but the Largeness of 
a whole View, considered as one entire Piece. Such are the Prospects of an open 
Champian Country, a vast uncultivated Desert, of huge Heaps of Mountains, high 
Rocks and precipices, or a wide Expanse of Waters [...] Our imagination loves to be 
filled with an object, or to grasp at any thing that is too big for its capacity. We are 
Hung into a pleasing astonishment at such unbounded [italics added] views, and feel 
a delightful Stillness and Amazement in the soul at the Apprehension of them.25 26
The idea of an unbounded whole is obviously paradoxical, and Addison’s 
greatness which amazes is the greatness of an enlarged whole, a whole which is 
somehow contained within itself and yet capable of expanding. Addison’s 
gesture of the erasure of the alternative “orders” of things is the gesture 
which is necessary in order to establish an ontological security of position 
(R.D. Laing’s term), a position from which whatever is perceived is on­
tologically real and thus epistemologically available to human understanding. 
A whole which has no limits, which is unbounded cannot be an entity, an 
object but it is rhetorically presented as an entity in order to secure the 
substantiality of the perceived world, its integrity and presence. “To the 
eighteenth century,” says Georges Poulet,
[...] existence seems constantly being saved from nonbeing. [...] The preservation of 
the universe and of the creature no longer is directly conceived as the immediate 
effect of the creative action. The latter is relegated to a remote past.24
If the belief in real existence of other worlds is madness, a belief in 
nonexistence, then it is necessary to save the being of the world as an infinity, 
a boundless, but still natural, entity whose exploration by human reason is 
thinkable despite its “vasteness.” The eighteenth-century world is “constantly 
being saved” because, once created, it might go mad, and thus become 
nonexistent for us as reality, a suspicion which was the central mechanism of 
Descartes’ fear. The complete separation of madness from reason, and thus 
24 Ibid., p. 209.
25 Ibid.
26 G. Poulet, Studies (London 1967), p. 19.
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also the institutional exclusion of madness in the classical age, is a necessary 
defensive gesture which saves the ontological of the world’s existence. Addison 
achieves this separation by presenting the world as both whole and infinite, as 
a space in which there is simply no room for unreason because the very idea of 
something whole and infinite is the geometrical idea of “Pascal’s fearful 
sphere,” as Borges phrased it, whose centre is everywhere and circumference 
nowhere. Yet the struggle cannot be thus simply ended, because the paradox of 
the fear of delirious madness is that we can never be certain whether the 
reasonable is not, in fact, its own adversary. “What characterizes madness,” 
writes Shoshana Felman, “is thus not simply blindness, but a blindness blind 
to itself, to the point of necessarily entailing an illusion of reason."2’’
Things which necessitate a reasonable approach to and an explanation of 
the sublime, things which are great, uncommon, or beautiful do have a space 
in the boundlessly whole world and their labelling as strange or uncommon is 
a result of the inadequacy of our epistemological tools. A theorization of the 
sublime is thus a necessary step whose task is, paradoxically, a desublimation 
of the sublime, the domestication of the uncommon, putting the uncommon 
within the tabulated space of the classical classes and categories. This is made 
quite plain, as we shall see, in Burke’s Enquiry, but it is also in quite an 
interesting way, hidden in Addison’s essays.
One of Addison’s overt claims is that human mind does not really like 
enclosures, restrictions or any other kinds of confinement:
The Mind of Man naturally hates every thing that looks like Restraint upon it, and 
is apt to fancy it self under a sort of Confinement, when the Sight is pent up in 
a narrow Compass, and shortened on every side by the neighbourhood of Walls and 
Mountains. On the contrary, a spacious Horizon is an Image of Liberty, where the 
Eye has Room to range abroad, to expatiate at large in the Immensity of its Views, 
and lose it self amidst the Variety of Objects that offer themselves to its 
Observations.27 8
Ranging abroad is thus a natural tendency of both human mind and eye. 
Going outside certain limits or borders, transgressing them, is an expression of 
human drive to liberty. Though Addison seems to be talking about landscape, 
a certain economy seems to be at stake here as well. The unbounded circle of 
natural constitutes a certain domain of man, a space which is properly human 
although amazingly great or immense. The perceived objects “offer themsel­
ves” to the eye of the beholder as yet strange and not domesticated (for this 
reason the eye loses itself), but the idea of their being already subjected 
27 S. Felman, Writing and Madness (LiteraturelPhilosophylPsychoanalysis) (Ithaca and New 
York: Cornell University Press 1985), p. 36.
28 Addison and... (R.J. Allen, ed.), p. 209.
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to human gaze is already inscribed in the word “offer.” One might actually 
suspect that the pleasures of human imagination consist here in the promise of 
eventual satisfaction of one’s desire not so much to be free, as to eventually 
organize the vast, unfamiliar space one is facing.
Moreover, as I have mentioned earlier, the real pleasures of imagination 
can be experienced only by those whose minds are already elevated enough to 
be able to conceive of them. The vulgar ones, those minds which are incapable 
of admiring what is really natural, must do with ghosts and spirits. The spheres 
of the infinite are not accessible to everyone, and Addison seems to be quite 
plain as regards this:
A Man of a Polite Imagination is let into a great many Pleasures, that the Vulgar 
are not capable of receiving. He can converse with a picture, and find an agreeable 
Companion in a Statue. He meets with a secret Refreshment in a Description, 
and often feels a greater Satisfaction in the Prospect of Fields and Meadows, than 
another does in the Possession. It gives him, indeed, a kind of Property in every 
thing he sees, and makes the most rude uncultivated Parts of Nature administer to 
his pleasures.29
There seems to be no difference for Addison between “receiving” and 
“perceiving” and there is quite evidently some link between Addison’s 
economy and epistemology. “Polite Imagination” only receives more, it 
does not take anything. Just as in the previous fragment, though the word is 
not mentioned, pleasures hidden in things “offer” themselves to the polite 
imagination rather than to the vulgar kind of fancy. The pleasures are 
quite explicitly compared to the pleasure of possessing here, and one endowed 
with the polite imagination (mentally) possesses more, because he possesses 
such things as are without any properties of property to the vulgar eye. The 
situation is similar to that of Gonzalo who desires to possess Prospero’s 
island (on which others see nothing to possess) and become its ruler 
simultaneously declaring that there would be no rulers in his dominion. 
Even the most uncultivated parts of nature show some tendency to be 
already “cultural” and actually want some administration on the part of the 
more polite pleasures. This kind of “propriation” by the polite imagination is 
rhetorically rendered as disinterested — disinterested because mental and 
aesthetic rather than economic and political. Polite imagination gives one the 
ability to look “upon the World, as it were, in'another Light” and to discover 
“in it a Multitude of Charms, that conceal themselves from the generality of 
Mankind.”30
29 Ibid., p. 207.
30 Ibid.
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Daniel Cottom reads the remaining minority of mankind as aristocracy. 
What is at stake in the postulate of objective observation of things, he 
observes, and of seeing in them the properties others do not see, is the disguise 
of the realities of social organization
in the form of a mental principle. That is to say, the claim of disinterest is only made 
possible because those objects which are regarded by the Spectator can be said to 
already belong to him, in spirit if not in actuality.31
Putting it very bluntly, there are those who are more sublimated and see 
more, and those who see less — the vulgar. Moreover, those who see more, 
see the world disinterestedly, “with no petty desires which might taint 
their judgement,”32 and thus can be those who are naturally disposed to 
guide others. The possession of the deeper insight into nature is in a sense an 
“involuntary possession” (Cottom’s term) of things which naturally offer 
themselves to those endowed with the second nature, with the nature which is 
as it were inherited. This second nature is, for Rousseau, the first, original 
nature which has somehow been forgotten, obscured and repressed by 
custom:
The more we distance ourselves from the slate of nature, the more we lose our 
natural tastes; or rather habit makes us a second nature which we substitute for the 
first to such an extent that no one knows that first nature anymore.33 34
The “no one” Rousseau is talking about is, of course, not the “we” that sees 
how “our natural tastes” are lost, the fact which posits Rousseau as a person 
capable of educating Emile, of teaching him naturally to see something 
which, provided he is endowed with the capability of seeing it, he will naturally 
see anyway, like Rousseau. Hence the paradox of the idea of education. 
Since the knowledge of nature is the matter of possessing the primary, natural 
tastes rather than the matter of work, then education, Daniel Cottom notices, 
“must be brought to the point of artlessness just as art must be refined to the 
point where it appears so natural that it aids in discovering the art of 
nature.”3*
Addison’s ability to see the world “in another light” is also a natural, 
innocent (i.e. disinterested) pleasure restricted to those “but very few who 
31 D. Cottom, “Taste and the Civilized Imagination,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, XXXIX/4 (1981 Summer), p. 371.
32 Ibid.
33 J.-J. Rousseau, Emile, Oeuvres completes (Paris 1919), 4: 407—408, quoted m D. Cottom, 
“Taste and...," p. 379.
34 D. Cottom, “Taste and...,” p. 373.
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know how to be idle and innocent.”35 Such pleasures of imagination are 
experienced without any labour or effort, they are actually “awakened”36 
and, compared to the pleasures of understanding, they are actually even 
healthier:
We might here add, that the Pleasures of the Fancy are more conductive to 
Health, than those of the Understanding, which are worked out by Dint of 
Thinking, and attended with too violent a Labour of the Brain. Delightful scenes 
[...] not only serve to clear and brighten the Imagination, but are able to disperse 
Grief and Melancholy, and to set the Animal Spirits in pleasing and agreeable 
Motions.37
What is great, uncommon, or beautiful brings the human mind to a state of 
mental equilibrium and purifies it of everything that might be spoilt by the 
common labour of the brain, by habit or superstition. An affinity with 
Aristotle’s notion of kâtharsis as a method of curing madness and melancholy 
by means of purgatives seems to be discernible here.38 In the light of Addison’s 
clear-cut distinction between the polite and the vulgar kinds of imagination, 
those who perceive the world in the vulgar manner are generally unhealthy, 
and incurably so, because they are not capable of elevating their imagination 
and feel liberated at the apprehension of “Unbounded views” and other 
charms concealed from “the generality of Mankind.” Yet Addison’s notorious 
use of “we” works to the effect that the whole society and the generalized 
human nature are at stake here. What might be now termed the sphere of the 
aesthetic is thus presented as a sphere which is conductive to healthy existence, 
both of the body and that of the mind. This sphere as the sphere where the 
mind, at least momentarily, is liberated from everything that restrains it is 
actually also a threatening sphere in which the possibility of one’s total 
dispersion in unrestrained liberty is inscribed. One can purify oneself only to 
a degree which is pleasing and agreeable. For this reason there must exist 
a sphere of transgression, the liberating sphere of the spacious prospects and 
horizons, but, simultaneously, just as the idea of an unbounded whole, it must 
be somehow totalized and thus confined. The lack of such a sphere would 
deprive us of the possibility of purifying ourselves, of “brightening our 
imagination,” it would be a state of constant, unhealthy mental constipation 
without the possibility, or even space, for release. Addison, of course, does 
not use the term “constipation” in this respect, but the more ambiguous 
35 Addison and... (R. J. Allen, ed.)., pp. 207—208.
3<s Cf. ibid., p. 208.
37 Ibid.
38 Cf. H. Podbielski, Introduction to: Arystoteles, Poetyka (Wroclaw: Ossolineum 1983), 
p. lxiv.
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word “satiety” which brings to mind both fullness and negative excess, 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction at the same time:
We are indeed so often conversant with one Set of Objects, and tired out with so 
many repeated Shows of the same Things, that whatever is new or uncommon 
contributes a little to vary human Life, and to divert out Minds, for a while, with 
the Strangeness of its Appearance: it serves us for a Kind of Refreshment, and takes 
off from that Satiety we are apt to complain of in our usual and ordinary 
Entertainments.39
Human life, both social and individual, as it seems, is thus organized upon 
two planes which are actually one; the plane of ordinary, repeated shows, 
and the relieving or liberating plane of the new and the uncommon. The 
liberating plane, which is quite evidently the sphere of the aesthetic, is the 
sphere which rhetorically inscribes freedom within the individuals who 
otherwise are bound to repeat one and the same lowly necessities. Where there 
is no room for freedom, there is no room for the free individual, but since 
this individual has to freely participate in the social bond, those freedoms 
must be somehow bounded as well. Hence the necessity of an unconfined 
confinement of sorts; unconfined because productive of freedom, and confined 
for two reasons — as to restrict the freedom to the “demands” of the society 
so as it does not disperse in anarchy, and as to keep the already discussed 
realms of ghost and spirits as products of ill imagination away from the 
epistemologically safe sphere of reason which, paradoxically, must be presen­
ted as unconfined and natural because within the idea of the limit or border 
there is quite reasonably inscribed the possibility of the existence of different 
realms and spheres. Addison does not deny the necessity of common, repeated, 
ordinary actions dictated by custom and law (which he anyway somehow 
elevates to “entertainments”) which are overtly restricted and restrictive and 
are thus felt as “satiety” which is necessary to biological existence but which is 
also something we desire to relieve. This sphere can be controlled by the 
restrictive apparatus of both the law and the “court of reason” which, 
classifying, also restricts. Since the human mind, as we have seen, “naturally 
hates” restrictions, this unnatural necessity is extended (and thus as it were 
naturalized) in Addison to the aesthetic, unrestricted pleasures of imagination 
which freely liberate us “for a while,” and contribute “a little” to vary our 
life. The questions “for how long” and “to what extent” becomes thus 
the key question to be answered, and the question which cannot be actually 
answered, by the eighteenth-century philosophers of the mind; the question 
which leads Hume, for instance, to “an abysmal plunge into scepticism,” 
39 Ibid., p. 412.
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as Terry Eagleton phrases it.40 The question must be answered because, if left 
unrestricted, the duration and scope of the pleasure of freedom would 
dismantle the social system and translate it into a “libidinal” drive leading 
towards self-destruction. The question cannot be answered, however, because 
such an answer would necessarily have to be restrictive, it would have to 
impose a limit upon our pleasures and thus deny the liberty necessary for the 
existence of the very idea of the social contract of which the notion of the 
already mentioned oxymoron of “free bondage” is constitutive and of which, 
according to Eagleton, “the aesthetic is a vital symbol.”41
Though Addison’s essays on the pleasures of the imagination do not 
present any explicit vision of state or society it is exactly this foregrounding of 
the aesthetic which “politicizes” his text. The aesthetic is posited as the sphere 
where some natural form of social coexistence is thinkable. In order to live 
naturally in the state with no restrictions which one naturally hates one has to 
restrict oneself to those pleasures which are not excessive:
A Man should endeavour, therefore, to make the Sphere of his innocent Pleasures as 
wide as possible, that he may retire into them with Safety, and find in them such 
a Satisfaction as a wise Man would not blush to take.42
Addison offers us a sphere of retirement from the restrictions of reason 
as an extension, as a territory which leaves the realm of reason intact but 
whose very necessity renders it as insufficient. Though in the previously 
quoted fragment he uses the phrases “a little” and for “a while,” here we learn 
that the sphere of pleasures should be as wide as possible but not boundless 
because restricted to those pleasures which are “innocent,” to the pleasures 
which can be morally judged as virtuous. Here Addison touches once again 
upon the question of the compatibility of individual, subjective, and diversified 
opinions and tastes and the demands of reason whose working is rooted in 
homogeneity and stability of categories. Enslaved by reason one has to purify 
oneself of it by means of some vagaries of innocent pleasures which cannot be 
confined to some stable, empirically measurable categories. Yet the pleasures 
must remain innocent and virtuous and the measurement of whether they are 
excessive or not offered by Addison does not come from any reasonable 
explanations or philosophical speculation but it comes from the body as 
a blush, as a natural, bodily reaction which by itself informs one that he has 
transgressed. It is our sensibility alone which is capable of withholding our 
desire, of distinguishing between innocence and vice, of actually making us 
pure from both the displeasing confines of reason and the tempting huge 
40 T. Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1990), p. 47.
41 Ibid., p. 56.
42 Addison and... (RJ. Allen, ed.), p. 208.
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spaces of infinite, pleasurable prospects which simultaneously terrify us, also 
naturally, and thus also warn us that infinity is not the proper, naturally 
proper, sphere of man.
Terry Eagleton suggests that the British eighteenth-century moralists 
celebrate ‘moral sense’ as a category which “allows us to experience right 
and wrong with all the swiftness of the senses, and so lays the groundwork 
for a social cohesion more deeply felt than any mere rational totality. If the 
moral values which govern social life are as self-evident as the taste of peaches, 
a good deal of disruptive wrangling can be dispensed with.”43 Since reason, as 
Descartes proved, leads mainly to doubt and to an equally doubtful certainty 
of one’s existence in thinking then, granted that we exist, we should try to find 
the certainty as to other spheres of our life somewhere else, outside reason, 
without, of course, completely denying it. In addition to our reasonable 
certainty of being we must also be “beautiful” — agreeable, innocent, 
harmonious, good, virtuous — aesthetically ethical, as it were. Addison, of 
course, does not use the term aesthetics in his writings as the term was 
verbalized by Alexander Baumgarten in Aesthetica in 1750. Yet it is exactly the 
sphere of the later aesthetics in the sense of the whole sphere of human 
perceptions and sensations (aisthesis)44 that Addison seems to be suggesting as 
a region of our exploration.
The sphere of innocent pleasures with which he supplements the speculative 
ways of reason is rendered as the sphere of safety in the above fragment 
because security is alien to reason not only as a feeling, a sensation but also 
because the reasonable speculation is productive of such a kind of terror which 
can hardly be modified by any “positive” adjective of the type “pleasing.” 
A pleasing horror is pleasing exactly for the reason (though this last word 
seems to be quite wrong in this context) that it naturally warns us, like a blush, 
against any attempt at our full identification with a vast, great, novel or 
unusual prospect. Addison uses the adjective “pleasing” as an indirect modifier 
of “speculation” only in the case when he tries to compare the sphere of the 
imagination with the sphere of reason as regards infinity: “Such wide and 
undetermined Prospects are as Pleasing to the Fancy, as the Speculations of 
Eternity or Infinitude are to the Understanding.”45 This however seems to be 
a gesture enforced by the structure of the sentence rather than an attempt to 
endow reasonable understanding with the ability to feel. What seems to be 
at stake is that reason and understanding can be sources of pleasure only 
when looked upon as aesthetic objects in themselves, as some mental 
landscapes offered to the politely imaginative eye. Writing about those 
43 T. Eagleton, The Ideology..., p. 34.
44 Cf. ibid., p. 13.
45 Addison and... (R. J. Allen, ed.), pp. 209—210.
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writers who, unlike those who deal with poetry and fiction but are “obliged to 
follow Nature more closely” (historians, natural philosophers, travellers, 
geographers) Addison gives preference to those who do not reveal reality at 
a stroke but to those who keep us “in a pleasing Suspense.”46 In this case he is 
writing about a historian thus supplementing the demand of the factographic 
veracity of his writing with a demand for an aesthetic dimension of the 
historical text, with the demand to delay the revelation of truth for the sake of 
the pleasure of the imagination. Livy is given as an example of the historian 
who “excelled all who went before him” exactly for the reason that he 
“describes every thing in so lively a Manner, that his whole History is an 
admirable Picture.”47
Thus having aestheticized history Addison goes on to discussing the 
authors of “the New Philosophy,” whose writings also gratify and enlarge the 
imagination
whether we consider their Theories of the Earth or Heavens, the Discoveries they 
have made by Glasses, or any other Contemplations of Nature. We are not a little 
pleased to find every green Leaf swarm with Millions of Animals, that at their 
largest Growth are not visible to the naked Eye.48
The microscope is thus also a “macroscope” of sorts which in addition to its 
function of discovering things we cannot see, also serves as a device producing 
the aesthetic pleasure by opening up new visions of infinity, greatness and 
strangeness constitutive of the pleasing astonishment. The infinity as an idea 
rather than a great, boundless prospect, the infinity as a product of thinking 
and reason is unwelcome to the imaginative eye because it can by no means be 
rendered as a picture or an image.
The Understanding, indeed, opens an infinite Space on every side of us, but the 
imagination, after a few faint efforts, is immediately at a stand, and finds her self 
swallowed up in the Immensity of the Void that surrounds it: Our reason can pursue 
a Particle of Matter through an infinite variety of Divisions, but the Fancy soon 
loses sight of it, and feels in it self a kind of Chasm, that wants to be filled with 
Matter of a more sensible Bulk.49
What is striking in this fragment is the presentation of the imagination both as 
feminine (“finds her self’) and neuter (“in it self’)- Paraphrasing Nietzsche's 
idea of experience as the feminine, Terry Eagleton claims that while the 
German moral aestheticians, like Baumgarten, subject this “treacherous
46 Ibid., p. 216.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., p. 217.
49 Ibid., pp. 218 -219.
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terrain” (of the feminine) to reason, the “British moral sense thinkers follow 
a more liberal path: the feminine, in the form of pure intuition, is a surer 
guide to moral truth than the masculine cult of calculative reason.”50 Since 
such intuitions are in fact the necessary elements of our agreeable, social 
co-existence, they cannot be entirely left upon the treacherous terrain of the 
feminine and their link with the “masculine regime of Reason” must be 
retained though the intuitions themselves are “too sublime for rational 
decipherment. The feminine is thus no more than a passage or mode of 
access to the masculine regime of Reason, whose sway [...] remains largely 
unchallenged in most moral sense philosophy.”51
Addison’s, say, androgynous imagination is rendered as defective because 
it cannot cope with the immensity of the productions of reason. It is actually 
reason which is endowed with the potentiality of creating the sublime by itself, 
of opening vistas hardly penetrable to the imagination. Infinity is not sensibly 
perceptible and in contact with the conceptual infinity there arise two kinds of 
nothingness in Addison: the void into which imagination plunges, by which it 
is “swallowed up,” and the chasm which it feels within itself and which results 
from the loss of sight, from the inability to sensually perceive. The feminine as 
a passage to the reasonable Eagleton talks about seems to be interrupted in 
Addison, though there is a promise of the gap’s being filled with some sort of 
sensibility which would enable the contact. The chasm within the imagination 
actually “wants” to be filled with sensibility and this natural want, probably 
the only feeling which the imagination transformed into a gaping chasm is 
capable of feeling, is the possibility of the eventual reconciliation of reason 
with sensibility. The sublime as the infinite and unbounded is thus relegated to 
the sphere of reason and the imperfect imagination quite literally lags behind 
it. Interestingly, Addison hypothesizes that it is not the spiritual constitution of 
man that is responsible for the imperfection of imagination but its “con­
junction with the Body”:
It is possible this Defect of Imagination may not be in the Soul it self, but as 
it acts in Conjunction with the Body. Perhaps there may not be room enough in the 
Brain for such a variety of Impressions, or the Animal Spirits may be incapable of 
figuring them in such a manner, as is necessary to excite so very large or very minute 
Ideas.52
The imperfections of human body are thus, probably, the obstacle on the way 
to reconciliation of reason with imagination which resides within the otherwise 
perfect soul. Without the obstructive intervention of the body both spheres 
50 T. Eagleton, The Ideology..., p. 49.
51 Ibid.
52 Addison and..., (R. J. Allen, ed.), p. 219.
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are perfect and capable of harmonious coexistence. The body confines human 
mind to the narrow capacity of its brain, though it cannot confine the feeling 
of the natural “want” of unconfinement. What is left to us constitutes 
a predicament which has to contradict Addison’s dislike for supernatural 
creatures because the perfection can only be achieved outside the body, 
without the body’s mediation, or the body has to grow large enough as to be 
able to be filled with infinity. This, while being impossible in this world, might 
be possible in another:
[...] we may well suppose that Beings of a higher Nature very much excel us in this 
respect, as it is probable the Soul of Man will be infinitely more perfect hereafter in 
this Faculty, as well as in all the rest; insomuch that, perhaps, the Imagination will 
be able to keep Pace with the Understanding, and form in it self distinct Ideas of all 
the different Modes and Quantities of Space.53
In order that our sensibility keeps pace with the prospects offered us by reason 
we have to elevate ourselves to another level of existence outside or beyond the 
body. Only then can the ideas of infinity harmoniously coexist with our 
imagination. Or, perhaps, not so much coexist as become identical. The 
sublime feeling of delightful horror we experience in the face of great and 
uncommon things is but a hint, a symptom of the pleasures which will not be 
horrible at all once we have become souls or angels, for instance. Confined by 
the imperfection of our bodies we are bound to be restrained despite our 
natural compulsion to transgress, despite our natural hatred of restraint 
discussed above. Or, like Clarissa Harlowe, we have to open ourselves up to 
infinity and die in order to get married with the true order of things, constantly 
writing letters denouncing this world on our own coffin used as a desk. For the 
living, the sublime is always away, elsewhere, in the sphere of sensibility 
inaccessible to senses, to souls. The sublime, hardly mentioned in Addison, let 
us repeat, is, in Addison, yet another sphere of ghosts and spirits, the sphere 
“of a higher Nature” which is both life and death, of a present-absence which 
is, however paradoxically, the only sphere where reason can meet imagination 
in Addison. The sublime turns out to be the inaccessible sphere of divinity, the 
sphere which only testifies to the infinite grandeur of the Maker whom we 
cannot face, whom we cannot communicate with, but whose nature is glimpsed 
at in the spheres of infinity and in the very idea of the infinity which elevates 
the mind but which simultaneously stops it in its working, binds the mind to its 
own limitations. Living within the confines of the body and of the society we 
are bound to bound all unbounded wholes and live with the beautiful rather 
than with the sublime because beauty, despite the obstructive work of the 
body, has a direct access to our souls:
53 Ibid.
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But there is nothing that makes its way more directly to the Soul than Beauty, 
which immediately diffuses a secret Satisfaction and Complacency through the 
Imagination, and gives a Finishing to any thing that is Great and Uncommon.54
Beauty is thus a finished infinity of sorts, a diminished Greatness and the 
Uncommon made common, social, agreeable, acceptable to everybody. Things 
great and uncommon are not beautiful in themselves, but they provide the 
ground for the existence of the beautiful as an object of shared, common 
admiration which consists in “finishing,” in this faculty of our imagination 
which is free to “give a finishing” wherever it pleases provided that it gives the 
finishing. The “where” is of course the sphere of the individual freedom, the 
sphere of aesthetics, of tastes, pleasures and agreeable agreements; the sensual 
sphere explored by the moral sense philosophers (like Hume, Smith, or Burke) 
as the sphere of exchange of feelings and sympathies which “give a Finishing” 
to the society of free individuals so as it does not fall to pieces.
54 Ibid., p. 211.
3 Approaches of Infinity...
Ill
The Lesson of Feeling
(On “Man a Machine” and the Dilemmas 
of Hum(e)an Nature)
In short, for an action to be “moral,” it must not be 
reducible to an act or a series of acts conforming to 
a rule, a law, or a value. Of course all moral action 
involves a relationship with reality in which it is carried 
out, and a relationship with the self. The latter is not 
simply “self-awarenes” but self-formation as an “ethical 
subject,” a process in which the individual delimits that 
part of himself that will form the object of his moral 
practice, defines his position relative to the percept he 
will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that 
will serve as his moral goal.
Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure
“We were not originally made to be learned”; says La Mettrie in his Man 
a Machine (1747), and
we have become so perhaps by a sort of abuse of our organic faculties, and at the 
expense of the State, which nourishes a host of loafers whom vanity has adorned 
with the name of “philosophers.” Nature created us all solely to be happy — yes, all, 
from the crawling worm to the eagle that soars out of sight in the clouds. That is 
why she has given all animals some share of natural law, a share of greater or less 
delicacy according to the needs of each animal’s organs when in good condition.1 1
1 J.O. La Mettrie, “Man a Machine,” in Les philosophes, N.L. Torrey, ed. (New York: 
Capricorn Books 1980), p. 176.
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All creatures have thus their own pleasures which make them happy, from the 
lowliest worm to the most sublime and invisible eagles. There must thus also 
exist species of happiness appropriate for each of the natural species, with the 
important precaution, of course, that the creature is in good condition, that is 
to say, normal, and does not want to partake of the pleasures of others. 
Learning is, according to La Mettrie, not only a secondary, artificial product 
but actually a distortion of nature, a parasite upon the body of nature upon 
which philosophers feed and create systems supporting the existence of the 
institution of state. The natural laws in which we all have share are thus not 
theoretical constructs of human art and the only proof of their existence is 
feeling which the unphilosophical pen of La Mettrie identifies with law:
Now how shall we define nature' law? It is a reeling which teaches us what we should 
not do, because we would not wish it to be done to us?
It thus turns out that a dint of learning is a natural thing though the teacher is 
not a reasonable philosopher, for instance, but, rather, some feeling of 
discomfort as regards ourselves. Rousseau’s natural teacher of Emile and “La 
plus sublime vertu” of not doing harm to others quite evidently reverberates in 
La Mettrie. Feeling is not a forbearing kind of teacher because his activity 
consists mainly in threatening us from doing wrong things by positing them as 
wrong to ourselves. We are thus naturally both egoistic and egocentric, as it is 
only for our own pleasure and comfort that we are good to others, and it is for 
the constant fear of the loss of that comfort that the society can naturally 
function. “Would I dare add,” La Mettrie goes on, “[...] that this feeling seems 
to me but a kind of fear or dread, as salutary to the race as to the individual?” 
He, of course, dares and says that we love purses as well as lives of others 
“only to save our won possessions, our honor, and our own lives.”2 3
The lesson of feeling requires an aid of threat, some kind of presentation 
of unhappiness which, simultaneously, does not affect our happiness for 
which we have been made by nature. We exist only for pleasure, like Freud’s 
babies, and philosophical and theological speculations are products which 
cheat us with the delusion of finding some reason for human existence. 
We exist “like mushrooms that appear from one day to the next” and “who 
knows whether the reason for man’s existence is not simply the fact that he 
exists?”4 Reason is also a part of our nature but it has become denaturalized 
in the hands of philosophers who have created a separate world of reason 
and via institutionalization and education imposed upon us various systems 
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. 177.
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only in order to make us blind to the fact that we exist only in order to exist. 
Relying on reason alone is misleading because reason is productive of 
abstractions which have little to do with one’s natural feelings. La Mettrie’s 
ideas are not abstract, and the way he achieved his nonphilosophical system 
(which is not a system but truth alone: “Such is my system, or rather the 
truth”) was by uniting thought and feeling, reason and senses, by naturalizing 
reason, so to speak, bringing it back to the body. His work, probably Man 
a Machine,
is not the work of prejudice, nor even of reason alone; I would have disdained 
a guide which I believe so untrustworthy, had not my senses held the torch, so to 
speak, and induced me to follow reason by lighting the way. Experience has thus 
spoken to me in behalf of reason; and in this way I have combined the two.’
Reason, if it is to be of any use, must be dark and silent, and the light and 
voice of truth come from the feeling body, from experience. In other words, the 
idea of natural law is not an idea as a product of reason but a formulation 
dictated by the sensual experience of that law. Since that law is governed by the 
fear of the loss of happiness, it must have been fear that taught La Mettrie 
what he should not do, be a philosopher, for instance, because philosophy 
harms by imposing unnatural, and hence unwelcome laws which direct and 
restrict our happiness.
The paradox seems to be that fear itself is not, I think, a pleasurable kind 
of feeling. In La Mettrie fear is, as it were, a constitutive outside of happiness 
which, in turn, without that fear, is a reduction to a mushroom, to existence in 
order to exists. On the other hand, fear is salutary to existence as a source of 
human activity for the preservation of happiness. Being happy actually 
consists in being afraid, in feeling fear and simultaneously keeping it away as 
not ours. In order that we are happy, there must exist some realm of 
unhappiness, of threat or danger, of theft, robbery and death. La Mettrie 
actually reads life and possessions as one and the same kind of happiness and 
thus posits death as a thief of life who lurks in the dark and forces us to be 
watchful of ourselves, or live, against death — not kill in order not to be killed. 
The fearful sphere of natural law is thus rendered as actually alien to us, 
unexplorable to those whose natural compulsion for happiness makes them 
naturally feel what is wrong and naturally incapable of doing it. Fear is thus, 
say, pleasurable or agreeable as productive of happiness. We are thus naturally 
happy and institutionalization of that happiness denaturalizes the natural law 
by positing it outside man and actually verbalizing the sphere of the intuitive 
fear thus making it into a prohibited object present and open for exploration. *
5 Ibid.
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Natural fear of death restrains us from killing because the idea of killing is 
alien to the natural happiness of life. “Thou shalt not kill,” as a verbalized law, 
posits an external legislator and an artificial threat of punishment instead of 
the natural fear of death as the guiding principle of human conduct. All civil 
laws are constructs of reason alone, created without the torch of the actual 
feeling and thus propagating various arbitrary values defining the spheres of 
human happiness from the outside. Life governed by the civil law is quite 
different from that in which the natural law is followed, the former being 
a learned kind of life, and the latter natural, intimately felt, and thus real. The 
former is the life of the State, the latter is the life of man:
You see that natural law is nothing but an intimate reeling which belongs also to the 
imagination like all other feelings, thoughts included. Consequently it evidently does 
not presuppose education, revelation or legislator, unless we confuse it with civil 
laws, in the ridiculous fashion of the theologians.6
Man is thus a social creature in the way of a mushroom endowed with human 
feelings and he needs no teachers except himself to live and let live. Since'his 
thoughts are also feelings (natural thoughts, of course), such a man of feeling 
will naturally withdraw from the spheres alien to him and will choose only this 
share of natural law which is proper to him, to his organs. Feelings which are 
not intimate, all abstract thoughts and values imposed by social codes are 
objects naturally alien to men and a really natural creature should locate them 
in the sphere productive of fear or dread to be both avoided and never 
practised. La Mettrie also locates “a supreme being” in the abstract sphere 
alien to the sphere of happiness and says that God’s existence is “a theoretic 
truth with very little practical value.”7 All abstract ideas are alien to man and 
thus fearful and dangerous to him. They alienate man from man and 
traditional philosophy is something La Mettrie would not like to be done to 
him and what he himself does not do. It is through senses, through the body, 
through feelings which we find agreeable with ourselves that we can eventually 
understand our nature and not through abstract, metaphysical reasoning 
which, as not properly ours, as alien, is as fearful as pain, discomfort or death 
and which “can no more attain truth that frogs can fly.”8
What is thus implicitly hinted at in La Mettrie’s discourse is the idea of the 
truth of human nature as a secure totality of body and soul (like Blake, he 
accuses the philosophers like Descartes of recognizing and separating two 
distinct substances of body and soul in man) whose identity is confined to the 
coherent and ‘cohering’ individual feeling of security trough the rejection 
6 Ibid., p. 176.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p. 169.
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of fear which negatively teaches us what is our nature, which teaches us our 
natural happiness. The natural law, the natural order, is actually inscribed 
within us as some fear-sensitive organ which warns us against the approaches 
of the Other. Hence the demand for the normal functioning of our senses. We 
all fear different things and find them disagreeable, but these differences are 
due to some bodily deficiencies which obstruct our imagination9, and due to 
our ability to speak, to use language, which subjected us to its own rhetorical 
productions which we now take for the natural state of being.
Words, languages, laws, sciences, and the fine arts, have come, and by them our 
rough diamond of a mind has been polished. Man has become trained in the same 
way as animals; he has become an author, as they become beasts of burden.10 11
The polished diamond of our minds might be artful, or even beautiful from the 
point of view of a thus polished, or educated man, but it is by no means 
natural. Through language we have become authors, slaves to linguistic 
constructions which constitute our contemporary knowledge which “blows 
up the balloon-like brains of our proud pedants” and which, for this reason, 
“is therefore a huge mass of words and figures.”11
La Mettrie’s natural fear makes him abhor all intellectual constructs as 
contrary to nature and the natural happiness which he propagates. The sphere 
of aesthetics, of the polished diamonds, is the through and through artificial 
sphere of what is in fact chaos and disorder, a “huge mass of words and 
figures,” of abstract concepts which do not partake in what he calls happiness. 
We have been enslaved by that chaos while the only real order is that of 
natural laws and natural fears. It is thus only through experiencing, or 
practicing, nature that we can be happy, because only then is any kind of order 
available to us. He does not call that order beautiful since this word is already 
loaded with the negative connotations of polishing, but it is quite evidently 
opposed to the disorder of the order invented by the authors, by philosophers 
who create nothing but heaps of words about words, fearful landscapes of the 
mind which create other, alien, unnatural worlds, the sublime spheres of higher 
orders and higher beings, like God, of no practical value from the lowly point 
of view the natural being which knows which share of the natural law is proper 
to it.
It is thus impossible, and actually contradictory, to theorise the natural 
order without the distortion of philosophical abstractions. The “heap of 
words” constituting the body of Man a Machine is an object which cannot 
’ Cf. ibid., p. 172.
10 Ibid., p. 175.
11 Ibid.
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communicate any truiüs regardless of La Mettrie’s positive statement to the 
contrary (“Such is my system, or rather the truth”). Though didacticism is one 
of the things he abhors, his book actually teaches, though negatively, what is 
unnatural rather than states (an impossible thing in nature) what is natural. 
He thus writes as it were against the grain of his own nature and produces, or 
does, exactly what we (and he) “would not like to be done to us” and thus 
only negatively hints at there being some more agreeable possibility of being, 
an order whose order is natural, and hence probably different from what the 
artificial word “order” seems to be meaning.
La Mettrie’s programme could thus be rightly called that of desublimation. 
If for Addison, as we have seen, the abstract productions of reason were still 
a part of human nature promising a development of imagination which is as 
yet incapable of pursuing them, La Mettrie renders them as enslaving, blinding 
and in fact, naturally, nonexistent in the natural sphere of happiness in which 
feeling with an admixture of reason constitute man. There is nothing aesthetic 
in ‘man a machine,’ nothing divine or infinite from the perspective of human 
happiness reduced to the pleasure of secure being, of security in general, in 
whose constant learning by fear our life, both individual and social actually 
consists. La Mettrie himself, however, is not a didacticist, he only shows the 
truth without any attempt to show us, or tell us, how to create a new society of 
natural beings. He only lays bare our nature, leaving the discovery of the 
actual laws of nature to the natural machines about which we have forgotten 
how to be. Yet the idea of human sociability is implicitly marked in the very 
principle of the natural law in which it is the comfort of others that constitutes 
our own comfort.
This idea of an absolutely free individual living for his own pleasures which 
are the pleasures of others was in a peculiar way developed by William Godwin 
in his idea of new society based on the principle of self-love (see chapter VI) 
in which eventually everyone becomes a self-made eternity. La Mettrie’s 
sphere of sociability is the sphere of sensibility which, regardless of his 
criticism of rhetoricity, can only exist as an allegory of the society which he 
criticizes, an allegory of state and institutions without state and institutions, 
a theoretical construct whose actualization La Mettrie leaves to others, to 
other ourselves, but which is as equally verbal a construction as any other 
philosophical system he criticizes (“a huge mass of words and figures”). In the 
philosophers of feeling less sceptical as regards language than La Mettrie the 
sphere of interest seems to be quite similar to his, the difference being that the 
latter would use such terms as justice, state or law in a more positive sense thus 
suggesting a naturalization of the existing institutions rather than banning 
them as totally artificial and thus non-human.
It is exactly here, I think, that the necessity of such a notion as the sublime 
arises. In La Mettrie it exists only implicitly, just as the sphere of the natural 
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is also implicit in him. He does marry, as we have seen, thought and feeling, 
but he does so to the point where thought actually becomes feeling (“like all 
other feelings, thought included,” let us repeat) and where the purely 
speculative sphere is denied any status of usefulness as a sphere beyond (above 
or away from) the properly human world, and whose proper effect upon our 
normal senses should be that of fear — a version of terror which for Burke, 
the theoretician of the sublime, is, as we shall see, the feeling coming from, 
say, elsewhere. The philosophers who take some kind of social reality for 
granted will read the nature hypothesized by La Mettrie as an object which 
can be expanded or extended to human understanding, a possibility presup­
posed and simultaneously denied in La Mettrie in the very notion of “natural 
order” whose “orderly” part is either to remain unexplained thus reducing 
us to mushrooms (which, I think, does not necessarily have to be unpleasant 
or very untrue), or reasonably explained at the cost of the naturalness of 
being.
It is because of this oxymoronic paradox that Hume, for instance, will read 
the very hypothesis of the purely natural state of nature exactly the other way 
round, and will accuse natural philosophers (as opposed to moral philoso­
phers) of extending reason to the spheres of their own invention:
[...] philosophers may, if they please, extend their reasoning to the suppos’d state of 
nature-, provided they allow it to be a mere philosophical fiction, which never had, 
and never could have any reality.12
This notion of extension seems to be very important here. Extension entails 
a certain continuity, a prolongation in which some elements of the original 
form or object should be still discernible. Hume accuses natural philosophers 
of extending reasoning to the spheres which are discontinuous with reality, and 
thus endows the unreal with the possibility, however vain, of being explored by 
reason. Obviously not criticising La Mettrie (Treatise was published in 1740), 
Hume accuses natural philosophers of treating “affections and understanding” 
as two separable things simultaneously claiming that they are inseparable.13 In 
other words, like Mettrie, natural philosophers postulate that there is reason in 
nature (natural order) simultaneously claiming that this reason is of a different 
order, of the natural order unavailable to man. Though La Mettrie overtly 
claims that he has joined reason and living experience, he actually produces 
an unreal world of an equally unreal nature claiming that human reason 
actually distorts natural order and leads it astray. Hume’s demand of joining 
12 D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 
1981), p. 493.
13 Cf. ibid., p. 493.
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affection and understanding is literally the same as that of La Mettrie, though 
it is the extension, the movement of affections that he, unlike La Mettrie, 
seems to be criticizing:
Human nature being compos’d of two principal parts, which are requisite in all its 
actions, the affections and understanding; ‘tis certain, that the blind motions of the 
former, without the direction of the latter, incapacitate men for society.14
Affections alone are thus blind drives comparable to Freud’s subconscious and 
the nature propagated by the natural philosophers, even if it were not a fiction, 
would be but a chaotic movement of matter to no point, without a direction. 
Hence the necessity of pointing the direction by understanding which gives 
sight to the affections and thus makes man a social being who, moreover, sees 
himself as such. The “state of nature, therefore,” Hume repeats, “is to be 
regarded as a mere fiction”15 because nature without understanding is simply 
incapable of producing any “state” or to remain within any stable “state” 
without the guidance which shows it where to go. The phrase “state of nature” 
itself is thus a mere oxymoron which only contradicts itself. Hence the 
necessity of extending nature to reason, of inscribing nature within the 
understanding, a gesture exactly opposite to that of La Mettrie, but productive 
of very similar oxymoronic constructions. Nature becomes inscribed within the 
very idea of state and the “production” of “states” becomes a natural activity, 
be they states of mind or political states. It is for this reason that Hume can 
talk about “The natural obligation to justice”16 without seeing that natural 
justice is also an oxymoron because it is justice on which the state is now 
naturally based. Our subjection to the law is thus a natural gesture of 
submission to the natural law of the state which in turn is based on the notion 
of property. In La Mettrie’s natural order of things theft of property is 
mentioned as a source of displeasure and fear but already on the level of the 
political organization of the society which he simultaneously condemns as 
unnatural, and it is, as I have said, contradictory to his writing to positively 
state any particular natural laws without the risk of denaturalizing them. 
Hume, despite his relegation of the “state of nature” to the world of fiction 
does make an excursion to that world and finds a trace of property in 
somehow convoluted logic of the following statement:
[...] tho’ I assert, that in the state of nature, or that imaginary state, which preceded 
society, there be neither justice nor injustice, yet I assert not, that it was allowable, in 
such a state, to violate the property of others. I only maintain, that there was no 
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p. 498
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such thing as property; and consequently cou’d be no such thing as justice or 
injustice.17
Hume simply cannot imagine a nature without properties, without the 
property of property which it was perhaps forbidden to violate, though it did 
not exist. Having made nature an understandable thing, having extended 
nature to understanding, Hume’s understanding stops in its working (very 
much like Addison’s imagination) in the face of the sphere where nobody 
knows who is who and hence what is whose. There is no state without justice, 
and though there is no justice in the imaginary world of nature, there still must 
be a justice which prohibits violation of property. The extension of nature to 
understanding is thus a gesture which represses the existence of the unnatural, 
a gesture which naturalizes and legitimizes all human creation simultaneously 
making all “natural creation” available to understanding.
This naturalization of understanding seems to be the source of Hume’s 
dilemma concerning philosophy and, say, common life. The marriage of 
nature and understanding leads to the situation in which philosophical 
speculations, “the refined reasoning,” about nature lead to total skepticism as 
to the eventual explanation of nature and actually turn against themselves. 
Reasoning alone “entirely subverts itself, and leaves the lowest degree of 
evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life.”18 Yet the 
rejection of the refined reasoning is a contradiction because it is itself a maxim 
“built on the preceding reasoning” which is thus also contradictory. Hence 
Hume’s well known statement:
We have, therefore, no choice left but between a false reason and none at all. For 
my part, I know not what ought to be done in the present case. I can only observe 
what is commonly done; which is, that this difficulty is seldom or never thought of; 
and even where it has once been present to the mind, is quickly forgot, and leaves 
but a small impression behind it.19
Without reason we are left with nature alone, the fictitious nature of natural 
philosophers. Though Hume declares here that he does not know what should 
be done, he opts for false reason rather than for its absence because reasoning, 
however sceptical, is also a natural state of mind held in check by our natural 
dispositions, by passions and feelings. Philosophical speculations do not 
produce any final resolutions, do not explain the world, they actually “leave 
but small impressions” on us, but neither do breathing or eating leave any 
greater impressions. Reason is an extended nature which “by an absolute 
17 Ibid., p. 501.
18 Ibid., p. 267.
19 Ibid., p. 268.
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and uncontrollable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe 
and feel.”20 Reasoning is thus rendered as a bodily function similar to that of 
eating and feeling, and it is for this reason that Hume gives the absolute power 
of control over reason to what he terms “passions,” to our mental dispositions, 
the dictates of our inner nature:
We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passions 
and reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never 
pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.21
It is thus not reason that reasons by itself and its only function is to follow the 
dictates of passions, of pleasures and desires which thus become the main 
current of sociability, “the very currency of society,” as John Mullan puts it.22 
Here he quotes Hume from Treatise: “The passions are so contagious, that 
they pass with the greatest facility from one person to another, and produce 
correspondent movements in all human breasts.”23 A Treatise of Human 
Nature is thus a treatise about human passions which cannot be controlled and 
explained by any treatise whose reasoning is naturally necessary and yet 
uncontrollable (see above). Hume’s Treatise is, as it were, the dictate of his 
human passions which he is obliged to judge because this compulsion to 
judgement, to ‘refined’ thinking is also a human passion.
The ambiguity of the title of Hume’s book does not seem to be 
a coincidence here. Since nature let us repeat, “by an absolute and uncon­
trollable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel,” 
it has also obliged everyone, every human nature to philosophize, to write or 
think treatises of their natures. If it were otherwise, then nature and passions 
would be under the rule of reason which could fully control and explain 
human nature to which it “should be” a slave.
This compulsion to philosophize is, however paradoxically, a compulsion 
to withdraw from philosophy at the same time, to return to “all the unthinking 
and unphilosophical kind of mankind, (that is, all of us, at one time or 
other).”24 This apparent contradiction is the result of Hume’s programmatic 
positive scepticism. We have to philosophize in order to remain sceptical, in 
order to be unphilosophical in the sense that we do not allow reason to 
dominate. “In all the incidents of life we ought still to preserve our scepticism,” 
says Hume, even if the “incident of life” is the feeling or passion to the refined 
20 Ibid., p. 183.
21 Ibid., p. 415.
22 J. Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability. The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1988), p. 23.
23 D. Hume, A Treatise..., p. 605.
24 Ibid., p. 205.
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reasoning and instruction of mankind, as he puts it. The naturalization of 
reason goes hand in hand with the naturalization of philosophy which is 
also a passion which heats Hume’s brain25 to the point of extreme scepticism 
at which he is ready “to reject all belief and reasoning” productive only of 
uncertainty and unanswerable questions.26 Yet he does not quite reject 
them because passion tells him that philosophizing is pleasurable, and thus 
natural.
Hume thus philosophizes for two contradictory reasons. First, philosophy 
(refined reasoning) is natural and pleasurable. This, he declares, is the origin of 
his philosophy:
These sentiments [to philosophize and instruct mankind] spring up naturally in my 
present disposition; and shou’d I endeavor to banish them, by attaching myself to 
/ any other business or diversion, I feel I shou’d be a loser in point of pleasure; and 
this is the origin of my philosophy.27
To abandon the sentiment to philosophize is thus rendered as contrary to 
Hume’s feeling of pleasure, and actually an act of acceptance of the 
dictatorship of reason. Second, philosophy itself is inconclusive and productive 
of confusion (“[sceptical arguments] admit of no answers and produce no 
conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and 
irresolution and confusion, which is the result of scepticism.”)28 from which 
the mind will naturally withdraw anyway back to the state of the natural 
exchange of passions and feelings, to the sphere of the common pleasures. 
Since reason itself is incapable of “dispelling these clouds,” the clouds of 
scepticism it itself produces, “nature herself suffices to that purpose, and 
cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium.”29 A philosopher 
who calls philosophy “melancholy and delirium” seems to be really away from 
the proper path, or furrow, of reason because what he suggests is that 
philosophy is a kind of madness. However, since Hume realizes that there is 
a dint of madness in philosophy, he himself is probably not properly mad. 
Simultaneously, as we have seen, he offers philosophizing as a sphere of some 
sophisticated feeling of pleasure, of passion which he will not completely 
renounce as such renunciation would actually postulate another mad world, 
a natural world without reason. Hence he posits philosophy as a curable 
25 Cf. ibid., p. 268.
2e Ibid., pp. 268—269.
27 D. Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed. (Oxford 1978), Enquiry I, p. 155, quoted in J. Mullan, Sentiment 
and..., p. 20.
28 Ibid., p. 271.
29 Ibid, p. 269.
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kind of (pleasurable) madness from which we can always withdraw to a more 
regulated world of more regulated passions of more common pleasures. For 
the nature that cures Hume of his “philosophical melancholy” is not some 
herb or cobweb that he applies to his heated imagination but the agreeable 
society which eating, drinking, talking and naturally functioning constitutes 
a home to which Hume can always securely return from the sublime, mad, 
inconclusive (and hence infinite) ways of his pleasurable speculations:
I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; 
and after three or four hour’s amusement, I wou’d return to these speculations, they 
appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter 
into them any farther.30
One who says “I’m going slightly mad,” to quote Freddie Mercury a little out 
of context, is the one whose passions dictate his reason to philosophise, but 
who can always return to the womb of the social agreement of feelings and 
more mundane pleasures. One who believes that the productions of his reason 
or imagination are true, one who is not sceptical, is properly mad, properly lost 
to the society.
There are, as it seems, at least two kinds of madness in the eighteenth 
century and both of them actually verge on the border of the sublime and 
sociable (rather than beautiful). One such kind is Hume’s madness of 
philosophy which he terms “melancholy” or “delirium,” and which is socially 
acceptable as curable in the sense of the possibility of the return back to the 
normal from the nonexistent worlds, from the productions of “heated brain” 
which can be cooled down by agreeable conversation, games, or even proper 
diet. This delirium of philosophy, the sphere of the pleasurable, aesthetic 
feelings is seen as a pastime of sorts which we have to sceptically hold at 
a distance and of which, through scepticism, we can never be certain. It is thus 
also a fearful sphere as uncertainty which, in Hume’s classification of passions, 
is productive either of fear or of hope.31 In the case of the “refined reasoning” 
of philosophy, an identification with which is negative and actually evil, the 
feeling admixed to that of pleasure would be the fear of its inconclusiveness, 
of, exactly, its uncertainty. The delirious is thus both pleasurable and 
fearful (even in the sense La Mettrie used the term “fear”), agreeable and 
disagreeable, convenient and inconvenient, as opposed to the pure convenience 
of the social exchange and communication of certain, unquestionable, normal, 
unheated passions which are beautiful because “convenience is a beauty.”32 
Philosophers are thus “slightly mad” because, at least occasionally, they 
30 Ibid., p. 265.
31 Cf. ibid., p. 439.
32 Ibid., p. 364.
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take a voluntary leave of the convenient (beautiful) and drift away toward the 
“delirious” which as a mixture of pleasure and terror, at least according to 
Burke’s divagations, can be provisionally termed the sublime, and only 
provisionally, since it exists, in Hume, Burke and elsewhere, only as the 
provisional domain of discernible chaos and infinity of madness against which 
we define our beautiful convenience of being at home, a possibility of return to 
what we are.
In the introductory Book I of his Treatise (1739—1740) Hume warns the 
reader that he departs from the world and presents philosophy as a lonesome 
journey into an immense, dangerous abyss (“before I launch out into those 
immense depth of philosophy, which lie before me, that forlorn solitude. 
[...] This sudden view of my danger strikes me with melancholy”).33 Yet, 
as we have seen, he departs from the social only to return to it and to see even 
more clearly that his journey was a reverie, an outburst of passion to 
philosophize about which he knows in advance that it is dangerous and against 
which he warns the reader in order that he or she does not alienate his or her 
mind from the world and keeps Hume’s discourse, like he himself, sceptically, 
at a distance, observing the philosophical depth and insanity from the secure 
position of Book I. It is thus also a sane kind of insanity which, as in Addison, 
purifies us of insanity by offering it to us as a thereness which we can safely 
watch only from here.
Since the locus or source of passions is the human body the degree to which 
one follows the dictates of one’s passions or sentiments depends on one’s 
bodily constitution. Already in 1729 Nicolas Robinson, a physician, observed 
that what he called elevation of the mind depended on
a System of Veins, Nerves, and Arteries. All those sublime Flights and extatic 
Visions, that elevate the Soul above itself, whereby it towers above the Clouds [...] 
owe their rise due to Modulation of the Solids, to this happy structure of the 
Fibres.34
The system is to a certain extent elastic, and as long the constitution of the 
“happy structure of the Fibres” is not disrupted the sublime flights are still 
healthy. In the later eighteenth century the elasticity of the nervous system 
becomes the privilage of the “learned” who are generally seen as more sensitive 
than common people. John Mullan discusses this phenomenon more exten­
sively in his Sentiment and Sensibility. He notices there that “the refined or 
studious hypochondriac” is a necessarily exceptional figure, deriving his 
“Distemper” from preoccupations and proclivities which remove him from 
33 D. Hume, Treatise..., p. 213.
34 N. Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, Vapours, and Hypochondrie Melancholy 
(London 1726), p. 229, quoted in J. Mullan, Sentiment..., p. 229.
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“the common People” or “the ordinary state of human nature.”35 Yet 
such a “distempered” person still remains “normal” as long as his sublime 
flights, like Hume’s, are only an extension of common sensitivity shared 
by, and constitutive of, common society, as long as the flights are the sphere 
of an aesthetic pleasure for those endowed with Addison’s polite imagi­
nation. Melancholy is thus “a privileged affliction” caused by strong pas­
sions which simultaneously are marks of both moral and intellectual superio­
rity.
One step from this kind of madness is something more dangerous, the other 
kind of madness which is not the madness of philosophy, but an unphiloso- 
phical, too excessive kind of madness, the madness proper which, John Mullan 
notices, “complicates perceptions of learned melancholy.”36 It is for the 
properly mad ones that Bedlam has been designed not so much as a place 
where madness was to be cured, as where it was to be kept in seclusion. The 
problem, as ever, was that of the border or limit between strong and too strong 
passions, the limit of transgression.
The most clear-cut distinction between the two comes from Dr. William 
Battie who distinguishes between “Original” madness and “Consequential 
Madness.” The former “is solely owing to an internal disorder of the nervous 
substance” and thus incurable and the latter being only “distorted ab extra” 
and curable.37 The latter kind is curable because its “ab extra” causes can be 
traced back to some originary emotion or passion communicated by the 
“patient.” The “original” madness, on the other hand is, as it were, its own 
cause and such a madman perceives his flights of imagination as real and 
normal without any distance, he is “Persuaded of the Existence or of the 
appearance of any thing, which does not exist or does not actually appear to 
him.”38 Putting it bluntly, the madman proper (Battie actually uses the phrase 
“properly mad”) does not know and cannot know that he is mad and thus 
cannot, unlike Hume, return from his expedition to dangerous depths of 
nonexistent worlds because he does not know that he has departed. The 
distinction still holds. For some reason, as R. D. Laing notices as if referring to 
La Mettrie,
A man who says that men are machines may be a great scientist. A man who says he 
is a machine is ‘depersonalized’ in psychiatric jargon.39
35 J. Mullan, Sentiment..., p. 213.
36 Ibid., p. 209.
37 W. Battie, A Treatise on Madness (London 1757), p. 20.
38 Ibid. p. 6.
39 R. D. Laing, The Divided Self. An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness (Penguin Books 
1969), p. 12.
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Hume’s refined reasoning is perceived by Hume as an abnormal state of the 
mind which cures itself by itself and, unlike in the case of the proper madness, 
he does not identify himself fully with his theories. He describes himself in 
a letter “as suffering from ‘the Disease of the Learned,’ a synonym for the 
‘Distemper’ which he calls ‘the Vapors,’ a ‘Weakness... of Spirits’ deriving 
from ‘profound Reflections’ which prompts him to take ‘Anti-hysteric Pills’ 
and long daily rides.”*0 Various writings on this kind of still innocent 
distemper suggest that this distemper is most frequently the suffering of those 
who live a sedentary kind of life and “indulge themselves in too much study, 
continual Meditations,” and the distemper is “very common among the 
Literati" and, interestingly, also among women whose “sypathethic sen­
sibility” of organisms condemns them to the vapours.40 1 Common people, or 
men, do not suffer from it because they lead a mobile kind of life, “active, 
laborious and mechanical.”42 As we have seen, instead of becoming active and 
laborious, Hume returns to the society to reconstruct himself as it were 
through common pleasures, and, in addition, takes some pills and “long daily 
rides.”
“Escape from reality” is yet another Freddie Mercury line which can be 
quoted here again a little out of context. Since the mental journey into the 
speculative worlds of philosophising is a disease resulting from immobility and 
sedentary life of philosophers and literati, an escape into nature in various 
forms becomes a cure for all kinds of nervous disorder. Though Hume, as we 
have seen, theoretically praises common pleasures as agreeable and healthy for 
his heated imagination, he admits that instead of coming back to the common 
he’d rather take pills and rides. It is so, probably, because the agreeable, 
common life of common sentiments and passions turns out to be equally 
theoretical and, practically realised, would mean a displeasure of confronting 
the plain passions and ideas of those who have not been endowed with any 
kind of polite imagination, with the mob which in order to become agreeable 
has to be first elevated, taught to philosophize and thus become capable of 
understanding their human natures. Hence another contradiction in Hume’s 
enterprise. In order to see that speculative thinking and reason are misleading 
and to no point people have to share Hume’s passion for it, and Hume’s 
scepticism; hence his writing, Hume feels, let us repeat, should contribute “to 
the instruction of mankind.” Within the society as it is, governed by prejudice, 
such a uniform choir of sensibility is unthinkable, and the real balance of 
one’s mind can only be attained away from the reality of society, in contact 
40 J. Mullan, Sentiment..., p. 209.
41 Cf. ibid., p. 209 and p. 220. (The quoted phrases come from A Medical Dictionary by 
R. James (London 1743—1745).
42 Cf. ibid., p. 238.
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with nature. Travel became both fashion and therapy in the second half of the 
eighteenth century, especially in England, “the prestigious cure for more 
serious distresses of the upper middle class,” as Klaus Doerner puts it.43 
In the seventeenth century the status of travel was quite different, it was 
actually a cause of uneasiness, homesickness and illness frequently associated 
with the change of climate.44 In the eighteenth-century England social life of 
the middle class moved from London to Bath:
Pastoral life, outings, hunting, fishing, riding, gymnastics, took an aura of 
wholesome moderation, as did the English Garden, milk cures and other natural 
diets. Since the nerves were seen as vibrating, taut strings, music was also said to 
possess [...] healing powers [...]. The cathartic effect of water, linked since time 
immemorial with rebirth, became institutionalized: [...] Bath became a center of 
social life.43
The rich were going to the waters, the poor were frequently kept in tubs 
with cold water in Bedlam, a method still practiced in psychiatric institu­
tions.
Doerner also supplements his long list of pleasurable activities with travel 
and grand tours. The task of all outings and travels practiced by the middle 
class was theoretically a therapeutic contact with one’s own natural nature, 
with the “inner nature, the subjective truth about [oneself], via the harmony 
and innocence of virgin external nature,” which should result, Doerner notices, 
in correspondence “to moral ‘naturalness’ which tempers the behaviour 
towards the norm.”46 Morality is thus inscribed within, say, outer nature, as 
a certain norm and theoretically wherever one goes out away from the city one 
should encounter a natural harmony against which he should measure his own 
temperament. One may also, of course, go to the waters, to Bath for instance, 
where the purity of nature is encountered in meeting the same people one met 
in London, but already purified by the waters and thus equally natural as 
green fields, meadows and hedges. Within the city limits one is constantly 
exposed to less agreeable visions of the less tempered feelings whose heated 
imaginations might be mistakenly taken for the norm. Since temperament 
and temperature are related terms, eighteenth-century wits, as Terry Castle 
notices, make a remarkable rhetorical use of the figures of thermometer 
and weatherglass:
43 K. Doerner, Madness and the Bourgeoise. A Social History of Insanity and Psychiatry, 
trans. J. Neugroschel and J. Steinberg (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1981), p. 61.
44 Cf. ibid., p. 60.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
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With their curious, seemingly animate capacity to “feel” alterations in the 
atmosphere, weatherglasses, as they [thermometers] were known in the seventeenth 
century, lent themselves from the start to metaphoric adaptation. In the hands of 
eighteenth-century wits, they became registers for measuring fanciful changes of all 
sort — fluctuations in sexual desire, physical or emotional excitement, religious 
enthusiasm, and so forth.47
Since already at the end of the seventeenth century thermometers became 
portable things, an idea that one could carry a thermometer and thus 
constantly check the temperature of one’s passions, of once’s mental “wea­
ther” or aura began to develop. Initially regarded as male instruments 
for measuring and tempering female “moodiness and susceptibility to hys­
teria,” thermometers, towards the middle of the eighteenth century, “have 
come increasingly to be perceived as belonging to both sexes.”48 Hume’s 
subjection of reason to passions resulting in the epistemological insecurity of 
identity, in its instability and uncertainty seems to be also an example of what 
Castle sees as the growing feminization of the male subject and the feminiza­
tion of human nature itself in the second half of the eighteenth century.49 Since 
human identity becomes a matter of negotiable sentiments and agreeable 
feelings with other members of the society, human nature becomes deprived of 
the central, underlying substance of the ontological security and begins to exist 
outside itself as it were. Frederic Bogel calls the Age of Sensibility the Age of 
Insubstantiality in which what is at stake “is not the mind’s effort to know but 
the world’s ability to be experienced.”50 The lack of center, of stability, 
existence to “no point” in the airy spheres of vapours traditionally associated 
with women and ridiculed in the peculiar genre of writing called “satires on 
women” flourishing in the seventeenth century51, become the ontological 
predicament facing the later eighteenth-century thinkers and writers. Our 
existence has now to be empirically rediscovered from the outside, through 
experience, through shared feelings, and the sphere of interest changes from 
that of the discovery of the object of being to the exploration of becoming.
47 T. Castle, “The Female Thermometer,” Representations, No. 17 (1987 Winter), p. 2.
48 Ibid., p. 13.
4S Cf. ibid.
50 F. V. Bogel, Literature and Insubstantiality in Later Eighteenth-Century England (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press 1984), p. 4.
51 Cf. “Satires on Women” (1682, 1687, 1691), The Augustan Reprint Society (Los Angeles: 
University of California 1976).
IV
That Ingenious Genius
(On Men, Women and Gardens)
HEDGES, appearing as such, are universally bad. They 
discover art in nature’s province.
(William Shcnstonc, The Progress of Gardening)
Hume’s scepticism is, of course, only an implicit acknowledgment of the 
feminization of human nature, which concept is a product of post-structuralist 
sensitivity to gender depression. This acknowledgment of one’s instability, 
Hume’s embracing of uncertainty, is, according to Bogel, the extreme 
expression of the experience of insubstantiality:
Few, perhaps, were as willing as Hume “to live with uncertainty, with no 
supernatural justifications, no complete explanations, no promise of permanent 
stability, with guides of merely probable validity,” as Peter Gay puts it. But in 
adopting such a stance Hume was less an exception to the British thought of his time 
than the figure in whom certain tendencies of that thought found their purest and 
most complete version.1
As we have seen, however, Hume was not really so willing to constantly 
live with uncertainty and he clearly searched for some place of repose 
where the uncertainty could be forgotten leaving but little impression on the 
mind. He took pills, he “outed” as if trying to regain within himself the 
agreeable sympathy he propagated as the sphere where society is cemented. 1
1 Ibid., p. 61. (Quotation from P. Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, vol. 1, The Rise 
of Modern Paganism (New York: Knopf 1966), pp. 418 419.
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Hume’s Treatise lists all the possible dangers and distractions of the mind as 
only potentially dangerous to those whose temper tells them where to stop and 
who thus lose contact with the reality of the social exchange of feelings, whose 
taste, another synonym of one’s agreeable character, does not dictate to one 
what is good and what is bad, both at the table and in the way one lives. “In 
the eighteenth century,” says Daniel Cottom, “‘taste’ is a metaphorical as well 
as an alphabetical anagram of ‘state.’”2 This is of course a pun, but in the 
context of the following statement from Schiller this pun seems to be very well 
justified:
Taste alone brings harmony into society, because it gives harmony to the individual 
[...] only communication of the beautiful unites society, because it refers to that 
which is common to all.3
Hume talks about “a right or a wrong taste in morals,”4 and if in Schiller 
politics and aesthetics are not really two different domains, Hume’s Treatise 
makes ethical judgements a matter of an aesthetics as well. Taste and sympathy 
are actually equivalent terms in Hume as they make all sentiments of others 
“intimately present to us” which presence testifies to reason (and thus forces 
reason to affirm it) that a given sentiment is really common to all.5 There is 
thus both uncertainty and certainty in Hume, an uncertainty which, though 
impossible to be overcome by philosophy, has to be kept in constant check on 
the level of aesthetical/ethical/political pleasures of social co-existence which 
Schiller sees as the communication of the beautiful.
The feminization of nature Terry Castle talks about verges thus on 
a certain gap or aporia which Hume’s epistemology opens up. On the one hand 
there is the desire to dismiss reason and philosophy only because this 
philosophy, though somewhat absurd, as Eagleton phrases it, is at least 
“unlikely to topple the state.”6 Hence, on the other hand, there is enough 
reason within the agreeable state or society to hold in check not all passions, 
because these, at least in theory, control reason, but the extravagant, excessive 
passions to philosophize which are vain and which in effect turn against 
themselves in the propagation of a return to the however limited bonds of 
blind habits and fetters of reason. By an inescapable paradox the philosopher 
explores the regions which are only felt by the layperson simultaneously 
saying that those regions are in fact nonexistent products of his heated 
2 D. Cottom, “Taste and...,” p. 377.
3 F. Schiller, “Über die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in Einer Reihe von Briefen,” 
in Schillers Werke (Weimar 1962), Vol. 20, pp. 410—411. Quoted in English in ibid., p. 377.
4 D. Hume, A Treatise..., p. 547.
5 Cf. ibid., p. 320.
4 T. Eagleton, The Ideology..., p. 49.
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imagination, of his trifling employment which does not really impress the 
mind. He does present the world he discovers in his explorations as uncertain, 
ambiguous, unreliable — as feminine, but he simultaneously guides others to 
stay where they are, preaches the active stability of being oneself, of practicing 
one’s standard tastes and habits so that one does not go melancholic and does 
not have to take pills or go to Bath, for instance, which really would not house 
more than the few literati whose brains demand some cooling.
Interestingly, though not surprisingly, Hume’s vision of philosophy, or 
philosophising (though the latter is Kant’s term), could be attributed by means 
of most of the attributes used by authors of conduct books for women, a genre 
(the books, of course) extremely popular in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. In Enquiry into the Duties of the Female Sex (1798), for instance, 
Thomas Gisborne includes the following list of “destabilizing traits” in 
women:
The gay vivacity and quickness of imagination, so conspicuous among the qualities 
in which the superiority of women is acknowledged, have a tendency to lead to 
unsteadiness of mind; to fondness of novelty; to habits of frivolousness, and trifling 
employment; to dislike of sober application; to dislike graver studies.7
Woman is thus naturally equipped with a number of philosophical predis­
positions, with vivid and quick imagination which as such makes women 
superior, but which can be productive of useless speculations and thus the state 
of “the philosophical melancholy and delirium” Hume wrote about. Since the 
task of conduct books for women was to temper their frivolous characters, to 
keep their leisurely activities under strict control of men and to thus teach them 
the “Rudiments of Taste,” some analogies to the philosophical discourse 
cannot go unnoticed. They are, I think, inscribed in the very epistemology of 
the Age of Sensibility as the rudiments of social co-existence in general. 
Man are to women what philosophers are to society as those endowed with 
both male and female natures and hence the ability to judge and actually 
dictate what should be the proper nature of both women and society. The 
feminine, as in Addison, turns out to be only a “passage to the masculine 
regime of reason” as the unwelcome excess “too sublime for rational 
decipherment,”8 and in fact a dangerous outside of the safe, social 
co-habitation which in conduct books for women takes the form of literal 
domestication, of assigning women domestic duties and prohibiting them to 
work “outside.” Since leisure and sedentary kind of life lead, as we have seen, 
7 T. Gisborne, Enquiry into the Duties of the Female Sex (London 1789), p. 54. Quoted in 
N. Armstrong, Desire and Domestic Fiction. A Political History of the Novel (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987), p. 99.
8 T. Eagleton, The Ideology..., p. 49.
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to melancholy and undue excitement of imagination, women busy themselves 
at home with “drawing, painting, modeling, making artificial flowers, 
embroidery, writing letters, reading,” etc.,9 while men work in order to provide 
for the household and thus are also kept busy and thus stop their minds from 
wandering too far. The unstable, uncertain sphere of heated imagination is 
reserved for philosophers who do their job on the margin of the society, away 
from it and simultaneously warn others against doing what they are doing; as 
if returning from the less mundane spheres back home and telling other people 
that they should be happy with what they have and are because they 
(philosophers) have not in fact been anywhere else. Since “we [philosophers] 
seek in vain for a standard, by which we can reconcile the contrary 
sentiments,” since philosophical certainty has become the feminine uncertainty 
of feelings, imagination or intuition it is human confinement to what one 
already has and is, to one’s (natural) properties and their exchange with others 
that can grant the smooth and stable functioning of the society. Hence what 
Eagleton terms “instinctual economizing of the mind”10 11which naturalizes the 
state and the idea of state in general simultaneously denaturalizing everything 
alien to it, everything we feel disagreeable to our, literally, state of nature, 
denaturalizing nature itself.
This latter denaturalization can be observed in various writings on 
landscape gardening extremely fashionable in the eighteenth century. It is 
already hidden in the very oxymoron of a landscape garden if by landscape one 
means some view or prospect in which human art has no share. In a letter to 
the Rev. Mr Wheeler (1751) Joseph Spence lists the general rules which he 
followed in designing his garden. He begins this list with a peculiar definition 
of the genius of the place:
The first [principle] and most material is to consult the Genius of the place. What is, 
is the great guide as to what ought to be.11
Symptomatically read, the last sentence is an expression of an extreme 
ontological scepticism suggesting that being is but a theoretical guide or 
a handbook to the construction of some more proper reality. In the context of 
a text about gardening, however, “what is” probably refers to the territory 
upon which the garden is to be constructed as should be. A simplified version 
of Spence’s first principle would sound something like “first go and see 
the place.” Yet the genius that dwells there somehow complicates a plain 
9 E. Darwin, A Plan for the Conduct of Female Education in Boarding Schools (Dublin 1798), 
p. 25.
10 T. Eagleton, The Ideology..., p. 51.
11 The Genius of the Place. The English Landscape Garden 1620—1820, J. D. Hunt and 
P. Willis, eds. (London: Paul Elek 1975), p. 268.
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reading of the statement. It actually seems that the genius is not the place 
itself, but a certain inscription upon the place which can be consulted, like 
a guide book or a conduct book for women, for instance. Yet it is not a secret 
kind of writing that Spence wants to consult, but, rather the spirit of the place 
which constitutes its identity, its uniqueness and with which Spence is 
somehow capable of communicating. Since what is at stake is correction 
(“what ought to be”), it is the spirit of the place which prompts the gardener 
what it finds wrong with itself and guides the gardener to perfection. In order 
to be understood, the spirit needs another spirit of the kind within the 
addressee with whom he communicates on the basis of shared feelings, on the 
basis of a Humean sympathy. The gardener does not, of course, intervene in 
nature by changing the place, but follows its own dictates, he does what 
nature, both his own and that expressed by the genius of the place, wants him 
to do. He changes the place without changing nature.
Spence’s first principle is reminiscent, of course, of Pope’s call to first 
following Nature in An Essay on Criticim (1711). Spence’s third principle seems 
to confirm this: “31y To follow Nature.”12 However, if Pope can still talk 
about just standards of nature and natural rules, Spence follows the silent 
voice of nature’s spirit and actually recreates it without reaching to human art, 
creates a garden in the image of nature:
Gardening is an imitation of ‘Beautiful Nature,’ and therefore should not be like 
works of art. Wherever art appears, the gardener has failed his execution. Our old 
gardens were formed by the rule and square, with a perpetual uniformity and in 
a manner more fit for architecture than for pleasure-grounds. Nature never plants 
by line, or in angles.13
Thus the garden as a pleasure ground is a space where there is nothing 
artificial, a space away from both culture and wild nature, as opposed 
to the beautiful one, whose spirit dictates how to make its wildness agree­
able. The “Beautiful Nature” is also irregularly harmonious, lacking any 
geometrical patterns like straight lines or squares which are, of course, 
constructs of pure reason, and as such inadmissible in the garden because 
the spirit of the place, rendered as some natural gardener in the above 
fragment, never plants geometrically but naturally. Nature is a master 
gardener whom those endowed with the polite.imagination and enough money 
to buy a “place” are capable of consulting and following his suggestions 
concerning the improvement of the other nature, of a her who, like a woman 
from the conduct books, lacks taste and produces deficient or displeasing 
patterns:
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., pp. 268 -269.
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41y To assist or correct the general character or the ground, if deficient or 
displeasing. [...] If the ground be all flat, one should make risings and inequalities in 
it: very small swellings will help much if properly placed, and natural irregular 
risings (mounts) where an particular object or pleasing prospect is to be caught, 
etc.14
Imperfection is thus, however conditionally, inscribed within the “general 
character of the ground” which must be assisted in a self-correction of sorts 
as to eventually become pleasingly irregular by way of, exactly, regulating 
nature back to irregularity. Nature as it were goes out of itself in the form of 
a spirit or feeling which works on the same wavelength as that of the owner of 
the place and in the common effort both the owner and the spirit naturally 
negotiate what is proper and where it should be properly placed. Irregularity 
and variety can be pleasing and beautiful provided that all the “citizens” of 
a garden do not quarrel with each other, that the space of the garden is ordered 
in such a way that the plants and objects of conflicting characters never meet 
with each other but harmoniously coexist in the natural order of the garden 
segregated and properly located by the gardener watchful of the natural order 
of things; “To observe the different friendships and enmities of different 
colours, and to place the most friendly ones next to each other” says Spence’s 
15th principle.15
Seen as an allegory of society, a garden is a space where property as 
character is naturalized. Variety of characters is acceptable provided these 
characters are properly (i.e. naturally) organized, assigned proper places or 
positions agreeable to gardener’s eye aided by the natural predispositions of 
the place expressed by its spirit. This naturalization of property as an 
individual character also entails naturalization of property as ownership. 
The genius of the place is but a lonely spirit who “fails his execution” as to 
what the place should be like without the actual gardener, the owner of the 
place.
Ownership is inscribed within the very idea of “beautiful nature” as the 
demand for being corrected, of being made beautiful or agreeable. Left to 
itself, without the proprietor, the place is wild and actually unnatural, an 
“ugly” nature of sorts which really needs a master who will execute its beauty. 
It is this property of being a property that guarantees naturalness and beauty 
of all the surrounding places which, though belonging to others, will express 
their beauty on the basis of the shared sentiment for property which is as 
universal as beauty. The agreeable space of one’s garden should thus be 
surrounded with equally agreeable spaces in the manner friendly colours are 
placed next to each other. Nature, the beautiful one, is an universal thing, 
14 Ibid., p. 269.
15 Ibid., p. 270.
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and fencing one’s property in a too visible way would suggest that outside 
the fence there might be something less natural, a nobody’s space which 
needs correction. Just as individuals are not fenced from each other within 
the society thus making possible the exchange of agreeable sentiments, so too 
the boundaries of gardens must be invisible. The principle of unity in variety 
holds together both the society and the garden thus making them both 
contiguous and continuous wholes. Contiguity grants independence and 
property, but the various, independent individuals must be so much alike, 
naturally beautiful, that the whole is but a continuity of similar specimens 
mimetically linked by the demand of being natural. Hence the following three 
principles of Spence’s:
81y To conceal the bounds of your grounds everywhere, if possible. [...]
91y To unite different parts of your garden gently together.
10 To contrive the outparts so, as to unite well with the country round about 
them.1®
The unification of differences will ideally be realised as the denial of the 
outside as really different from the inside. A well united territory is agreeable 
in all its parts and so is an ideal society of beautiful people living in a beautiful 
landscape.
Though traditionally classified as an aesthetic study, a study in aesthetics, 
Burke’s Enquiry quite openly declares that it is also a “sociological” study, 
a study of the category of the beautiful which Burke defines as a social 
quality:
I call beauty a social quality; for when women and men, and not only they, but when 
other animals give us a sense of joy and pleasure in beholding them (and there are 
many that do so), they inspire us with sentiments of tenderness and affection 
towards their persons; we like to have them near us, and we enter willingly into 
a kind of relation with them, unless we should have strong reasons to the contrary.11
Society is thus a pleasurable cohabitation in which everybody has a distinct 
habitat, but where there are agreeable neighbours whose very appearance is 
a pleasurable kind of sight. This pleasure arises from their seeing us as 
equally beautiful, and it is this mutual giving of pleasure arising from 
similarity, and actually from mimicry, that is the core of Burke’s idea of the 
beautiful. The agreeable space of a garden surrounding one’s home, one’s villa, 
is a metaphor of the society, of the social sentiments made easily available *
16 Ibid.
17 E. Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful 
(London 1912), pp. 66 67.
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even when one is by himself, a space to which one can easily “travel” without 
actually leaving one’s home and thus, in contact with the beautiful sight, cool 
down his heated imagination, for instance, in the way Hume returned to the 
social pleasures from the world of sceptical philosophy.
The principle which dictates Spence that he should hide the fence of the 
garden is the principle of being open to society, to the society one finds 
agreeable, and which is equally open to the gardener. One cannot separate 
oneself from society and live in solitude because “an entire life of solitude,” 
as Burke puts it, “contradicts the purposes of our being, since death itself is 
scarcely an idea of more terror.”18 It is important to notice here that it is not 
society in general that is productive of the pleasurable feeling of elegant 
coexistence, but the society as experienced by an individual, the cultivated part 
of the society whose neighbourhood one accepts as friendly. “Good company, 
lively conversations, and the endearments of friendship, fill the mind with great 
pleasure,”19 Burke declares. Absolute solitude deprives a person of such 
pleasures and actually banishes him to the terrifying sphere comparable to 
death.
Unlike the absolute solitude, however, Burke adds that “a temporary 
solitude, on the other hand, is itself agreeable. This may perhaps prove that 
we are creatures designed for contemplation as well as action.”20 Since the 
space of the well designed garden as an extension of the social agreeability 
dictated by the genius of the place does not allow for any kind of solitude, 
since everything in the garden is but an expression of beauty (“a social 
quality”) Burke’s temporary solitude is a mental operation, “contemplation” 
as opposed to the “action” of lively conversations, to the “action” of the 
pleasurable cohabitation with others. The temporary solitude is thus, 
as in Hume, a mental departure from the social world, a departure within 
which there is inscribed the necessity of return. Since this “departure” is 
simultaneously, as we have seen, a mental disorder resulting from the 
sedentary life, the cure of a travel back to the agreeable can be easily applied 
as, without visible fences, wherever one goes one is welcome by the agreeable 
social landscape which calms the mind and puts it into proper action. One 
cannot, say, topographically depart from the social sphere because one either 
sees an already cultivated space of a garden or meets the genius of an as yet 
uncultivated place which makes the potential encounter of some wilder 
kind of nature always already marked by a silent presence of what the place 
should be.




On some broader grounds, like America, for instance, the genius of the 
place takes the name of conversion and bringing light, of a marriage of, as 
Gayatri Spivak puts it, “Europe and its not yet-human other, of soul 
making.”21 This soul making is of course inscribed as a potentiality of having 
an European soul within the disagreeable Indians who, without that soul, are 
but wild plant-like figures which the genius of the place would rather not see 
within its domain. Since the genius of the place cannot act alone but needs 
a proprietor of the place to be consulted, it is the latter one that will decide as 
to the method of beautification. As not-yet-human, Indians have to wait for 
their humanity either taking the role of “natural slaves”22 (provided that 
there is a discernible trace of human nature within them) or have to be expelled 
from the territory and in case of resistance exterminated. Colonial and 
aesthetic discourses go hand in hand and the idea of “beautification” of 
space is by no means politically innocent. The possibility of a rhetorical 
reduction of people to plants or weeds is the governing principle of colonial 
discourse which actually depopulates the colonial territories exactly in the 
manner huge territories of the English homeland have been depopulated in 
order that beautiful gardens could be created. Joseph Darner, for instance, 
the future Earl of Dorchester depopulated the whole village of Milton only 
because he didn’t want it “in sight of his mansion.”
He removed the whole place — a hundred houses, a brewery, a grammar-school, 
[...] almhouses, inns, even the very tombstones. Even so, it is recorded that 
Mr. Damer was much annoyed because the bones of past Miltonians kept turning 
up as he laid out his gardens.23
This theme of depopulation is, of course, the theme of Goldsmith’s The 
Deserted Village (1770), a poem which compares a landscape garden to the 
grave of rural community (“The country blooms — a garden and a grave” 
[line 302]). A landscape garden is, for Goldsmith, a fallen land, a land 
“‘betrayed’ by the seducer, luxury; for the land, unproductive luxury is 
equivalent to death. The earth is dislocated into human history, it dies into 
time,” as Laurence Goldstein puts it.24 Away form his rural, Irish home 
Goldsmith makes the nostalgia for the lost past a theme equally well applicable 
to the depopulation of English villages as to the draconian laws of the British 
21 G. C. Spivak, “Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism,” in The Feminist 
Reader. Essays in Gender and the Politics of Literary Criticism, C. Belsey and J. Moore, eds. 
(MacMillan 1989), p. 180.
22 Cf. H. While, Tropics of Discourse. Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press 1987), pp. 185—188.
23 L. Goldstein, Ruins and Empire. The Evolution of Theme in Augustan and Romantic 
Literature (Pittsburgh 1977), p. 104.
24 Ibid., p. 111.
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colonists which literally depopulated Ireland by economically forced emi­
gration. Ireland dies into history, into time, in the way rural nature, regulated 
only by the natural rhythm of the seasons, becomes subjected to whimsical 
theories of beauty as practiced by the British gentry. If history institutionalizes 
forgetfulness (as Jose' Rabasa claims in his allegorical reading of Mercator’s 
Atlas)25 in the way topographers replace the native geographical names of 
“discovered” territories, the names which they treat as nonexistent, then 
enclosures do exactly the same with the rural land simultaneously making it 
useless. Using Spence’s terms, what is, is translated into what should be, 
ignoring the past and actually seeing it as the displeasing bones of the dead 
which occasionally turn up upon the smooth surface of Joseph Darner’s 
lawn, for instance. Garden is thus for Goldsmith an allegory of forgotten 
past, of nature infected by the luxurious pleasures of landowners who, by 
leveling old tombstones, create spaces where no death is in sight as a part of 
the less beautiful nature which the genius of the place, the spokesman for the 
beautiful nature, is silent about.
Goldsmith sees the British lanscape garden, the idea of landscape 
garden, as contrary to nature, as through and through artificial, as an exact 
opposite of Spence’s demand that there should be no trace of human art in 
one’s garden. A luxurious kind of nature is not natural at all, it is nature 
already “displaced by the vanity of London” in which Goldsmith lives “as 
a hostage in the oppressor’s camp.”26 27Simultaneously, however, Goldsmith’s 
rhetoric accepts the oppression of the artificial, imposed pleasure as actually 
necessary and inevitable. In The Citizen of the World (1762) he writes:
The more various our artificial necessities, the wider is our circle of pleasure; 
for all pleasure consists in obviating necessities as they rise; luxury therefore, as it 
encreases our wants, encreases our capacity for happiness.21
The logic of this sentence is really deceptive, though, as it seems, it is not 
going to deceive Goldsmith’s wealthier readers, as Laurence Goldstein 
claims,28 with his acceptance of imposed luxury. Rather, it is Goldsmith who is 
trying to convince himself that he has not accepted it. Goldsmith is quite 
explicit here as to the artificiality of all pleasures simultaneously saying that 
they are necessary. The image of a land from before the “conquest” by the 
landscape garden, the image of some true, natural order of things betrayed by 
luxury (“Thus fares the land, by luxury betrayed;/ In nature’s simplest 
25 Cf. J. Rabasa, “Allegories of the Atlas,” in Europe and its Others, F. Barker, P. Hulme, 
M. Inersen, D. Loxley, eds. (Colchester: University of Essex 1985).
26 Ibid., p. 103
27 Quoted in ibid., p. 102.
28 Cf. ibid.
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charms at first arrayed; [lines 280—281]) is an imaginary vision comparable to 
the visions of the natural philosophers criticized by Hume as fictitious. By 
rendering this past, natural world as the object of his homesick nostalgia 
Goldsmith propagates a world without the necessary pleasures, a natural 
world in which, as yet, the sphere of aesthetics does not exist. The world is 
necessarily aesthetic, naturally artificial (here he accepts the oppressors’ 
position) and the life “in nature’s simplest charms” can only be an imaginary 
world to which one can nostalgically travel (like Hume to the world of 
philosophy), but from which one is always bound to return to the necessarily 
artificial world of pleasures. If one simultaneously understands artificial as 
foreign (to nature), then one is actually bound to be a foreigner, even in one’s 
own country, and it is for this reason, I think, that Goldsmith writes about the 
Irish as if he was English, and about the English as if he was Irish. The English 
construct gardens thus destroying nature while the Irish, and he uses here 
the pronoun “They,”
live in a fruitful country [...] sequestrated from the rest of mankind, protected by 
a powerful nation from foreign insult. [...] They have no important national 
concerns to make them anxious, or cloud their tempers with the solemnity of pride. 
In such circumstances they are contented with indolence and pleasure, take every 
happiness as it presents, are easily excited to resent, and as easily induced to 
submission.29
What is at stake is more complex than simply being forced to write in a “tone 
of a smug landlord” in order to somehow function in Grub Street, as 
Goldstein claims.30 It is the British who have provided the Irish both with 
security and with the artificial pleasures to which they submit and, though no 
longer Irish (“they have no important national concerns”), neither are they 
British as they content themselves with only a small fraction of the luxury, of 
the artificial necessity, of beauty whose abundance is necessary for the British 
to exist. The Irish submit their own pleasures and accept foreign ones because 
pleasures are anyway artificial (including the pleasure of being a nation) and, 
like Goldsmith, they emigrate to England simultaneously preserving their 
natural being in the past, in the Golden Age which they feel has been artificially 
suppressed, but which still lurks as a nostalgic absence, as a remembrance of 
innocence in the way one always dreams of revisiting one’s childhood. Since 
the revisiting is impossible, the horticultural conquest by the British, for 
instance, or any other culture (he talks about “a powerful nation”) is as 
inevitable as growing old. One’s resistance to this oppression can thus only be 
a living in the past, living now and then, outside history which demands 
29 Quoted from The Royal Magazine (1760), in ibid., p. 100.
30 Cf. ibid.
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facts to be present, and which cannot be made present if they also take place 
here and there at the same time, in England and in Ireland, for instance.
Goldsmith’s position is exactly that of the citizen of the world for whom, 
as Goldstein rightly notices, the haunting by ephemeral shades, though 
desirable as a token of the lost paradise, is also a condition of “imprisonment 
in the enemy camp.”31 Goldsmith feels enslaved by artifice, yet he simul­
taneously accepts it as the constitutive oustide of the “ephemeral shades,” of 
the haunting presence of ghosts and spirits which, paradoxically, can only be 
revived by the artifice, in the artistic creation of deserted villages which mark 
gardens with tokens of decay. Culture is the grave of nature, but it is equally 
natural as death. Nature dies through culture, it is a grave of nature within 
which there lives the forgotten nature.
The death of culture would thus be equally paradoxical as the death of the 
grave, as the death of death, an image equally improbable and tautological 
as the revival of life. Goldsmith’s position of the citizen of the world is the 
position from which one can escape the predicament of choice of being either 
this or that, and from which one can be critical of the subjection to an empire 
only by accepting one’s political status of a citizen simultaneously not defining 
one’s topographical and, importantly, temporal positions. Goldsmith is 
not the kind of the citizen of the world who is at home everywhere, but 
one who is always homeless and homesick, longing for a home which is 
irrevocably, as he realizes, lost. The lost past is always elsewhere, and an 
attempt to revive it otherwise than mentally, through imagination, an attempt 
at its institutionalization is unthinkable as it would cure the nostalgia and thus 
deprive the world of the only trace of the existence of another nature, which 
would imply a total submission to the order dictated by the state, by empire. 
In this sense Goldsmith’s deserted village also stands for the world, for the 
space depopulated by culture and inhabited by an imperial power of luxury 
with which everyone has to at least partially identify oneself simultaneously 
longing for something else. This something else, on the other hand, must be 
tolerated by the empire as an alien sphere which it finds disagreeable, but 
which it cannot fully conquer without turning against itself, without becoming 
a dream or a remembrance of the past itself, without deserting or depopulating 
itself.
It is here that Goldsmith seems to actually admire the empire, though 
he quite evidently does not love it. If the revival of the natural life is but 
a mental operation, then it must be held within the limits of one’s mental 
capacities, and since this revival is a pleasant visitation, there must be a degree 
of artifice within the happy society he revisits. Though implied in Goldsmith’s 
vision, such a society is in fact always already dead. What terrifies Goldsmith
31 Ibid., p. 109.
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is not the empire itself, but its infinite desire to extend its power of luxury over 
the whole world, which would be, of course, threatening to his position of the 
detached citizen of the world. A small empire, an empire of very simple 
(though artificial) pleasures is still acceptable and actually good provided that 
it is confined to a locality, to where it is and which changes this locality 
according to the demands of the true genius of the place which needs only 
a little luxury and simple pleasures. When Goldsmith approaches a garden, 
however, he already sees an excess of artifice in it and without denying the idea 
of the genius of the place, he claims its usurpation over the garden and 
recollects a better one who once dwelled there. Visiting William Shenstone’s 
estate, Leasowes, he meets a genius of the place, but finds it absolutely 
disagreeable compared to the one who dwelled there of old:
[...] the Genius of the place appeared before me, but more resembling the God 
of Time, than his more peculiarly appointed to the care of gardens. Instead of 
sheers, he bore a scythe. [...] Having remembered this place in its pristine beauty, 
I could not help condoling with him on the many alterations which had been 
made, and all for the worse: of the many shades which had been taken away, of the 
bowers that were destroyed by neglect, and the hedge-rows that were spoiled by 
clipping.32
The old genius of the place propagated pristine beauty, the original beauty of 
‘unclipped’ hedges and bowers which has been killed by the God of Time. 
Goldsmith does not mind using sheers to modestly regulate nature according 
to modest pleasures dictated by a more modest genius of the place. Spence’s 
first principle as to how design one’s garden seems to be equally acceptable 
to both gardens, old and new. Unlike Spence, however, Goldsmith avoids 
using the phrase “natural beauty” and calling it “pristine” renders it as 
originary, only slightly marked by the inevitable artifice I have mentioned 
above. What transforms the true Genius of the place into a deathlike figure of 
the God of Time is only the measure of the artifice which, in the hands of the 
great land owners, lacks any measure. Hence the feeling of oppression and 
terror. Hence one more paradox: oppression is either good or bad depending 
on its measures and tools, and it is ideal when it does not introduce any 
alterations within the pristine arrangement of things. Once having used sheers, 
it should now only keep an eye on the order thus created. Since, however, the 
oppressors have already used a scythe and thus increased the domain of 
artifice, this artifice became as it were naturalized, it increased our “capacity 
for happiness” and though one cannot really change it now back to the 
original, one can at least mourn, condole or weep over the lost past which 
one revisits visiting its devastated ruins in the form of English gardens.
32 Quoted from Goldsmith’s essay “The History of a Poet’s Garden,” in ibid., p. 108.
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The “pristine beauty” of Ireland is thus also posited there and then. The Irish 
are “they” because it is vain to identify oneself with the past, with ghosts and 
spirits of the places which no longer exist. Goldsmith simply wants to conserve 
the world as it is so as not to allow any further changes, to stabilize the growth 
of empire so as it does not, eventually, devastate and depopulate itself. He 
would probably agree with Eagleton’s vision of the Gaelic revival as a chaotic 
attempt to recreate what already does not exist reminiscent of the Babelian 
confusion of tongues:
The city [Dublin during the Gaelic revival] was a cacophony of tongues [...] Some of 
the literati would write only in Gaelic, frightened of becoming European lest they be 
thought English. Others maintained that the Gaelic revival would simply make their 
fellow countrymen illiterate in two languages rather than in one. Some translated 
their own short stories from one language to the other, occasionally forgetting in 
which tongue they had composed the original. John Synge pulled off the rare trick of 
writing in English and Gaelic simultaneously, using an Irish peasant speech as no 
other writer had used it, and probably no peasant either.33
Goldsmith would rather avoid this. He chose a living in the past, in London, 
simultaneously locating the past there. He thus also lived in a borrowed home 
(a metaphor of metaphor for du Marsais) which he proclaimed to be “the 
republic of letters” in which he could not fully identify himself with either the 
Irish or the English. England was a metaphor of decay and death, Ireland was 
a metaphor of a lost life. He accepted the death of Ireland but he also accepted 
the empire, the principle which inflicted death simultaneously fearing that 
this empire might also pass away, like Rome, thus depriving him of the 
possibility of metaphorizing the lost past. England does symbolize decay, but 
without that decay, as a metaphor, there would be no room for the equally 
metaphorical, living past.
Writing about English colonial expansion Goldsmith, quite sympto­
matically, at least partially identifies himself with the British without reading 
the colonization of Ireland as colonization:
[...] an empire, by too great a foreign power may lessen its natural strength, and 
that dominion often becomes more feeble as it grows more extensive. The ancient 
Roman empire is a strong instance of the truth of the assertion. [...] To be as 
explicit as possible, I see no reason why we should aggrandize our colonies at our 
own expense; an acquisition of new colonies is useless, unless they are peopled; 
but to people those deserts that lie behind our present colonies, would require 
multitudes from the mother-country; and I do not find we are too populous at 
home.34
33 T. Eagleton, Saints and Scholars (London: Verso Publishers 1987), p. 50.
34 Quoted from Weekly Magazine, in L. Goldstein, Ruins and..., p. 105.
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“We” is an obvious mark of identification with the empire here. Goldsmith 
again says “enough,” and he says it not because colonization kills people and 
depopulates other territories, but, paradoxically, because it depopulates the 
empire. Yet he identifies himself only with the empire which is capable of 
controlling its desire to expand because too great an expansion leads to 
a deconstruction of empire, it actually changes the empire into the desert 
which it conquers. Goldsmith obviously knew that the as yet unconquered 
territories were peopled by Indians and yet he quite explicitly presents the 
territories as an uninhabited waste land where there has never dwelled any, 
however pristine, genius of the place, as a disagreeable, huge territory 
incommensurable with any artificial pleasures and measures. West of the East 
coast, America, unlike Ireland, is too foreign to be conquered, it is a space 
simply too vast to be agreeable to human nature and thus lacking any human 
dwellers.
Goldsmith is thus not writing about America here, but about the empire, 
about its power to produce luxury which must confine itself to territories 
already marked by some kind of artifice. Simultaneously, however, he realizes 
that this power can hardly be restrained as the difference between wildness and 
artifice is marked by the vague notion of nature which he also ascribes to the 
strength of the state. The empire must not reach outside itself, it must not 
engage in things foreign to it, because it will lose this natural cohesion which is 
constituted, as we have seen elsewhere, by sympathetic feelings of its 
inhabitants. Upon too great a space, upon a foreign space where no familiar 
genius tells us what should be, this cohesion may easily lead to dispersion, to, 
exactly, depopulation. Yet, as he witnesses, the empire does reach outside itself 
exactly in the manner this movement outside is inscribed within the individuals 
as the sphere where agreeable pleasures are communicated and exchanged. 
It is for this reason that Goldsmith criticizes the empire with which he partially 
identifies. The expanding empire is too vast for him too fully identify with. As 
I have already said, he admires it and does not love it.
5 Approaches of Infinity...
V
The Sublime
(On Burke’s Submission 
and Kant’s Starry Sky)
Do you think you can tell heaven from hell?
Pink Floyd
The distinction between admiration and love which ends the preceding 
chapter is one of the numerous attempts of Burke to eventually tell the 
sublime from the beautiful which he undertakes in his Enquiry. Being 
no philosopher, Goldsmith only vaguely and metaphorically hints at the 
sublime which he sees in an unrestrained growth, in growth to infinity 
of the pleasures, of artificial luxuries whose limited growth he finds agreeable, 
and whose abundance is productive either of deserted villages (which is 
still agreeable because productive of the pleasurable nostalgia) or to actual 
living in the deserts of America which goes hand in hand with the growth 
of emigration from England (and, more importantly, Ireland) and the 
“increase of production” of landscape gardens by those few who stay at home 
with even more territory to devastate. Burke claims his Enquiry to be 
philosophical and in addition to “statements that are often absurd”1 as 
regards his minute analyses of shades of feelings and passions, the general 
scheme of his work is very much like that of Goldsmith; an identification with 
something one cannot identify oneself with. Let us begin with admiration 
and love:
1 S. Monk, The Sublime..., p. 86.
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There is a wide difference between admiration and love. The sublime, which is the 
cause of theTormer, always dwells on great objects, and terrible; the latter on small 
ones, and pleasing; we submit to what we admire, but we love what submits to us; in 
one case we are forced, in the other we are flattered into compliance.2
Though quite a lot has been already written about Burke’s sublime, no 
commentators, to my knowledge, have noticed a certain lapsus in this 
important fragment which, in a sense, agreeably summarizes what Burke 
didn’t want to say — we are sublime to what submits to us. There are as it were 
two levels of the sublime in Burke, both consisting in submission. We love 
what submits to us, but it submits to us because it admires us in the way we 
submit to the sublime because we admire it. Thus depending on the perspective 
we are either sublime or beautiful.
In Burke’s rhetoric the beautiful little something submits to us voluntarily, 
with no terror constitutive of the sublime. We love small things for their 
submission to us because no force is used against us, small things are too weak 
to impose their beauty upon us and all they have at their disposal is flattery 
which is but a version of seduction. The beautiful only wants to be possessed 
by us, it seduces us to this possesion and for this reason it is also the social 
quality of agreeability which I have already mentioned. Small things are nice 
to be with because they themselves form a society of subjected subjects, of 
individuals who with pleasure submit to submission. What goes unmentioned 
in Burke is that social submission and the something to which such beautiful 
things submit stand on two different levels. If society is a “we,” then it 
submits itself not to what it loves, but to what it admires, and thus to the 
sublime which actually imposes the submission. Yet, on the other hand, the 
sublime is posited as hostile to an ideal social order as openly repressive, as 
something to which we are forced and in which we do not participate 
voluntarily, a space openly hostile and thus improper for an agreeable 
cohabitation. In order to be beautiful, things have to be blind to the force to 
which they submit and actually see it as equally beautiful and thus no object 
or rule to which the word “submission” is applicable. Since it is the sympathy 
of feeling which links society, a possibility of sympathy with what subjects 
us to being beautiful has to be a part of this ideology since one cannot really 
identify oneself and agreeably live with the sublime as the latter, in its pure 
form, is productive of nothing but threat and terror:
Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, 
whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in 
a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of 
the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling. [...] When danger 
2 E. Burke, A Philosophical..., p. 212.
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and fear press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight, and are simply 
terrible; but at certain distances, and with certain modifications, they may be, and 
they are delightful, as we every day experience?
Sympathy and close coexistence with the sublime is thus unthinkable as it is, at 
an extreme point, more than painful — a coexistence with “an emissary of this 
king of terrors” which is death. The sublime has to be kept at a distance, 
modified, changed, transformed into some more agreeable shapes so that its 
approaches do not translate our life into a sickness unto death, a fearful life 
full of unwelcome admiration but empty of the ‘cohesive’ power of life. The 
sublime is translatable into something which brings “delight,” a pleasure 
which, unlike beauty, is not pleasurable in itself, but a pleasure which is 
produced by the removal of pain,3 4 a relief which comes after the terrible part 
of the sublime has been done away with, pushed away beyond the horizon of 
the living community.
Like Goldsmith’s America, Burke’s sublime is not really an area to be 
populated (and in the context of the pleasures of subjecting this analogy is not 
unmotivated here), it is a vast, huge, obscure, dark, infinitely other terra 
incognita whose cognition is unthinkable unless it is somehow diminished 
and enlightened. We can fully conquer and socialize only those things which 
subject themselves, where the conquest has already, again as in Goldsmith, 
taken place. Yet the possibility of keeping the sublime at a distance (though 
still in sight), as well as the possibility of its modification actually make 
conquest a necessary movement against the stagnation of our curiosity which 
“has an appetite which is very sharp, but very easily satisfied.”5 Society 
avoids stagnation by feeding on the edible parts of the sublime which provides 
it with a variety of delightful foods which enliven it, which nourish, but whose 
excess is painful and actually lethal as it, as we have seen, is dangerously close 
to death. The sublime, like the Greek pharmakon, is both a remedy and 
a poison, “both good (agatha) and painful (aniara),”6 which cannot be fully 
harmless “or fully wholesome; beneficence is not a simple good, pestilence 
could be a pharmakon or remedy, the beneficial virtue of a substance does 
not prevent it from causing pain, and pain and disease themselves could be the 
agents for health and the absence of pain.”7 Since the full satisfaction of 
curiosity is disagreeable for Burke, the ‘unpleasure’ thus felt can be cured 
3 Ibid., pp. 59—60.
4 Cf. S. Monk, The Sublime..., p. 91.
5 E. Burke, A Philosophical..., p. 42.
6 Cf. J. Derrida, Dissemination, trans. B. Johnson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 
1981), p. 99.
7 H. de Almeida, Romantic Medicine and John Keats (New'York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1991), pp. 148—149.
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by the delightful horror of the sublime provided that the pain, the terror of its 
application soon becomes delight alone:
[...] if the pain and terror are so modified as not to be actually noxious; if the 
pain is not carried into violence, and the terror is not conversant about the 
present destruction of person; as these emotions clear the parts, whether fine or 
gross, of a dangerous and troublesome incumbrance, the are capable of producing 
delight; not pleasure, but a sort of delightful horror, a sort of tranquility tinged with 
terror; which, as it belongs to self-preservation, is one of the strongest passions. 
Its object is the sublime. Ils highest degree I call astonishment; the subordinate 
degrees are awe, reverence, and respect, which, by the very etymology of the words, 
shew from what source they are derived, and how they stand distinguished from 
positive pleasure.8
Admiration is of course one more species subordinated to astonishment 
which is totally unwelcome as a passion which is caused by the immediacy of 
the sublime in its unmodified version, a paralysing fear which, like Addison’s 
infinity, fills the mind full and stops it in its working:
[...] astonishment is that state of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended 
[...] In this case the mind is so entirely filled with its object, that it cannot entertain 
any other, nor by consequence reason on that object which employs it. [...] No 
passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as 
fear.9
The sublime in its pure, terrifying form is thus inconceivable, it momentarily 
makes one unable to perceive anything and in fact brings one to an almost 
immediate presence of death as a monolithic kind of nothingness which 
is so huge that there is not enough room in one’s mind to take it. Hence 
the necessity of its modification, of actually diminishing it to some more 
agreeable size which the mind can be capable of conceiving, but which 
it is still unable to subject or make submit and thus make beautiful. The 
operation of the sublime has thus cathartic effect on the mind as it clears 
the mind of the “dangerous and troublesome incumbrance” through 
the danger whose deadly threat is translated into admiration, reverence 
or respect. If love is the domain of health and beauty, admiration is a pain­
ful submission to treatment, a negative pleasure, as Burke frequently 
refers to it, whose negativity is naturally painful and which thus produces 
delight, the lack or elimination of pain which, for Burke, is not as yet 
pleasure but a promise of pleasure of the organism thus made only healthy. 
8 E. Burke, A Philosophical..., pp. 257—258.
9 Ibid., pp. 95—96.
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The oxymoron “delightful horror” removes the “horror”, part of it to the 
past leaving us with the delight of once having been subjected to submission. 
By modifying the sublime, by distancing ourselves from it and diminishing it, 
we diminish the degree of its rule or power to subject which in the case of 
astonishment is infinite. And though Burke claims that admiration is nothing 
but submission, this admiration is already a product of our own power to 
control passions, to subject the sublime and thus make it a larger kind of the 
beautiful.
The theme of the genius of the place imposes itself here irresistibly. 
It is as though within the sublime landscape, be it a sea, high mountains, 
a desert or an infinite landscape of the mind there is already inscribed 
what is terrifying and horrible and from which we should distance ourselves 
and then modify by our art creating an enclosure of beauty, a not too 
large garden, for instance where we enjoy subjection by means of shears 
rather than scythe. The position of the gardener in Burke’s theory, however, 
must be different from that of the “submitted” object and the latter is actually 
denied any immediate contact with the sublime. If there is anything it can 
admire it is the greatness of the gardener who takes the place of the sublime 
and produces submissive objects which agreeably yield to his will or whim. 
Admiration or respect are emanations of the sublime, which, no longer sublime 
themselves, play exactly the same role as the sublime on some “lower” level. 
Burke’s “We,” in astonishment, submits to the force and terror of the sublime 
and thus hardened in the war with the alien enters society which loves this 
entry and voluntarily submits to it as it no longer brings threat but pure 
pleasure. This last image of warfare and sexuality brings to mind the question 
of feminization of the aesthetic discourse which I have mentioned earlier. 
Eagleton’s penchant for this theme makes him summarize Burke’s enterprise 
explicitly as a sexual violence of the upper-class which pretends it is not 
violent:
The sublime is an imaginary compensation Гог all the uproarious old upper-class 
violence, tragedy repeated as comedy. It is beauty’s point оГ inner fracture, 
a negation of settled order without which any order would grow inert and wither. 
The sublime is the anti-social condition of all sociality, the infinitely unrepresentable 
which spurs on to yet finer representations, the lawless masculine force which 
violates yet perpetually renews the feminine enclosure of beauty.10
What Eagleton does not notice, or at least does not say, is that the presence of 
the sublime is denied to the “feminine enclosure” to which it always already 
speaks from the position of the law of the masculine law formed and, as 
10 T. Eagleton, The Ideology..., p. 54.
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I have already said, hardened, in contact with the sublime. Its violence is thus 
legalized and, in effect, no longer felt as harmful, horrible — no longer felt as, 
exactly, violence. On the orderly social level the sublime simply does not exist 
and it is reserved to speculative thinking of the philosophers who expose 
themselves to violence in the name of (and for the sake of) happiness and of 
a Humean humanity which should engage itself in an exchange of some less 
lofty feelings and ideas: smaller, handier, more convenient, like the pleasures of 
embroidering, for instance. It is those who can naturally judge and tell good 
from evil, remedy from poison, sublime from beautiful, those naturally 
endowed with the proper taste who can formulate the law of taste and then 
teach others to discover it without providing them with things judged as 
tasteless or disgusting, like the sublime. The perpetual renewal of beauty, as 
necessary to avoid stagnation of ideas, is a matter of teaching and guiding 
others to discover beauty in things already offered as beautiful.
It is not a coincidence that Burke’s Enquiry begins with an “Introduction” 
On Taste, in which Burke does not quite define this category only saying that it 
must be stable and unchangeable thus grounding his theory on this stability. 
“And indeed,” he says,
it is very necessary, at the entrance into such an enquiry as our present, to make this 
point as clear as possible; for if taste has no fixed principles, if the imagination is not 
affected according to some invariable and certain laws, our labour is like to be 
employed to very little purpose; as it must be judged as useless, if not an absurd 
undertaking, to lay down rules for caprice, and to set up for a legislator of whims 
and fancies.11
I
Tastes, unlike caprices or whims, do not quite differ. If they did, then one 
might find the sublime beautiful, or a little object disagreeable. Interestingly, 
Burke seems not to love the “little purpose” of a useless and absurd work 
implying, probably, that the purpose should be great, if not sublime, and that 
it should be the formulation of fixed principles of taste which, as yet, have not 
been formulated (at least Burke does not know them) and which must be 
formulated in order that Burke’s certainty as to their existence is confirmed. 
Whims and fancies do not need a legislator as they are but feminine trifles 
which can be regulated if the proper principles of taste are legislated. Though 
the only argument for the existence of such principles is the absurdity of 
Burke’s (or “our,” as he probably speaks in the name of philosophers) 
Enquiry, it is upon this principle that he constructs his theory, actually 
failing to tell us what the sublime is and telling us that it, in a sense, does not 
exist (it is, in fact, Eagleton who tells us with some precision what it is). Since 
the sublime is accessible only through mediation and distance its immediate 11
11 E. Burke, A Philosophical..., p. 3.
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presence making us unable to conceive of it, we cannot verbalize it as some 
sort of positive category. Eventually, at the very beginning of the Enquiry, 
we learn that the great purpose of the book is scepticism and modesty, a total 
mistrust of our understanding:
If an enquiry thus carefully conducted, should fail at last of discovering the truth, it 
may answer an end perhaps as useful, in discovering the weakness of our own 
understanding. If it does not make us knowing, it may make us modest.12
Hidden in the structure of the conditional sentence there is a promise, however 
faint, that in the midst of uncertainty, Burke has perhaps formulated some 
kind of truth. Still modestly, a few pages later, he warns the reader that s/he 
should not expect a “full dissertation on the Sublime and Beautiful” because 
Burke’s task was much more modest than the completeness of explanation, 
that he “went no farther than the origin of these ideas.”13 Thus having said 
that going to beginnings of things is but a very modest enterprise, he goes on 
to say that, in fact, he wrote about the qualities of things rather than origins, 
and that it is really irrelevant whether he wrote about a sublime or a beautiful:
If the qualities which I have ranged under the head of the Sublime be all found 
consistent with each other, and all different from those which I place under the head 
of Beauty [...JI am in little pain whether any body chooses to follow the name I give 
them or not, provided he allows that what I dispose under different heads are in 
reality different things in nature. The use I make of the words may be blamed, as too 
confined or extended; my meaning cannot well be misunderstood.14
It now turns out that Burke writes about difference which he believes is there, 
but which he cannot really verbalize. He is modest as regards his use of words, 
but he is quite certain that regardless of the words, the meaning is the last, 
unmovable instance which one must not question. There is a sublime, and 
there is a beautiful, but both are accessible only by analogy, through their 
qualities which are never things in themselves, but, like words, exist analogical­
ly, away from what they name.
Burke reaches to the origin of the ideas of the sublime and the beautiful 
through qualities, indirectly, without presenting the object as such simul­
taneously underlining his inability to present which, in Lyotard’s reading of 
Kant, is the paradox of the sublime which “involves the finality of 
a non-finality and the pleasure of an unpleasure.”15 Burke’s meaning is offered 
12 Ibid., pp. vi-vii.
13 Ibid., p. ix.
14 Ibid., pp. ix-x.
15 J.-F. Lyotard, “The Sign of History,” in Post-Structuralism and the Question of History, 
D. Attridge, G. Bennington and R. Young, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1987), 
p. 171.
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the reader as a pleasure to be achieved away from writing, as a finality (origin, 
perhaps) which writing cannot finalize. Needless to say, the way Burke’s 
meaning is to be understood, or seen, is through the operation which is 
constitutive of his theory of the sublime: withdrawal and modification. Writing 
as such is uncertain and words can obscure the meaning which is, as it were, an 
enclosure of beauty which in its purity cannot be taken for something else and 
which submits to us provided that we reduce the obscurity of writing by 
eventually rejecting it for the sake of truth, if “to make any thing very terrible, 
obscurity seems in general to be necessary,” then writing makes things 
terrifying, potentially productive of things which do not exist in the light of 
meaning (and reality), such as “the notions of ghosts and goblins, of which 
none can form clear ideas.”16 Thus in order to see what the sublime and the 
beautiful really are, to see Burke’s meaning, one has to withdraw from the 
obscure sublime of writing, actually deny the sublime, in order to safely dwell 
where everything is small, nice, and clear. The sublime can be made present 
only in its absence exactly in the way meaning can be really present only in the 
absence of writing, when writing is seen as only a dark or obscure horizon 
behind which we approach the areas of uncertainty and the vastness of infinity. 
“Hardly any thing,” says Burke,
can strike the mind with its greatness, which does not make some sort of approach 
towards infinity; which nothing can do whilst we are able to perceive its bounds; but 
to see an object distinctly, and to perceive its bounds, is one and the same thing. 
A clear idea is therefore another name for a little idea.17
Little ideas, like small objects, are of course beautiful things, and Burke’s 
lesson of modesty which his Enquiry is to teach us is also the lesson of the 
beautiful, a lesson of aesthetics. Burke does not want to strike anybody’s mind 
with any greatness and all he wants to do is present some clear, and thus little, 
ideas of the sublime and of the beautiful which both, as clear and small, are 
now wholly submitted to human understanding. It is the bounds, the frame 
(Kant’s parergon) which negatively constitute the work accomplished, the idea, 
which, however dark, obscure and close to infinity, is not contaminated or 
darkened by those approaches of infinity which constitute the limit constitutive 
of their presence. Writing is thus a substitute of some nonverbal com­
munication of ideas which must be seen only as a limit, as the dangerous 
approach of the sublime, of darkness and uncertainty where “clear” and 
“little” mean different things but which, in the reality of presence, are in fact 
the same. Burke does declare that words are “The proper manner of conveying 
16 E. Burke, A Philosophical..., p. 99.
17 Ibid., pp. 107—108.
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the affections of the mind from one to another,” because “there is a great 
insufficiency in all other methods of communication” (like music), simul­
taneously declaring that he uses words exactly for the reason that they are not 
quite clear. The access to clear things must lead through the perception of its 
bounds, through the threat of obscurity, because without this limit one could 
not really talk about the pleasures of making things submit, of making 
them small, or little, or clear. It is not being beautiful which is the sphere of 
interest of Burke, but making and becoming beautiful.
The pleasure of writing is thus the pleasure of laying things bare without 
quite depriving them of the “dress” which obscures them, but which 
seductively promises their nakedness and prompts man to action, to writing, 
for instance, whose very movement promises and actually makes the object of 
desire to which, or whom, it does not want to grant any idependence outside 
writing whose bounds the object has to continually perceive. A naked object is 
a desublimated object whose naked beauty, whose clearness, whose immediate 
accessibility makes it unattractive. “In reality,” Burke declares, “a great 
clearness helps but little towards affecting the passions, as it is in some sort an 
enemy to all enthusiasms whatsoever.”18 Symptomatically read, this last 
statement says that clearness and beauty breed impotence, that once made 
naked, truth, idea, or whatever that has been made naked is incapable of 
exciting any pleasures. Burke’s Enquiry which, as a philosophical text, 
promises to lay bare both the sublime and the beautiful, or at least, more 
modestly, their origins “in reality” says that things are neither purely sublime 
nor purely beautiful, both sublimity and beauty being little and clear ideas 
whose existence, like the existence of some stable foundations of taste, one 
cannot doubt though one has to satisfy oneself (and quite perversely so, as the 
eventual satisfaction is the end of affection) with the analogy, with qualities 
which are a mixture of both, which are neither this nor that, but which point to 
their origins in a presence, or in presences, which Burke cannot, and does not 
want to, uncover. Modesty which we are supposed to learn from the failure of 
(his) presentation is ambiguous as it propagates a Barthesian jouissance, 
a pleasure without separation,19 a textual pleasure without an eventual 
satisfaction (which is the end of pleasure) simultaneously renderning this 
pleasure as dissatisfying exactly because the object to be “consumed” by the 
reader is separated from the text, lies outside it as a pure meaning or a cause 
which is only accessible through its effects, through phenomena or qualities 
which distort and hide their purity. Burke admits that what he is really 
18 Ibid., p. 102.
19 Cf. R. Barthes, “From Work to Text,” trans. S. Heath, in Image-Music-Text, S. Heath, ed. 
(Fontana/Coliins 1977), p. 164.
74
presenting is neither sublime nor beautiful and then clearly declares that 
what is at stake is a phenomenology which searches for noumena, for 
blackness of black and whiteness of white, and not for some actualizations 
which are imperfect:
If the qualities of the sublime and beautiful are sometimes found united, does this 
prove that they are the same; does it prove even that they are not opposite and 
contradictory? Black and white may soften and blend; but they are not therefore the 
same. Nor, when they are so softened and blended with each other, or with different 
colours, is the power of black as black, or of white as while, so strong as when each 
stands uniform and distinguished.20
The sublime and beautiful, like black and white, are thus rendered as principles 
which establish the practice of their actualization but which themeselves 
cannot be expressed or defined, they always exist in the middle, partaking of 
both extremes thus testifying to their existence. Any immediate contact with 
those principles is both impossible and actually deadly, as paralyzing as the 
unmediated sublime. The power of black or white is an instituting power of 
presence and order which in itself cannot be formulated, it is the power of the 
law whose formal formulation is actually reformulation, a distorting work of 
writing which, if believed to be only an expression without distortion, leads to 
the distortion of natural order comparable to the distortions caused by the 
French Revolution so abhorred by Burke. Burke loves the unformalizable 
exactly because there is a power in it (like in black or white), an informal 
power of sorts which belittles the world, confines it to an actualization of the 
unwritten law which we desire, but which is available to us only in 
a pleasurable garment and thus an aesthetic object which we can enjoy in the 
manner Burke wants to enjoy the English constitution in which he sees “the 
most glorious work of art,” as Eagleton phrases it.21 It is exactly the law made 
naked, and thus unpleasurable, which is the main aspect of Burke’s dislike for 
the revolution in France. After the revolution
all is to be changed. All the pleasing illusions, which made power gentle and 
obedience liberal, which harmonized assimilation, incorporated into politics the 
sentiments which beautify and soften private society, are to be dissolved by this new 
conquering empire of light and reason. All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely 
torn off.22
Here is yet another aspect of Burke’s modesty. Nakedness in any form is 
indecent and is only made decent when somehow covered. Society must 
20 E. Burke, A Philosophical..., p. 239.
21 T. Eagleton, The Ideology..., p. 43.
22 E. Burke, Reflections on the French Revolution (London 1955), p. 75.
75
be decently lovable, submissive only to a certain extent, according to taste, of 
course, whose principles are also dressed or hidden within our hearts or minds. 
The post-revolution society is a desublimated society because, paradoxically, it 
stands face to face with the naked power of the sublime now rendered not 
exactly as darkness, but as a blinding light in which there is no shade to hide. 
This light must also be very cold because, further exploring the metaphor of 
dress and nakedness, Burke also says that we shiver in it:
All the superadded ideas, furnished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination, 
which the heart owns, and the understanding ratifies, as necessary to cover the defect 
of our naked, shivering nature, and to raise it to dignity in our own estimation, are 
to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd, and antiquated fashion.23
Revolution brings fashion for nakedness and a country where everybody is 
naked is quite evidently not lovable, or lovely (“To make us love our country, 
our country ought to be lovely”)24 for Burke. Dress is an artificial thing, but as 
it dwells in the wardrobes of our hearts it is as natural as our feelings. Deep in 
our heart, we are what we wear — this could be Burke’s redefinition of taste 
— thus making the defective “vulgar nature” into la belle nature which 
dignifies. Since it is irrelevant for Burke, as we have seen, what “heads” he 
gives to his meanings we might say that the word “revolution” is a synonym of 
the sublime, of the unrestrained power to make us submit against which we 
shiver, against which we are incapable of thinking or imagining and thus of 
“ratifying” what we should cover our nakedness with. Under the rule of the 
sublime in its pure, naked from, we become naked and defenseless against pure 
hegemony, pure power which makes us submit.
Away from that sublime, across the Channel, where decently dressed 
people decently live in a lovely, green country the sublime is unwelcome. 
The English make their country lovely, they design gardens thus covering 
all the defects of naked nature according to the taste which they negotiate 
with the British genius of the place. What is, let us repeat, is what it should be, 
and what should be is a nice dress, an artifice or a certain degree of 
luxury which Goldsmith saw as an artificial necessity and which Burke secs 
as equally necessary “superadded ideas” which naturally dwell in human 
hearts.
Spences’s principles "of garden design nicely annihilate the sublime without 
even mentioning it because in the landscape of continuous gardens without 
fences there is simply no room for anything alien and hostile, and even in the 
yet uncultivated areas there is a depository of the proper garment in the hands 
23 Ibid., p. 74.
24 Ibid., p. 75.
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of the genius of the place. France never had such a genius, and the designs 
of French gardens are but reflections of the ancien regime which never dwelt 
in human hearts and thus never had any contact with any nature. The artifice 
of the French garden is a pure, external artifice dictated by the will of the ruler 
who plants what he wants and where he wants and the regular geometry of 
such gardens is but an emanation of pure artifice as opposed to naturalized 
artifice of the British. The French Revolution, as seen by Burke, at least, is but 
a reversed version of the old regime, an elevation of pure reason whose proper 
place is in one’s heart.
Kant’s critique of pure reason, let us remark here, was also a critique of the 
French Revolution in which he saw an outburst of enthusiasm (which is for 
him the extreme limit of the sublime), of chaos and disorder uncontrolled by 
the moral law whose place is within. As a product of pure reason without 
rather than within, revolution is a dementia of sorts which is “occasioned by 
an object which is almost pure disorder, which has no figure [...] which is an 
abstraction refractory to all functions of presentation — even by analoga."25 
If presenting is, for Burke, a way of dressing, of writing necessarily only 
analogical to what it presents, then Kant’s vision of the French Revolution 
presents it as “undressable,” as a non-object so contrary to human nature that 
its disagreability is morally elevating as it allows humanity to judge it exactly 
as sublime, and thus testifies to “the progress of the faculty of judgement in 
mankind.”26
The Kantian sublime, regardless of whether inspired by Burke, Addison, or 
Kant himself, is openly a promise of the eventual triumph of reason as the 
faculty of judgement over sensibility. Burke’s sublime as such is a dreadful 
thing which can be made pleasantly terrifying by distance and modification by 
diminishing it as it were to what is more agreeable to our senses, by dressing it 
with a garment from the wardrobes of our hearts, to return to a metaphor of 
dressing so dear to Burke. Reason but “ratifies” the selection of the clothing 
which in itself is dictated by taste rather than reason. Reason alone, reason 
without heart, is as sublime as the French Revolution and its victory over 
sensibility would be necessarily a victory of oppression dictating to us how to 
dress and write; what is pleasurable and what is not. Kant does actually the 
same, only having subjected reason to a human subject, having made it 
subjective, he can make use of this category as always already, at least partially, 
dwelling within man, within the human heart, and thus constituting a sensible 
reason of sorts which will eventually take the rule in its hand rather then confine 
itself to the more modest role of the “ratifier.” Reasonably speaking, Kant says 
that there is no sublime simultaneously giving us its definition:
25 J.-F. Lyotard, “The Sign...,” p. 174.
26 Ibid., p. 177.
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The sublime is that in comparison with which all else is small. Here we readily 
see that nothing can be given in nature, no matter how great we judge it to be, 
which, regarded in some other relation, may not be degraded to the level of 
the infinitely little, and nothing so small which in comparison with some still 
smaller standard may not for our imagination be enlarged to the greatness of the 
world.27
Mathematically, greatness as such is nonexistent and numbers can only be 
greater or smaller than other numbers, and for this reason we are always 
capable of diminishing or enlarging what seems to us great or small. The 
ultimate greatness could only be an infinity. Reason, however, demands 
presentation, it operates with units and totalities, and it “will not exempt even 
the infinite [...] but rather renders it inevitable for us to regard this infinite 
[...] as completely given (i.e. given in its totality).”28 The sublime is thus 
thinkable only as long as imagination inadequately judges the measures of 
things and does not see in the infinite a rational, ultimate measure of all things. 
Instead of stopping in its work, as in Addison, imagination should be 
supplemented by the faculty to judge and thus diminish or totalize the 
something which fills it with terror. In the same way the French Revolution, 
despite its seeming chaos and terrifying disruption of order, is pleasurable as 
a promise of the rule of the faculty of judgement, exactly because it evokes the 
feeling of terror
The feeling of the sublime is [...] at once a feeling of displeasure, arising from the 
inadequacy of imagination in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude to attain to its 
estimation by reason, and a simultaneously awakened pleasure, arising from the very 
judgement of the inadequacy of sense being in accord with ideas of reason, so far as 
the effort to attain to these is for us law.29
In Burke there was a moment of pure astonishment caused by the paralyzing 
inflow of vastness which was then followed by the instinctive movement 
backward, by our compulsion for diminishing. In Kant the displeasure and 
pleasure are simultaneous so that there is no time left for the experience of an 
unpleasurable pleasure. It is this simultaneous awakening of pleasure that 
makes the sublime actually nonexistent, or, better, almost nonexistent. The 
sublime is something which almost cannot be presented because it is colossal, 
a concept which attracts Derrida’s attention in his discussion of Kant’s 
parergon because described by Kant as
27 I. Kant, The Critique of Judgement, trans. I. C. Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1973), p. 97.
28 Ibid., p. 97.
29 Ibid., p. 106.
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“almost too large for any presentation” (der fur alle Darstellung beinahe zu gross ¡st). 
A concept can be too big, almost too big for presentation. [...] It did not slip from 
Kant’s pen. [...] The almost too retains a certain categorical fixity. It is repeated 
regularly, and each time associated with big?0
What is inscribed within the “almost too” is the possibility of the finitude of 
infinity, of its totalization. Blake’s dream of holding infinity in the palm of 
one’s hand seems to find its realization in Kantian subjectivism in which the 
human subject itself becomes “almost infinite” as capable of absorbing things 
almost too big for its capacity. Approaches of infinity are both frustrating and 
pleasurable as they confirm that what seems to be beyond our capacity can be 
entirely capacitated, we become aware, as Paul Crowther says, “that we are 
beings with capacities that transcend the limitations of our finite phenomenal 
existence.”30 1 Such limitations, however, are necessarily paradoxical ones, as 
they are the limitations of the unlimited, the realization that there is 
a (supersensible) limit (law) which “capacitates” us to somehow cope with 
infinity. We can transcend the infinite exactly by putting the limit upon it, by 
supplementing the infinite with a parergon, a frame which thus translates the 
infinite into an ergon, the work accomplished.
Though both Burke and Kant see the sublime mostly in nature rather than 
in art, in roaring oceans, high mountains and vast deserts, they simultaneously 
frame the sublime in the gesture of its limitation, in diminishing i^to the size 
commensurable with the capacities of human understanding and taste. Since 
the sublime is simultaneously defined, or “de-fined,” as Derrida phrases it, “as 
indefinable for the understanding,”32 we make it accessible to it as an already 
aesthetic object thus transgressing the limit of our non-understanding. 
Otherwise it would be impossible to talk, like Burke, about the opposition of 
the sublime and the beautiful as an opposition “can only arise between two 
determinate objects, having their contours, their edges, their finitude.”33 
Paradoxically, neither is it possible to speak of an opposition after the sublime 
has been already framed as the latter gesture domesticates the sublime 
within the field of the aesthetic experience and renders it but a species of the 
beautiful.
The starry sky above Kant’s head reminds him of the moral law within, 
infinity is transcended into the finitude of the subject. The starry sky is infinite, 
which does not terrify Kant at all, and which actually assures him of the 
30 J. Derrida, The Truth in Painting, trans. G. Bennington and I. McLeod (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press 1987), p. 125.
31 P. Crowther, The Kantian Sublime. From Morality to Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991), 
p. 100.
32 J. Derrida, The Truth..., p. 126.
33 Ibid., p. 127.
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existence of the moral law within. The sublime necessitates Kant’s judgement, 
tells him that there is a law of which Kant is so certain that he does not see 
that this certainty is already a judgement, a subjective one. Moral law exists 
within as the starry sky above, and Kant’s outside is but a bodily vessel which 
contains the law, but which is simultaneously not his private law, but 
a universal one, shared by all and executed in their judgements. The law is 
thus the very essence of the subject, the supersensible constitution whose 
unwritten articles all of us follow being thus obedient only to ourselves. Like 
the genius of the place in an English garden, the moral law tells us from within 
what we should be, what is good and what is bad. We do what we like, we are 
free, because we naturally like good and dislike bad things. This punning 
confusion of ethics and aesthetics reflects Kant’s use of beauty as a symbol of 
what is morally good, and which enables him to render aesthetic judgements 
equally universal as the moral ones:
the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, and only in this light (a point of 
view natural to every one, and which every one exacts from others as duty) does it 
give us pleasure with an attendant claim to the agreement of everyone.34 35
Since the moral law, as the supersensible, can hardly be made present to the 
senses, it is the aesthetic pleasure which symbolically reflects the unfelt 
pleasure of the good. Aesthetics is the reflection of ethics, but simultaneously 
the only means to somehow present the latter. Since an exacting of duty is also 
at stake, the question of aesthetics is inevitably the question of politics as it is 
in fact taste, the aesthetic judgement, which, as universal, legitimizes some use 
of power against those whose points of view are less natural.
The ethical subject is impenetrable, inaccessible to any kind of know­
ledge as an unrepresentable depth but it comes up, as it were, to the social 
sphere by displaying its taste which is an analogical presentation of its 
unpresentable morals. Kant’s rhetoric, interestingly, sees this coming up as 
going down in which mind becomes conscious of “a certain ennoblement 
and elevation above mere sensibility to pleasure from impressions of sense.”3 s 
Self-in-itself like a thing-in-itself is grounded upon the supersensible a priori, 
a noumenon whose analogical presentation in ennobling because 
it endows us with an intuition of there being something beyond mere 
phenomena, something which rhetorically presented as ground, is simul­
taneously posited on the level below the level of presentation, but whose 
intuitive realization moves us up, makes us transcend ourselves as only 
phenomenal. Judgements of taste restricted to the phenomenal sphere of our 
34 I. Kant, The Critique..., pp. 223—224.
35 Quoted in P. Crowther, The Kantian..., p. 72.
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experience are thus as it were extensions of the noumenal and the noumen« 
functions as some pure origin which determines the judgements of taste exactly 
as the unwritten law. Hence taste, like in Burke, is both free and confined 
universal and subjective. The phenomenal is not knowledge, let us repeat, but 
its rhetorical projection, a distortion of sorts, a “pseudo-knowledge” which 
known as the aesthetic,” as Eagleton phrases it.
When, for Kant, we find ourselves concurring spontaneously in an aesthetic 
judgement, able to agree that a certain phenomenon is sublime or beautiful, we 
exercise a precious form of intersubjectivity, establishing ourselves as a community 
of feeling subjects linked by a quick sense of our shared capacities. The aesthetic is in 
no way cognitive, but it has about it something of the form and structure of the 
rational; it thus unites us with all the authority of a law, but at a more affective, 
intuitive level.36
This intuitive unification with the law, however, is based on the mechanism of 
the already mentioned framing of the sublime which is also done intuitively. 
Sublimity, like the law, resides in our minds rather then outside, in nature, and 
the fact that we are capable of judging something as sublime testifies, as we 
have seen, to the existence of the faculty to judge rather than to the existence of 
the sublime. This may sound like a total misreading of Kant’s ideas, but it is 
really difficult not to see an affinity between the noumenal and the sublime in 
his theory.
Both the sublime and the noumenal are in themselves formless, unrep­
resentable, the difference being that the sublime is a projection of infinity 
while the noumenal can be intuited only as a law. The sublime is intuiti­
vely terrifying, the noumenal is pleasing, both being productive of the 
necessity of their rendition, or projection, on the level of the aesthetic 
as not presentable in themselves. They both meet on the level of mediation as 
symbols of something else, as neither this nor that, as a mixture of black and 
white, for instance, as to whose existence Burke had no doubts, but which 
he could not make present in his Enquiry. Simultaneously, however, the 
symbolic sphere of representation is the sphere which keeps the sublime 
and the noumenal apart thus positing both of them as uncategorisable 
categories in order to perceive which one really has to be endowed with 
another eye to see what Northrop Frye terms the “real reality” as opposed to 
the fake one available to us which the Romantics attempted to somehow do 
without:
[...] the shadow of Kant’s riddle falls across the whole Romantic movement. The 
world that we see and understand is not the noumenon, the world in itself, but 
36 T. Eagleton, The Ideology..., p. 75.
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only the world as phenomenon, as adapted to our categories of reasoning. The 
inference is that real reality, so to speak, cannot be known, at least by the subject 
object relationship.31
I shall shortly discuss the Romantic attempt at achieving an unmediated vision 
(Geoffery Hartman’s term) taking Coleridge’s writing as an example. Let us 
note here, however, that the riddle Frye talks about might actually be two 
riddles, or better, two in one — that of noumena and that of the sublime which 
Kant opens to an potential exploration exactly by rendering both as 
unrepresentable, and thus somehow present. As such, both spheres are really 
shadowy spheres which in fact mix into one and which, regardless of Kant’s 
postulates, are rhetorically offered as presentable as another nature, as kind 
of super-nature in order to cope with which one has also to be equipped 
with a super-vision and a super-language transcending the already existing 
representations which, as analogous, do not, of course, penetrate into the 
worlds within and without. That the new, romantic vision discovers super­
natural, infinite worlds of imagination simultaneously searching for their 
unity is but an imaginative reproduction of the sublime potentially being 
hidden in anything unrepresentable, in the “noumenal” law and order of 
things in themselves which, once rendered as accessible, become a nature which 
“is not at all natural but is an extra-ordinary, super-natural world, one that 
holds us at a distance and in awe,” as Anthony Cascardi puts it.* 38 The 
movement is thus not quite from the sublime to the natural, as the title of 
Cascardi’s essay suggests, but from the aesthetic back to the sublime repressed 
by the artifice of representation, back to “unrepresentation.”
Before we have a look at romanticism, which due to its traditional 
placement in the chronology of history can really be interpreted as an countcr- 
-discourse of Kant’s system, let us read some texts in which a certain 
movement outside the confines of the aesthetic is also observable, but whose 
landscapes are still discernible only through the already represented, which are 
discernible through the eye, as Blake had it, without quite giving up “the 
guiding metaphors of the eye and sight” whose abandonment Cascardi more 
or less rightly sees (after Hartman) as the prerequisite of the romantic 
oxymoron of “unmediated vision”39 in which we do not really see anything.
31 N. Frye, A Study of English Romanticism (New York: Random House 1968), p. 84.
38 A. J. Cascardi, “From the Sublime to the Natural: Romantic Responses to Kant,” in 
Literature and the Question of Philosophy, A. J. Cascardi, ed. (Baltimore and London: The Johns 




(On Smith, Swedenborg, Blake and Godwin)
You may say I’m a dreamer...
John Lennon
You will say I too am a dreamer;
Jcan-Jacqucs Rousseau
There will be no war, no crimes, no administration of 
justice, as it is called, and no government. Beside this, 
there will be no disease, anguish, melancholy, nor 
resentment. Every man will seek, with ineffable ardour, 
the good of all.
William Godwin
In his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) Adam Smith compares human 
society to a “beautiful and noble machine” in which
whatever tended to render its movements more smooth and easy, would derive 
a beauty from this effect, and, on the contrary, whatever tended to obstruct them 
would displease in that account: so virtue, which is, as it were, the fine polish to the 
wheels of society, necessarily pleases; while vice, like the vile rust, which makes them 
jar and grate upon one another, is as necessarily offensive.1
Smith does not say who the one who tends, the mechanic, is but the “wheels of 
society” are, probably, individuals. The society is beautiful when it works
1 A. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Oxford 1976), p. 316.
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smoothly, without the interruption on the part of those wheels which have 
not been lubricated by virtue, on the part of the rusty ones which not only lack 
“the fine polish” but also, by their very presence within the mechanism, 
obstruct the smooth motions of its other parts.
Virtue is thus a kind of immaterial substance, a pure oil which fills in the 
spaces between the individuals so that they are not offensive to each other. 
What somehow personifies the wheels of the machine in Smith’s metaphor is 
the feeling of pleasure which seems to be pleasing both for the “tender” of the 
machine as well as for its elements, members. The tender of the machine does 
ot necessarily have to be external to the construction, a designer who, once 
having created it, only looks after its proper functioning by adding some virtue 
here and there so that the world smoothly goes on. If this was the case, all the 
blame for the mechanism’s “malfunction” could be put on him. If anything, he 
has created the wheels, the individuals whose choice it is now to either function 
beautifully and pleasurably, or remain rusty and thus evil and uncomfortable 
both to themselves, and to the social mechanism.
Smith also compares society to more “aesthetic” an object than a machine, 
however beautiful and noble; to an orchestra: “the great pleasure of con­
versation and society [...] arises from a certain correspondence of sentiments 
and opinion, from a certain harmony of minds, which like so many musical 
instruments coincide and keep time with one another.”2 The virtue which 
harmonised the functioning of the machine is thus an object whose being 
appropriate (i.e. harmonious) can be verified only in comparison with 
other elements of the machine, with other instruments partaking of the 
production of the harmonious whole. The harmony, both that of the machine 
and that of the orchestra takes place outside the human body, it is the 
pleasurable sound of well tuned instruments, a correspondence of feelings and 
sentiments which, in order to correspond, must be more or less of the same 
order. It is not words used in conversation or correspondence which are 
pleasurably agreeable, but the uniform “sentiments and opinion” which they 
express. In this sense the virtue, the true sentiment also exists within man, 
constitutes man’s kernel or soul which has to be only expressed by the body, let 
outside, as it were, and then takes part in the unison choir of the social 
orchestra.
Man, social man, “takes place” outside himself and the kernel of his soul 
is also somewhere else than himself because it can only be made available 
when externalized and matched against other externalized insides, other 
harmonious, virtuous feelings which populate the world. Smith’s image of 
society is exactly that of going outside oneself to some collective marketplace 
and attuning oneself to the feelings of others. Rousseau writes about this kind
2 Ibid., p. 337.
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of transportation without recourse to a metaphor. We can be really free, 
natural citizens only provided that we are capable of
transporting ourselves outside ourselves, and identifying ourselves with the suffering 
animal, leaving our being, so to speak, in order to take his [...] Thus no one becomes 
sensitive except when his imagination is animated and begins to transport himself 
outside himself?
This going out of oneself must be done voluntarily in order that the social 
compact thus achieved is just and rightful. The name Rousseau gives to this 
transportation outside in The Social Contract (1762) is “alienation,” or, rather, 
the verb “to alienate” which Rousseau quite explicitly defines: “To alienate is 
to give or to sell.”3 4 5Selling oneself is slavery and this is exactly the principle of 
tyranny which buying one’s liberty is free to dictate its arbitrary, external laws 
to the society. By selling himself man alienates himself from his freedom. He 
does goes out of himself, but cannot come back, as it were, because he now 
belongs to someone else. In order that the law is natural, and thus just, the 
individual should alienate himself by giving himself, and only himself. Yet he 
should not give himself, say, charitably, for nothing:
To say that a man gives himself gratuitously is to say what is absurd and 
inconceivable; such an act is null and illegitimate, from the mere fact that he who 
does it is out of his mind. To say the same of a whole people is to suppose a people 
of madmen; and madness creates no right?
Addison’s going abroad oneself was both confined and gratified by beauty. In 
Rousseau the gratification, the pleasure seems to be that of the smooth, 
natural society. Going outside oneself for nothing is even worse than 
monarchy (selling oneself) because it leads to the chaos of anarchy in which 
there is a lot of freedom and nobody to be free. Pure charity is madness 
because it leads to the dissolution of the society through the dissolution of 
one’s freedom to give oneself which is the instituting property of man as 
a social being. Hence the paradox of Rousseau’s right to be free: one is free to 
be free only provided that one accepts it as an obligation and gives oneself for 
this purpose.
The property of liberty is human interest and duty, and he who renounces 
it either by selling himself or by giving himself without that interest in mind is 
no longer a human being: “To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, 
3 J.-J. Rousseau, Emile ou de ¡"education, vol. IV (Paris 1961), p. 261. Quoted by T. Eagleton, 
The Ideology..., p. 24.
4 J.-J. Rousseau, “The Social Contract,” in Les philosophes, (N. L. Torrey, ed.), p. 146.
5 Ibid., pp. 146—147.
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to surrender the rights of humanity and even its duties.”6 Freedom is thus 
rendered as a virtue which is simultaneously a pleasurable gratification, and it 
is in the context of this virtue that Rousseau uses the word “sublime.” “La 
plus sublime vertu est negative; elle nous instruit de ne jamais faire du mal 
a persone.” If human interest is to be happy then giving oneself for happiness 
one must not do any harm to the freedom of others. Freedom must come 
from others who do not interfere in it — hence the necessity of going outside 
oneself, giving oneself and still remaining oneself. One has to remain oneself in 
order that others remain themselves within the agreeable whole of the society 
and one’s going out of oneself must be limited to the sublime virtue of not 
doing harm to others, of lubricating, to return to Smith’s metaphor for a while, 
the wheels of the machine without falling out of it, which could be disruptive 
for its working.
The sublime negative virtue of Rousseau is thus the highest point a man 
can reach if he wants to still remain a human being, and the transgression of 
this point, one’s giving oneself disinterestedly, leads to the madness of 
nonbeing, to the dismantling of the mechanism in which there is nothing 
but, say, lubricants, a creation of the sphere of infinity conversant with either 
God or with nothing. Rousseau, like Addison, stops short of that sphere 
confining sublimity to the pleasure and virtue of being oneself for the sake of 
oneself and others rendering the sphere at whose sight Addison’s imagination 
stops in its working as a nothingness of madness rather than divinity.
Once such sphere has been pointed to, however, even as nothingness, 
its very possibility will both frighten and attract the human mind. It is the 
Age of Reason which, however paradoxically, opens up this sphere to 
human exploration. Its reason is reason itself which does not tolerate the 
unreasonable. Since, as we have seen in Addison, reason itself is productive 
of the spheres of infinity hardly accessible to man, reason becomes suspicious 
of itself and begins to explore, reasonably, the spheres it declares alien to 
it, the aesthetic spheres of feeling and sensibility which, once opened, begin 
to threaten with unreason and have to be reasonably closed down at a certain 
point, be it that of beauty, as in Addison, or that of one’s negative, sublime, 
virtue.
The liberating rhetoric of the discourse of feeling which promises the 
eventual naturalization of the human condition, as well as equality, freedom, 
harmony and happiness almost always stops short at the border of the sublime 
which is rendered as unlimited and simultaneously posited exactly as the 
border. The transgression of this border means the transgression of the sphere 
which has been delimited for humanity and becomes the sphere of the 
“possessed” who talk with Gods, like Blake or Swedenborg, who seek life
• Ibid., p. 146. 
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in death, like the Graveyard poets, or of hardly classifiable anarchists like 
Godwin whose contact with society, as we shall see, takes place on another 
planet, in the future of immortality. It is not the novel which the eighteenth 
century really offers us as a novelty. It is the novelty of the sublime which it 
promises and takes away exactly by means of what is novel, by means of the 
aesthetic pleasures of the mind which, thus liberated, will believe in its own 
freedom within the limits thus delineated.
Rousseau’s “giving oneself’ is thus giving oneself for oneself which is 
simultaneously the only way toward a happy society. About 1766 Emanuel 
Swedenborg will go a step farther and ask whether such an “interested” kind 
of giving is not a pretence of benevolence and will suggest not only that one 
should be charitable, but that the human being is born to become charity itself. 
Rousseau’s going out of oneself is actually done for the sale of negotiating 
social justice with other selves, preferably on the level of the exchange of 
natural feelings, of the natural, musical harmony which pre-exists language. 
His banishment of writing to the sphere of the supplement of speech is 
obviously dictated by the necessity of signing the social contract naturally, 
without any interference of the convention of writing. It is one’s very presence 
within the territory of a society which is the expression of one’s will to 
participate in the state thus commenced. In this sense expression, writes 
Derrida, “is the expression of affect, of the passion at the origin of language, of 
a speech that was first substituted for song, marked by tone and force."1 The 
society should be, as in Smith’s metaphor, musically attuned in a choir of pure 
sounds which express nothing but themselves, the purity of their free beings 
with nothing but desire to become parts of a larger whole.
Swedenborg makes no explicit reference to Rousseau in his unfinished 
sketch on charity, but since the idea of the harmonious choir of feelings is 
somehow reminiscent of Angelic choirs with whom Swedenborg, as is well 
known, used to communicate, and since there seems to be a certain, say, 
“negative affinity of ideas” in the two thinkers, let us have a brief look at 
Swedenborg’s text.
Already in the second sentence of De charitate (1766) Swedenborg says 
something quite contrary to Rousseau’s idea of wills of the citizens totalized 
within the general will of the state. “A man’s own will is nothing but evil. 
Unless he is reformed and regenerated, therefore, he not only remains as he 
was born, but even becomes worse, adding to the evils which he received 
hereditarily others done on his own account.”7 8 The original sin is thus 
7 J. Derrida, Of Grammatology, Irans. G. Spivak (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press 1976), p. 314.
8 E. Swedenborg, Charity, translated from Latin by W. F. Wunsch (New York: Swedenborg 
Foundation 1982), p. 27.
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that of our free will and Swedenborg’s “rege.,. ration” consists in our 
renunciation of it. Swedenborg does not write about “free will,” but about 
one’s “own will” thus allowing man some freedom: “Lord can remove 
evils if the man, for his part, tries to remove them.”9 101The will to remove sins 
and evil from us is thus not man’s own will (this is nothing but evil), which 
puts man in a peculiar predicament; he has to willingly, “for his part,” 
renounce his own will. The pleasure of one’s own will, and hence of one’s own 
being and being free is a pleasure of self-love, which is evil:
All evils are bom pleasurable, for we are born into self-love, and this love makes 
pleasurable all our own, all we ourselves will and think. Moreover, unless the 
pleasures of evil which are rooted in us from birth are conquered, we remain in them 
to the end of life. They are conquered only if thought of as agreeable poisons which 
kill, or as seemingly beautiful but poison-bearing flowers; in other words, only if 
they are regarded as deathdealing, and this until they turn undelightful.,0
The oxymoron of the “agreeable poison” is, like any oxymoron, a paradox. 
The oxymoron of “free bondage” in thinkers like Rousseau is also agreeable 
and pleasurable, it should lead to a pleasurable kind of life in a just and 
virtuous society. Addison’s “delightful horror,” or Burke’s sublime, “pleasing 
terror” are also oxymorons and they are also productive of the agreeable 
pleasures of the beautiful, of liberation of the mind. Elevating the discourse to 
the level of the “sublime of theology” (the term “sublime” is loaded with overt 
religious associations in the eighteenth century)11 Swedenborg actually reverts 
all the aesthetic and political pleasures into horrors. “Agreeable poison” is 
deadly exactly for the reason that it is agreeable. Pleasures are thus misleading 
and the beautiful atonement and at-one-ment of the social orchestra are but 
the hissings of the devil which must be recognized as such in order that we 
have a glimpse at the eternity and immortality of God. Charity, which in its 
pure form is, for Rousseau, madness, constitutes in Swedenborg the only way 
to go out of oneself and leave oneself behind, as it were.
Mr Allworthy defines chanty in Tom Jones (1749) as a virtue hardly 
attainable by humans because close to the spheres of angelic choirs: “that 
sublime Christian-like disposition, that vast elevation of thought, in purity 
approaching to angelic perfection, to be attained, expressed, and felt only by 
grace.”12 Once man found a secure location inside his ego, he became 
isolated from the sublime spheres which have become available only to grace. 
9 Ibid., p. 27.
10 Ibid.
11 Cf. A. Wilson, Turner and the Sublime (London: British Museum Publications 1980), 
p. 12.
12 Cf. H. Fielding, Tom Jones, Book II, Ch. V.
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“God exists, but he is out of reach,” as J. Hillis Miller puts it commenting on 
an Arthur Hugh Clough poem. “Modern times begin,” he says, “when man 
confronts his isolation, his separation from everything outside himself [...] 
with the inner experience of the isolated self’ which can be traced back to 
Montaigne and Descartes, and which results in the feeling of the absence of 
God, in “a radical sense of inner nothingness.”13 Rousseau’s man, as we have 
seen, does go out of himself, but he does so egoistically, in order to actually 
confine himself by natural law, to isolate himself from the approaches of the 
sublime which are destructive of order, beauty and harmony. Addison’s 
aesthetic sublime is also the religious sublime which is only a reminder of the 
presence of God in the sense of the Derridean restance — something which 
remains and is simultaneously left over.14 *The polite imagination does not 
explore the sublime and is only awakened by its approaches in order to be 
capable of creating a “finished” beauty. Swedenborg, having transgressed the 
finitude of the beautiful, transposes the discourse to the elevated sphere of 
godlike sublimity from whose perspective human beauty is a horrible beauty.
We do good things in this world, but these good things are actually evil as 
long as we have not noticed and repented ourselves from our own will which is 
the root of evil within us.
Evil is inwardly in us then, not opened, and therefore not cured, and real good 
cannot issue from evil — the fountain is impure. Good which issues from evil may 
wear the appearance of good, but in it is the man such as he is inwardly.13
The problem consists in distinguishing good from evil with a spiritual eye 
rather than with the human eye, as what seems to be good may eventually turn 
out to be evil. The verification, however, can be done from either an angelic 
perspective, or on one’s death. Rousseau’s image of man outside himself is 
used quite explicitly by Swedenborg here:
All we do is an image of us. Before the angels a man is thus imaged forth, quite 
outside himself; I have seen it a thousand times. [...] on death, when we are let into 
our inner nature, this good [done in bodily act] is taken away, and there is 
undisguised evil instead.16
Swedenborg speaks to us from the position of one endowed with a different 
kind of seeing reminiscent of Blake’s ability to see “through the eye” rather 
13 M. J. Hillis, The Disappearance of God (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press 
1975), pp. 7—8.
14 J. Derrida, Dissemination, trans. B. Johnson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 
1981), p. 8.
13 E. Swedenborg, Charity, p. 29.
16 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
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than with one. Swedenborg’s “semiology” is not very different from that of the 
sentimental writings in which feeling, as John Mullan puts it, “is above all 
observable,” where “tears, blushes and sighs — and a range of postures and 
gestures — reveal conditions of feeling which can connote exceptional virtue or 
allow for intensified forms of communication.”17 Swedenborg’s semiology is, 
additionally, an angelic kind of semiology which can tell, say, heaven from 
hell. Man can differentiate it only on his death, when his outside (i.e. whatever 
he does) is turned inside and when it is already too late to be good. In order to 
be really good man has to die during his lifetime, to achieve the angelic, 
spiritual insight into his inside which is done by means of repentance. This 
repentance consists in purifying ourselves from the originary evil which is, 
exactly, ourselves, our own will and thus give ourselves to the Lord charitably, 
without any interest in ourselves. Then we can be endowed with the divine 
nature because the Lord will simply replace the devil within us:
[...] before repentance there is no charity of which the good is from the Lord, but 
from the man, but after repentance it becomes charity of which the good is not from 
the man but from the Lord. The Lord cannot enter a man and Himself accomplish 
any good through him before the Devil, that is evil, has been ejected, but only after 
he has been ejected, which is effected by repentance.18
The paradox is that in order to repent one has to have already repented, 
achieved the gift of seeing through oneself outside and discovered the devil 
in what he thought was good. Only having repented can one be good and see 
the good, otherwise he will be doing good which is from man, and hence 
from the devil within: “Good before repentance is not good.”19 The world 
does not know about goods done without repentance being evil, “but the fact 
is manifest after death.”20 Swedenborg moves here the moment of the 
revelation of truth from “on death” till “after death” thus inscribing death 
within life as the possibility of another life, a life after life of sorts, within the 
natural life as an impossible possibility, as a possibility of being oneself which 
one has to repent and thus no longer be oneself — a being, like Swedenborg, 
outside oneself which sees through oneself, whose “all [...] utterance resounds 
with the evil which is in one. Good before repentance is entirely 
self-regarding.”21
11 J. Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability. The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1988), p. 201.
18 E. Swedenborg, Charity, p. 31.
19 Ibid., p. 33.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., p. 34.
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Swedenborg’s good after repentance is thus a kind of being in the future, 
within the sphere yet absent to the senses of “the natural man.” It is exactly 
this natural aspect of man which Swedenborg desires to leave behind in the 
world of sin and go outside himself towards the realm of the spiritual still 
trying to, however vainly, preserve the continuity between the two worlds. 
This continuity is implicitly suggested in the very possibility of having 
written the book on charity addressed to people from the position of one 
who “a thousand times” had the pleasure of seeing both himself and others 
from the other side, from the position of an angel. In other words, the sublime 
can be beautiful provided its beauty is of a different order. Good in its fullness, 
the really charitable one, is endowed with such adjectives as “lovely, innocent, 
pleasing,” with the adjectives we have seen in the description of some 
more mundane spheres, but the last of the adjectives which modify it is 
“heavenly,” which, of course, redefines all the beauties and pleasures Sweden­
borg is writing about (“Good after repentance is utterly different. It is good in 
its fullness, unimpeded from the Lord Himself; it is lovely, innocent, pleasing, 
heavenly”).22 If the natural beings are endowed with the bodies whose 
movements signify their internal infernos, the spiritual ones silently breathe 
out their divine origin. Goodness after repentance
is living, shaped by truth. [...] It puts away self, that is, evil, with every breath. In 
form it is like lovely flower, beautifully colored, glistening in the sun’s rays. With 
those in good, therefore, there are forms of life which can never be comprehended by 
the natural man; they are unimaginable and cannot be described.23
The natural being is evil as a self while goodness consists in putting the 
self away, in putting away one’s presence in the world as self-identity. 
A good, spiritual being identifies itself only with the divine which its natural 
counterpart cannot comprehend or visualise, it is a living dead of sorts which 
sees the evil of the carcass which it has already put away and goes outside itself 
charitably, actually disintegrating in the infinity of the divine. This iden­
tification with the divine is also an identification with the sublime, the highest 
possible disintegration in which the horrible or terrible of the sublime is 
rendered as infinitely pleasurable while the pleasures of the beautiful, of the 
natural and human become desublimated and put away to the hell of mundane 
existence.
A similar idea of charity comes from Christopher Smart, a poet who spent 
a few years in a madhouse only to die in prison for debts. Human charity, in 




a nonidentity. “For God nevertheless is an extravagant BEING and generous 
unto loss;” he writes in Jubilate Agno (manuscript discovered in 1939) 
simultaneously, in the next line of this peculiar text, punningly endowing 
human beings with this generosity by inscribing it into the word “generation”: 
“For there is no profit in the generation of man.”24 Human charity comes 
from the charity of God who nothing but gives, who gives unto loss of 
Himself as an object of worship thus disseminating this nonidentity upon 
men who, in turn, rather than profiting from that generosity, should dissolve 
in the activity of prayer unto loss for practicing which Smart was confined 
in a private madhouse.
Disinterested charity leads to the loss of person and Swedenborg’s 
“theory” of neighbour leads, of course, to the disintegration of both person 
and society as “bodily” creatures and their re-integration on the level of 
goodness which functions, as we have seen, on the levels of sublimity 
inaccessible to natural man. “A society is the neighbor because it is 
a composite man,”25 writes Swedenborg, but it does not mean that it is other 
persons with whom one “neighbours” within this composite being. “Good is 
the neighbor,” and it is this neighbourhood of goodness which constitutes the 
spiritual community of equally good spirits rather than men:
One individual is not the neighbor more than another merely in the point of person, 
but as to the good from which he is the man he is.26
Without an angelic insight we cannot tell a good man from an evil one just as 
we cannot really distinguish between good and bad societies (composite men). 
The reason for this is that “in the course of time man has become external, 
having turned away from love to the Lord to wisdom.”27 Rousseau’s going 
outside oneself as a gesture of liberating one’s natural self is misleading for 
Swedenborg because the body obstructs the true externalization of the spirit. 
Man has become external and all he is capable of perceiving are signs which 
belong to the level of understanding and reason. The external man can be blind 
to the evil within him and think himself good because his inside has been 
separated from him. It is again one’s death which has to be experienced in 
order that one can really see his inside and thus verify whether there is a true 
neighbour within. Only angels are internal men and their goodness speaks 
through their bodies:
24 The Poetical Works of Christopher Smart, K. Willimason, ed. (Oxford 1980), B 380, 
B 381. I discuss the question of identity in Christopher Smart in more detail in my Word and 
Confinement. Subjectivity in 'Classical' Discourse (Katowice: Uniwersytet Śląski 1992).
23 E. Swedenborg, Charity, p. 53.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 61.
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An angel in heaven appears as charity embodied. The character of the charity is 
visible in the face and audible in the voice. For after death we become our love, that 
is, our love’s affection. A spirit or angel is nothing else. Indeed the spirit or angel 
is a form of charity as to the whole body.28
Good has thus the form and the body of a spirit in order to see which one has 
to be a Swedenborg who speaks to us from the position of a living person who 
has already died and communed with angels. Without such persons there 
would be nobody to inform us about the possibility of our having become 
external and thus a society which only seems to be a smoothly working 
mechanism, like in Smith’s metaphor opening this chapter, and actually is 
being misled by that smoothness which has been achieved exactly by our 
externalization to the point of becoming blind to the truly sublime inside. We 
might be good, but we can never be certain of it unless there are really “sincere 
men” among us who, like Swedenborg, will keep an internal eye on us and will 
try to recognize who is who. Even if there are such persons, however, the 
absolute certainty has to wait till the time they become angels:
Still a sincere man with no thoughts contrary to charity can be recognized by face 
and voice, though with some difficulty because there are hypocrites who can feign 
charity’s sincerity, and ideed put it on, to the life. If, however, an angel inspects the 
face and listens to the voice he knows what a man’s quality is, not beholding the 
material mask, to which the material man attends.29
Swedenborg’s speculations on the alternative world of the alternative 
good beings only potentially dwelling with us verges, as it seems, not so 
much on his certainty concerning its existence as on the extreme scepticism 
as to the existence of this world. Swedenborg goes a step farther then 
Descartes, and by questioning the positivity of thinking one’s “I” as 
uncharitable and thus coming from the devil, and by questioning thinking 
in general as susceptible to error and falsity moves the world to the spheres of 
sublimity inaccessible to human understanding because posited outside 
that understanding. If Addison’s imagination stopped short in the face of the 
infinite spheres beyond its capacity, Swedenborg’s discourse stops short in the 
face of any finitude and sends it to hell and the Devil with which Swedenborg’s 
communication, unlike that with the angels, seems to be limited. This false 
world and hell are one and the same thing which due to human confinement to 
oneself, reason or thinking is rendered as the obstacle in one’s journey to 
infinity, to the truly sublime sphere which is quite explicitly rendered as the 
sphere of death of this life.
28 Ibid., p. 62.
29 Ibid.
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It is the one-sidedness of this sublimity that Blake finds intolerable in 
Swedenborg. In The Marriage of Heaven and Hell (1790) Blake reads 
Swedenborg as hardly original and actually false:
Now hear a plain fact: Swedenborg has not written one new truth. Now hear 
another: he has written old falsehoods.
And now hear the reason. He conversed with angels, who are all religious, and 
conversed not with devils who all hate religion, for he was incapable through his 
conceited notions.
Thus Swedenborg’s writings are a recapitulation of all superficial opinions and 
an analysis of the more sublime, but no further.30
Paradoxical as it may seem, Blake accusses Swedenborg of not being sublime 
enough, of stepping toward “the more sublime” rather than the sublimest. 
Swedenborg is wrong and no different from other thinkers, a commentator of 
“already published books,” because he confines his disputes to angels ignoring 
devils and thus subscribing himself to those authors who claim that soul and 
body are two distinct, separable things. Swedenborg “only holds a candle in 
sunshine”31 thus heralding only a faint part of the truth which must be 
supplemented with “the Bible of Hell — which the world shall have whether 
they will or no.”32 Swedenborg heralds only one world, a peaceful sphere of at 
least imaginary coexistence which, for Blake, is too limited because too 
peaceful, warding off the other world of Hell which translates the world 
into a being which is more than one: “the world shall have whether they will 
or no” [italics added]. Beyond “the more sublime” spheres of Swedenborg’s 
angels is the eternal delight of energy and life. As Tadeusz Sławek notices,
Since Blake himself says “Enough or too much” [...], and “you never know what 
is enough unless you know what is more than enough” [...] his definition of life 
must be based on some kind of surplus. A life seen within the horizon of the copy 
elevated to the original, a sexual union aufgehoben to virginity, is a reduplication of 
itself, is an endless repetition, self-commentary of a phenomenon upon itself. What 
is perceived from the outside as life is only an excess of life within a phenomenon, 
this life in what Blake calls “Corporeal Vegetation” is a surplus of life in 
“Eternity.”33
Blake’s life has thus to go out of itself towards a certain absence of the surplus 
which constitutes an appendix of life, a dangerous supplement, as Derrida
30 W. Blake, “The Marriage of Heaven and Hell,” in Blake. The Complete Poems, 
W. H. Stevenson, ed. (London and New York: Longman 1989), pp. 119-120.
31 Ibid., p. 120.
33 Ibid., p. 121.
33 T. Sławek, The Outlined Shadow. Phenomenology, Grammatology, Blake (Katowice: 
Uniwersytet Śląski 1985), pp. 124—125.
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would phrase it, of the Bible of Hell which as it were overgrows the sphere of 
eternity in which “one Thing never changes into another Thing. Each Identity 
is Eternal.”34 Swedenborg is only more sublime than other ‘uninspired’ writers 
because his sphere of Eternity is deprived of the sphere of growth and energy 
and rendered as false from top to bottom. Swedenborg is blind to garment, to 
outline, to the body which, as contrary to eternity and the promised “Naked 
Human form divine,” are productive of the progression which without 
contraries is unthinkable for Blake. Eternity and vegetation are two different 
things, but not quite separate things and it is through vegetation that we can 
progress toward the eternal identity of us and things. Mere dualism always 
separates, is productive of distinctions which Blake condemns as deadly 
though he constantly makes use of them. Presenting Swedenborg as “the angel 
sitting at the tomb; his writings are the linen clothes folded up”35 he presents 
him as a deadly figure whose nakedness has nothing to do with the human 
body. Men are not heavenly angels and the angel Blake converses with in 
The Marriage of Heaven and Hell is the one “who is now become a devil” 
and is Blake’s “particular friend. We often read the Bible together in its 
infernal or diabolical sense, which the world shall have if they behave well.”36 
Ambiguity as to any contraries is built into Blake’s vision of the world as an 
irreducible contamination or extension of the glorious whole and makes it 
impossible to classify him as either a dualist or a monist which forces Leopold 
Damrosch to oxymoronically classify his thought as “dualistic monism” or 
“troubled dualism.”37 What is at stake in Blake is thus not the idea of the 
reconciliation of the opposites, which is (as Damrosch believes Blake saw with 
increasing clarity) “really no advance at all over the complacent Augustan 
notion of concordia discors.”38 The reason why he deals with contraries 
at all is “not that reality presents itself as a harmony of opposites, but 
rather that an inescapable experience of pain and struggle is fundamental to 
any achievement.”39 Rather than an “isthmus” created by the denial and 
withdrawal from the stormy seas of the other Blake’s man lives in the state of 
the incessant extension whose other name is “emanation” and whose eman­
cipation from man is comparable to Eve’s having been left by herself by 
Adam and thus becoming the cause of the fall of both. Emanation or 
expansion are the female principle which, once separated from the male 
one, is wholly possessed by the devil and thus proclaims the kingdom 
34 Quoted in ibid., p. 125.
35 W. Blake, Blake. The Complete Poems, p. 105.
36 Ibid., p. 121.
37 Cf. L. Damrosch Jr., Symbol and Truth in Blake's Myth (New Jersey: Princeton University
Press 1980), p. 175.
38 Ibid., p. 176.
39 Ibid., p. 177.
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of the devil in which woman is endowed with a will, something unthinkable 
in Blake’s “Eternity.”40 If Swedenborg divorces heaven and hell by propaga­
ting the realm of angels alone, Blake’s Milton does exactly the reverse:
The reason Milton wrote in fetters when he wrote of angels and God, and at liberty 
when of devils and Hell, is because he was a true poet, and the Devil’s party without 
knowing it.41
Milton, like Swedenborg, praised eternal death though he did not quite realize 
it. Milton, in Paradise Lost (1667), inscribed Satan within Eve even before she 
was tempted exactly as the idea of separation from Adam, and hence as the 
separation of heaven from hell. It is in fact Eve who tempts Adam to separate 
before she eats of the fruit:
Let us divide our labors, thou where choice 
Leads thee, or where most needs [...] while I 
In yonder spring of roses intermixed 
With myrtle, find what to redress till noon.
Paradise Lost, Book IX
In Milton, Milton realizes that what he unknowingly propagated was “eternal 
death” which Blake sees engraved upon him in the poem:
The whole assembly wept prophetic, seeing in Milton's face 
And his lineaments divine the shades of Death and Ulro. 
He took off the robe of the promise & ungirded himself 
from the oath of God.42
Milton is thus naked of “the oath of God” and has to be reborn because 
he is, paradoxically, not quite naked form the divine but, like Homer, 
Ovid, Plato or Cicero whose writings are “stolen and perverted”, a slave 
of the sword (“Shakespeare and Milton were both curbed by the general 
malady and infection from the silly Greek and Latin slaves of the sword”)43 
which actually represses the divine inspiration and imagination leaving 
man alone defenseless and naked in the hands of the devil alone. There is 
a divine sphere in Milton, but having made man passive by separating 
heaven from hell Milton is only a copist and not a real author. The muse which 
dictated Milton’s writings was, like that of Ovid or Homer, “a daughter of 
Mnemosyne, or Memory, and not of Inspiration or Imagination” and for 
40 Cf. ibid., p. 182.
41 W. Blake, “The Marriage...,” p. 107.
42 W. Blake, “Millon,” in Blake. The Complete Poems, p. 508.
43 Ibid., p. 490.
96
this reason, as a copist of memory, Milton is not an author of “sublime 
conceptions.”4* Infected by Greek and Roman models, Milton’s writings “are 
set up by artifice against the sublime of the Bible”*5 whose sublimity consists, 
as we have seen, in its being supplemented with the Bible of Hell not as 
a separate book and realm of the Devil but the Bible’s own emanation 
authored by inspiration and imagination which make us capable of trans­
gressing the memory of our fall and “see the worlds of eternity in which we 
shall live for ever” in the active becoming ourselves in which there is no final 
destination, unveiling or consummation because the end of this activity means 
giving up to the passivity of a pure presence which, in Blake, is also the 
presence of death and the denial of eternity.
Blake’s sublime is thus the sphere of eternal authorship of becoming, of 
overwriting ourselves in which the garment of writing, like that of the Bible, 
must be incessantly supplemented so as it does not end up in a finished text, 
but constitutes the sphere of activity which disables the separation of the 
already written Bible of Mnemosyne and the “being written” Bible of the Hell. 
It is only in this activity that sublimity is being constantly revived and thus 
inseparably attached to every grain of sand as infinity, as the surplus of its 
presence, the irreducible “going out” of things whose end is the end of infinity 
and hence death. Blake’s sublime is thus not exactly infinite, but neither is it 
limited so as to be made agreeable to human imagination. Rather, it is the 
sublime of the everchanging or evergrowing contour which does promise the 
pleasurable dome of divinity, but promises it through the painful and arduous 
action of becoming, of writing and engraving upon our own human forms 
divine so as not to make them purely present (hence dead to eternity) and thus 
passive tools in the hands of the “slaves of the sword” who will carve the 
spheres of ourselves and our freedoms by themselves. Milton’s sublime is as it 
were external to himself, to Milton who, as Harold Bloom phrases it, “does 
stand outside his own Sublime.”*6 Milton stands outside his own writing 
presenting Satan, endowing him with his poetic genius, and simultaneously 
renouncing, or not realising, his (Milton’s) being of “the Devil’s party.” 
Milton’s Satan, says Bloom,
is a great rhetorician, and nearly as strong a poet as Milton himself, but more 
important he is Milton’s central way through to the Sublime. As such, Satan 
prophesies the post-Enlightenment crisis-poem, which has become our modem 
Sublime.44 *7
44 Ibid., p. 490 (quotation from Descriptive Catalogue).
4i Ibid.
44 H. Bloom, Poetry and Repression. Revisionism from Blake to Stevens (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press 1976), p. 23.
47 Ibid., p. 23.
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Milton prophesies a marriage of heaven and hell with a burning sword in his 
hand throwing the fallen man outside the paradise and promising a return there 
only after the Devil has been conquered, after the rhetoric he has given him gives 
way to the naked beautiful and glorious truth he glorifies in Areopagitica. It is 
thus not exactly Milton but Satan, the rhetorician, who actually represses the 
truth, but through whose repression the naked truth is promised. Truth becomes 
sublimated through repression, through the rhetorical work of the Devil who, 
against Milton’s exorcisms, incorporates his cunning work into the discourse of 
truth exactly by his being posited as what Bloom calls a “Counter-Sublime,”48 
as the repression of the otherwise sublime sphere of truth whose declared beauty 
is thinkable as beautiful only “through” the repression of the devil. Those who 
desire to annihilate the devil, who claim the goodness of human nature to be 
either present or recoverable without the devil are, for Blake, the enemies of life 
eternal, of the truly sublime of which the counter-sublime is both emanation and 
limit, people confined to themselves without any excess and thus objects both 
blind to the devil and such that can be easily used by the devil in order to 
produce the machine of the society, for instance.
What prompted this longish digression concerning Blake was Rousseau’s 
idea of “going out of oneself’ which, in Rousseau, stood upon the “ungivable” 
presence of onself and which, in Blake, seems to be exactly a kind of digression, 
a going away from the main route and still remaining upon it in the way Sterne’s 
travellers go to Rome, for instance, digressing about the problem of baptizing 
unborn children within the male seed. In Jerusalem (1804—1820) and elsewhere 
Blake digresses about Rousseau seeing him as a “Pharisee, a hypocrite, 
a pretender to virtue, and one who, whatever his theory of natural goodness in 
actual life, discovered only evil in men and who in long life found no friend”, as 
Jean Hagstrum puts it.49 In other words, Blake reads Rousseau as yet another 
“prophet” of eternal death, not quite different from Milton.
Very much like in Rousseau, however, this capability of going out of oneself, 
which Blake gives the names of the kind of “emanation” or “exuberance,” is the 
characteristic of human liberty in Jerusalem:
(In great Eternity, every particular form gives forth or emanates
Its own peculiar light, & the form is the Divine Vision; 
And the light is his garment. This is Jerusalem in every man, 
A tent & tabernacle of mutual forgiveness, male & female 
clothings.
And Jerusalem is called LIBERTY among the children of Albion.)50 
48 Ibid., p. 24.
49 J. H. Hagstrum, “William Blake Rejects the Enlightenment,” in Blake. A Collection of 
Critical Essays, N. Frye, ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall 1966), p. 152.
50 W. Blake, “Jerusalem,” in Blake. The Complete Poems, pp. 742—743.
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This garment of light as an external emanation peculiar to everything is 
simultaneously internal, a tent and tabernacle of forgiveness. It is the idea of 
“forgiveness” which seems to be responsible for the gap between Rousseau 
and eternity, for the “hypocritical” kind of liberty he proposes. There is no 
room for forgiveness in Rousseau’s state because going out of oneself one 
only compares oneself with the others and produces a more or less universal 
law common to all the human outsides who have to naturally level all the 
difference in order to harmoniously coexist. Once this is negotiated, any 
exuberant going out will be transgressive and subject to punishment by 
the law. The creation of the law is thus the negotiation of forgiveness. In the 
great eternity of Blake’s Jerusalem such a limiting intervention is disruptive 
to the true individuality, it covers everybody’s and everything’s peculiar 
light with a layer of “hoar-frost” thus extinguishing the fire of energy and 
subduing it to the “reasoning power of man” which domesticates the tigers of 
wrath.
This is actually the fate of Albion who fell down and over whom rose “the 
spectre like a hoar-frost & mildew” thus stopping the growth to eternity and 
saying:
“I am God, O sons of men! I am your rational power!
Am I not Bacon & Newton & Locke who teach humility to man,
Who teach doubt & experiment? And my two wings, Voltaire, Rousseau?51
The extinction of the peculiar, individual fire does not only limit oneself to 
oneself but it also breeds pestilence (“mildew”), like those who restrain desire 
but act not from The Proverbs of Hell. The individuals thus confined are 
both humble and humiliated. With limited individuals the eternity is also 
limited and thus no eternity at all, an eternity of Swedenborg’s angels who 
have to die in order to see another world. Blake does not want to see any other 
worlds in the world of eternity which he sees in everything except Rousseau, 
for instance, and except all those who want to dictate pretending that they 
don’t do it, who go out without going out, who forgive without forgiving, who 
only half-open the doors of perception in order to lock (or Locke) them for 
good.
In order to build a New Jerusalem, putting things bluntly, man has 
to reconstruct himself by deconstructing himself, by becoming a free, 
ever-expanding, unrestrained particular of eternity. On the social plane this 
is clearly the image of an uncoordinated society where it is exactly co­
ordination, legislation or any kind of external organization which disorganizes 
the state of eternity. Topographically, Blake posits a world which is situated 
51 Ibid., pp. 743 744.
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both here and there, a world of eternal growth and change which is the 
sphere of eternal life because it also incorporates death. Blake’s world begins 
(though “begin” is not quite proper a word here) where Addison’s imagination 
stops in its working; Blake’s imagination transgresses the limits of infinity 
imposed by Addison’s imagination. An individual, an infinite one, who lives 
both here and there, is of course hardly an institutional or civil kind of creature 
and bringing it, say, down to earth, to one place or an orchestra in which he 
should play beautiful, harmonious tunes seems to be hardly possible.
Yet such an attempt seems to be the undertaking of William Godwin in his 
Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793). Godwin’s individual is put in 
motion by a kind of pleasure principle which he calls “self-love.” It is 
a paradoxical kind of self-love because it is based on the perfection of the mind 
which “consists in disinterestedness.”52 Godwin does realize that the “system 
of self-love” might be easily accused of the impossibility of the existence of 
virtue in it. For this reason the principle of self-love must be accompanied by 
that of benevolence:
If self-love be the only principle of action, there can be no such thing as virtue. 
Benevolent intention is essential to virtue.53
Godwin goes a step behind Rousseau’s “interested” giving oneself to society 
with the sublime virtue of not doing harm to anybody else. Rousseau was, 
according to Godwin, the most benevolent of those philosophers whose 
systems “taught them to look upon their fellow men as thus perverse and 
unjust” and who, for this reason, “have been frequently cold in their te/.pcr, 
or narrow in their designs.”54 The two accusations of Rousseau’s system 
are of course reminiscent of Blake’s obsession with the narrowness of limits 
imposed upon liberty and the hoar-frost covering Albion. The principle of 
self-love itself is also a version of Blake’s restrained desire which breeds 
pestilence. Godwin’s Rousseau has been only “driven to the place the 
perfection of virtue in doing no injury.”55 This negative, or passive virtue was 
the terror of submission to the tyranny of reason on to being confined to 
oneself for Blake. Godwin, using rhetoric hardly reminiscent of Blake, also 
desires to prompt us to action, to a practice of virtue which the philosophers 
merely talk about and impose upon us “by foreign and frivolous con­
siderations.” If Rousseau’s man had an interest in himself, the self-loving 
individual of Godwin is disinterestedly benevolent, he loves himself for 
51 W. Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (Penguin Books 1985), p. 388.
53 Ibid., p. 385.
54 Ibid., p. 387.
55 Ibid.
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others, he goes outside himself beyond the point of the interest of his identity 
(the activity which was, we must remember, nothing but madness for 
Rousseau).
The system of disinterested benevolence proves to us that it is possible to be 
virtuous, and not merely to talk about virtue [...] when we call upon mankind to 
divest themselves of selfish and personal considerations, we call upon them for 
something they are able to practise. An idea like this reconciles us to our species; 
teaches us to regard [...] the men who have appeared to lose the feeling of their 
personal existence, in the pursuit of general advantage [italics added].5«
The reconciliation with our species is thus based upon a certain benevolent 
deconstruction of oneself which, in turn, is based on the internal virtue which 
must be spontaneously exteriorised. Spontaneously, because any external 
influence upon this externalization is disruptive of the principle of self-love. 
The “generous and magnanimous sentiments of our natures” must not be 
excited by any imposed laws, rules or teachers. All institutional teaching is 
contrary to human nature which knows good by itself, it is contrary to the 
interest of mankind and must be “unlearned before we can begin to be wise” 
and not remain “in a state of perpetual pupilage.”56 7
We have to unlearn even ourselves to the point of absolute co-identification 
with others, to the point where self-love is the love of all selves provided those 
selves also unlearn themselves. Our mind must be “vindicated” to the state in 
which the most sublime virtue is not only that of leaving others intact, but of 
rejoicing “in the good that is done by others, as if it were done by ourselves.”58 
Needless to say that Godwin also rejects private property as the basis of social 
organization. He mentions Plato’s Republic and More’s Utopia in a footnote 
praising them for their “proper mode of reasoning” but adding that “they 
knew not how to remove the difficulties that attended” the imperfections of 
their systems.59 More’s Utopia was a state whose beginning was the conquest 
of Sansculotians by Utopos and thus an imposed system. The system suggested 
by Godwin is better because it is the emanation of goodness from within us 
which, ideally, will annihilate private property including the property of being 
ourselves because this property, at least in Rousseau’s version, is achieved by 
limitation and imitation, we limit ourselves by imitating others whom we meet 
outside ourselves.
In Godwin, as in Blake, being is constant becoming, a constant “unlearning” 
of the being progressing towards an eventual perfection of one’s mind 
56 Ibid., p. 388.
57 Ibid., pp. 615-—616.
58 Ibid., p. 389.
59 Ibid., p. 729.
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and reason which has to be achieved independently of others, without 
institutional education which teaches us how to mime others and thus endows 
its mimetic products with the status of being. Hence the image of society 
as a harmonious machinery or an orchestra playing the same tune is 
unwelcome to Godwin. A self-loving individual cannot confine himself or 
herself to being which leads to stagnation and inequality, or to a disciplinary 
equality imposed by the law and not by one’s nature. Godwin’s equality 
consists in being equally unequal, different and the same in difference, in 
becoming different. The condemnation of social mimesis and law leads 
Godwin to mixing sentiments and feelings:
If you cannot bring over the hearts of the community to your party, expect no 
success from brute regulations. If you can, regulation is unnecessary. [...] Govern 
them through no medium but that of inclination and persuasion/0
Rather than teaching others the new individual, we should speak to his 
heart in order to persuade it to open itself to the truth of the persuader to 
which it is nevertheless already inclined. This inclination is elsewhere in the 
Enquiry called mental strength or natural reason as opposed to the reason 
imposed from above or abroad. Since there are, as ever, those endowed 
with the latter kind of reason, the ones who simply will not be persuaded, 
the declared equality of the unequal has to somehow cope with them, and 
it does. He who resigns himself wholly to “imitation can possess little 
of mental strength and accuracy. [...] He lives forgetting and forgot. 
He has deserted his station in human society. Mankind cannot be benefited 
by him.”* 61
However mundane Godwin’s speculations may seem if compared with 
Swedenborg’s, another species of man is quite evidently at stake in Godwin’s 
society, a species of disinterestedly benevolent creatures whose repentance 
of the evils of the world given to them endows them with the status of members 
of the society to which others have no access. Unlike Swedenborg’s angels, 
however, they do not live in perfect harmony but, rather, in constant pain 
of becoming, progressively improving themselves. Yet some paradise of the 
eventual “uniformity of judgement” is promised by Godwin:
The ideas, associations and circumstances of each man are properly his own; 
and it is a pernicious system that would lead us to require all men, however different 
their circumstances, to act by a precise general rule. Add to this that, by the doctrine 
of progressive improvement, we shall always be erroneous, though we shall every 
day become less erroneous. The proper method for hastening the decline of error, 
00 Ibid., p. 756.
61 Ibid., p. 757.
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and producing uniformity of judgement, is not by brute force, by laws, or imitation; 
but, on the contrary, by exciting every man to think for himself.* 2
The eternal “always” of our being erroneous is somehow limited as the 
production of uniformity of judgement seems to be the teleological aim 
of the diminishing of the sphere of error within ourselves. An individual 
can be really individual only without any society, without any other persons 
trying to restrain or bend one’s mind to another’s. Uniformity of judgement 
is thus, ideally, thinkable only within one person and the only thinkable 
“republic” the republic of a singular man. Society cannot thus be a mechanism 
or an orchestra, however smoothly functioning, however harmoniously play­
ing:
For example: shall we have concerts of music? The miserable state of mechanism, of 
the majority of performers is so conspicuous as to be, even at this day, a topic of 
mortification and ridicule. Will it not be practicable hearafter for one man to 
perform the whole?* 3
Godwin bans musical performance (as well as theatre)64 as a habitual 
execution of the compositions of others comparing it later to the repetition 
of unoriginal ideas coming from reading and education through which 
we have to, for the time being, carve out a space for individuality through 
co-operation with others which, painful as it is, is something which we 
have to suffer on the road of improvement in which all co-operation will 
eventually disappear. Conversation seems to be the most agreeable of the 
species of co-operation though one may have doubts whether it is not 
some kind of nonverbal communication that is at stake in Godwin’s rhetoric. 
In conversation one or the other party is always yielding “to have his 
ideas guided by the other” and in this sense it is not fully independent 
from error. “Yet conversation,” Godwin goes on, “and the intercourse of 
mind with mind, seem to be the most fertile sources of improvement.”65 The 
mental intercourse seems to be hinted at as an even better species of 
conversation where communication and co-operation are elevated to the level 
of a spiritual flow of sorts as the most perfect medium “between individuality 
and concert,” as he phrases it. Since the “concert” as a species of 
“co-operation” is the necessary hindrance to the solo choir of the individual, it 
also must be coped with on the level of the economic co-operation of people. 
Here Godwin enters the sphere of science fiction and begins to dream 
62 Ibid., p. 758.
63 Ibid, p. 760.
*4 Cf. ibid, p. 760.
*5 Ibid, pp. 760 -761.
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the dream of the eventual disappearance of manual labour which necessitates 
human cooperation in order to biologically survive, but which can be done 
without in the future. He does not quite mention robots, but he hints at them 
by means of a rhetorical question:
At present, to pull down a tree, to cut a canal, to navigate a vessel, require the 
labour of many. Will they always require the labour of many? When we recollect the 
complicated machines of human contrivance, various sorts of mills, of weaving 
engines, steam engines, are we not astonished at the compendium of labour they 
produce? Who shall say where this species of improvement must stop?46
The industrial revolution, which Blake abhorred as enslaving, is the proof of 
human development toward individual independence for Godwin, toward the 
freedom from the necessity of co-operation and thus freedom from manual 
work. If this is achieved, society will become the pleasurable sphere of 
aesthetic experiences only supplemented by the liberated mind: “We ought 
to be able to do without one another. He is the most perfect man to whom 
society is not a necessary of life, but a luxury, innocent and enviable, in which 
he joyfully indulges.”66 7 Once we have become individuals, we can occasionally 
go down to the society for pleasure simultaneously “finding the highest 
complacence and the purest delight” in solitude.68 Gradually, progressively, 
towards the end of Godwin’s Enquiry (in the Appendix) we discover that the 
sphere of human perfection, the sphere of purest delight is the sphere of 
solitude away from the world, the sphere of godlike sublimation from which, 
like from the Olympian heights, we occasionally pay visits to the world.
This divine sphere is a transposition of the idea of our mastery over matter. 
Godwin, quite independently, quotes twice the statement by “the celebrated 
Franklin” (which, he admits in the footnote, he has “no authority to quote 
but the conversation of Doctor Price” and which he later calls Franklin’s 
“sublime conjecture”), in which Franklin “conjectured that ‘mind would one 
day become omnipotent over matter.’”69
It is through this conjecture that Godwin quite literally approaches the 
spheres of the sublime and attempts at elevating society to the level of the 
omnipotent power over the world achieved by the liberation of the mind both 
from the body and from the world:
The conclusion of the progress which has here been sketched is something like 
a final close to the necessity of manual labour. Il may be instructive in such cases to 
observe how the sublime geniuses of former times anticipated what seems likely 
66 Ibid., p. 759.
67 Ibid., p. 761.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., p. 759 and 770.
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to be the future improvement of mankind. It was one of the laws of Lycurgus 
that no Spartan should be employed in manual labour. For this purpose, under 
his system, it was necessary that they should be plentifully supplied with slaves 
devoted to drudgery. Matter, or, to speak more accurately, the certain and 
unintermitting laws of the universe, will be the Helots of the period we are 
contemplating. We shall end in this respect, oh immortal legislator! at the point from 
which you began.70
Godwin mixes Franklin’s “sublime conjecture” with the conjectures “of the 
sublime geniuses of former times” (the Spartan system is referred to through­
out Enquiry) to the effect that matter itself becomes dematerialized into 
universal laws accessible only to those, or, better, him, who has created them. 
The “immortal creator” is man liberated from the world, the master of the 
laws of the universe by means of which he can create, as a completely 
independent creature, whatever he pleases from the beginning. Godwin’s 
future world is an allegory which sublimates slavery as practiced by the 
Spartans to an ideal social system in which there are no slaves and their owners 
because slaves are only the abstract rules in the hands of equally abstract 
thoughts. Slavery is thus rendered as a just system, provided that there are no 
slaves. Lycurgus was a “sublime genius” because his system, regardless of the 
actual Helots, was theoretically right, a step towards human developement and 
liberation from the manual labour which enslaves us.
This trope of enslavement is, of course, the trope which underlies any 
discourse which carries the torch of freedom and liberty. What promotes 
this discourse is, paradoxically, the trope of conquest preceded by the 
discovery of a New World. Since no such new world has been discovered 
on the earth, since the rhetorical paradise of the innocent America (e.g. 
Montaigne), for instance, has turned out to be a hell of extermination of 
the Other, the socio-political discourse had to move vertically, as it were, 
towards the spheres of another humanity within us, whose projection could 
only be conceived from another level, and on another level of perception. 
The crisis of monarchy did, to a certain extent, level the society, but it 
opened up the questions of the origin of law and authority, of the origin of 
order. The quest for human nature, the true one, becomes an attempt to 
fill in the gap between us and the spheres from which the order comes, or 
should come, without any mark of its being a human construct because 
such a mark is the nomination of the figure of the monarch and, the stamp 
of our slavery. Since we have become ourselves, and not the monarch’s, we 
must look for the truth both within ourselves and outside, in the sphere 
previously occupied by the order of the monarchistic hierarchy and now open 
for exploration. Hence the possibility, and actually necessity of “going out of 
70 Ibid., p. 759.
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oneself,” of extending the universal humanity to the spheres where kings 
communicate with God who made them lawgivers.
The revival of the notion of the sublime in the eighteenth century is 
a discovery of something which has already existed, the discovery of a territory 
upon which the only Indians are, paradoxically, ourselves. The rhetoric of 
conquest (and we must remain within the realm of rhetoric, because, as we 
have seen, from Smith to Godwin whose very names are rhetorically loaded, 
society is a rhetorical projection of one system upon another, a metaphorical 
metamorphosis of man into a lubricated machine, or of a man giving himself for 
something else, which is the mechanism of metaphor) is always, inevitably, 
linked with that of conversion, of persuading someone to be something else and 
making him believe that this is what he has always desired to be, a Swedenborg’s 
angel, for instance. Less metaphorically, the sublime is this sphere of discourse 
which provides space for the very idea of development, of change, for which 
there is no room in the system where everyone performs some predetermined 
function within the body of the king. The sublime gives us some space to, at least 
momentarily, look at ourselves from the outside, to see our own slavery to laws 
and rules. This space is also the space of the construction of the new systems 
away from the old ones, with the old ones still in sight.
Since the space of the sublime is infinite, since it approaches the divinity 
itself, the radicalism of a theory will depend on where the limit, the border of 
the new realm will be put. Needless to say that in the most radical cases, 
man, as in Godwin, wins or conquers God and elevates himself to the position 
of the eternal creator who really holds infinity in his hands and for whom the 
society functions only as a means of development towards the “unity of 
judgement” into which everyone ‘plunges’ only after having properly develo­
ped oneself. In this respect Godwin goes even farther than Swedenborg for 
whom everyone could see his evil inside at least after death, from the position 
of another world which only few can see in their lifetimes. Godwin’s man-god 
is the task to be achieved within the human development to perfection where, 
one might expect, people will eventually become immortal. Godwin does 
promise that as well, though, in his peculiar rhetorical manner, only as 
a distant possibility. He writes about this possibility in the chapter devoted 
to Health, and the Prolongation of Human Life. Since mind must eventually 
rule over matter, and since, as is evident from traditional medicine, the 
vivacious activity of the human mind is productive of cheerfulness, this also 
proves that we already, to an extent, have some mental power of control over 
our bodies. Why not ask, then, if it is not “highly probable, in the process of 
human improvement, that we may finally obtain an empire over every 
articulation of our frame?”71 If so, then why not suggest that human 
71 Ibid., p. 774.
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development “may contribute to prolong our vigor, if not immortalize it, and, 
which is of more consequence, to make us live while we live.”72
Not life after life but life during life. From the perspective of the sublime, 
of the sphere where everything becomes unlimited, the mundane, human life is 
in fact death, and the world a waste land of sorts, a country of the living dead. 
Immortality, and hence eternity, are a matter of mental conversion in which 
our particular mind must, by itself, renounce its own particularity and become 
universal. We must conquer the sublime so that the sublime eventually 
becomes ourselves. If we want to conquer it totally, we become eternal and 
divine forms sublime, as in Blake and Godwin, in the world whose less sublime 
parts still belong to it and struggle to improve, to sublimate themselves to the 
point of the eventual disappearance or dwelling on a planet where Jerusalem is 
in England. Swedenborg’s conquest of the sublime denied the necessity of 
development and struggle for perfection making the renunciation of the devil 
an act of a singular discovery of evil within us which momentarily moved us 
away to the sphere of the angelic choirs. Rousseau (and Smith) were, of course, 
less radical as regards the transgression of the limits, and their projects were 
actually those of the domestication of certain areas of the sublime as our own, 
as beautiful — a project parallel to that of Hume’s and Burke’s on the social 
plane. The social contract, as a sort of agreement, clearly and legally delimits 
the spheres of the human as agreeable to one’s nature, orchestrates the social 
functioning by means of the limited (by ourselves) spaces of freedom thus 
allowing man not to be quite confined to himself as dictated by the enslaving 
law of the ancien regime, but creating himself in the process of mimetic 
comparison with others from the outside, from the sphere of limited externality 
whose limits are the limits of freedom agreeable to everyone, the sphere of the 
negative virtue of not doing harm to others, of not “disharmonizing” the 
smooth work of society. Rousseau called this virtue sublime for the reason that 
for him this was the highest degree man could go and still remain a man. 
Beyond this limited sublime of Rousseau’s there is, as we have seen, only the 
nothingness of madness and an unnameable sphere which even the word 
“sublime,” as human word, cannot encompass.
72 Ibid., p. 775.
VII
The Spirit of Feeling
(On Mackenzie’s London with a Digression 
on Dr. Johnson’s Scotland)
There are certain combined looks of simple subtlety 
— where whim, and sense, and seriousness, and non­
sense, are so blended, that all the language of Babel set 
loose together could not express them — they are 
communicated so instantaneously, that you can scarce 
say which party is the infecter. I leave it to your men of 
words to swell pages about it.
Lawrence Sterne
The “vile rust” which obstructs the smooth elegance and movement 
of society in Smith’s vision of it in the beginning of chapter can be the previous 
done away with by less radical means than travels to nonexistent worlds of 
natural nature, to the worlds of angels or realms where heaven and hell 
agreeably cohabit a Jerusalem of London. Such mental travels are but “science 
fiction” versions of philosophical speculations which, as I have noted earlier, 
are frequently seen as a malady of sorts resulting from the sedentary life of the 
literati for whom some more real kind of “outing” is suggested as a cure. 
One can walk out to one’s garden, for instance, or, like Hume, return back to 
the society of friends and compose onself seeing that everything is in fact 
agreeable.
For Henry Mackenzie, Hume’s departure to France from Scotland “about 
the period of his first publications” is, as he declares in The Mirror, 
a circumstance which occasions the fictions of his The Man of Feeling (1771), 
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a departure which, according to John Mullan, can be read as an allegory “of 
the philosopher’s retreat — the finally unhealthy seclusion of the intellectual 
self from the redeeming influences of the society.”1 Mackenzie’s story is an 
attempt to bring Hume back from France, the country of les philosophes, 
to the Edinburgh of Smith and Mackenzie, but without his scepticism, as 
an inimitably simple Harley whose sceptical doubts have been left on the other 
side of the English Channel. Hume went too far from feeling “to the world” 
out there which, as unfamiliar, is actually hostile to the purity of the virtuous, 
local coexistence and thus also productive of the rust of selfishness, pride and 
desire — an image Mackenzie displays in his ‘counter-story’ — The Man of the 
World — published two years after The Man of Feeling, in 1773.
The theme of rust opens Chapter 11 of Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling, 
the opening chapter of the manuscript which a curate always took with him 
‘a-shooting’ because it made excellent wadding and thus torn could not make 
a complete story:
There is some rust about every man at the beginning; though in some nations 
(among the French, for instance) the ideas of the inhabitants from climate, or what 
other case you will, are so vivacious, so eternally on the wing, that they must, even in 
small societies, have a frequent collision; the rust therefore will off sooner; but in 
Britain, it often goes with a man to his grave; nay, he dares not even pen a hie jacet 
to speak out for him after his death.1 2
Rust is thus both welcome and unwelcome, naturally given us from the 
beginning, and still possible to be somehow gotten rid of, rubbed off through 
vivacious movements. The French do ‘derust’ themselves, but they do it 
excessively in the collisions of their ideas, which brings them to the point of 
being ‘so eternally on the wing’ that the rust will disappear altogether thus 
allowing for only too smooth a movement of unrestrained ideas productive of 
extreme scepticism. This approach of infinity is obviously unwelcome to the 
rusty British though the Scottish see this rust equally excessive as the French 
mobility, see it as covering the British to the point where the real metal which 
they are made of becomes unidentifiable. A method of getting rid of some of 
the rust suggested in the story is travel.
Travel, as I have already mentioned, was also suggested as a medical 
therapy for ‘the English malady’ of the literati who led a sedentary kind 
of life. The rust which ‘is about’ every man in Mackenzie is thus also 
a metaphor of a degree of some natural madness which we have to reasonably 
get rid of. In Mackenzie it is actually not “we,” but “they”: “‘Let them rub it 
off by travel,’ said the baronet’s brother, who was a striking instance of 
1 J. Mullan, Sentiment..., p. 115.
2 H. Mackenzie, The Man of Feeling (London 1967), p. 7.
excellent metal, shamefully rusted.”3 Himself rusted, Mr. Silton, the baronet’s 
brother (with whom the anonymous author of the torn manuscript disputes on 
rust) excludes himself from the process of ‘derusting’ and despite his being 
rusty, the excellence of the metal he is made of is somehow discernible. Unlike 
in the case of the British (“them”) the excellence of the metal reverberates, as 
we learn, in Mr. Silton’s remarks, in his words, a trace of the shameful rust 
being reflected only by his body:
His person was tall and well-made; but the indolence of his nature had now inclined 
it to corpulency. His remarks were few [...] but they were such as the world might 
have heard with veneration; and his heart, uncorrupted by its ways, was ever warm 
in the cause of virtue and his friends.4
Mr. Silton is both rusty and venerable. His immobility, or indolence, made 
him corpulent, but it simultaneously protected him from the corruption 
of the outer world, of the disagreeable world with no friendly society around. 
Hence the paradox: a sedentary life is productive of rust, but the travel he 
suggests as a means of wearing off the rust, contact with the ways of the 
world can corrupt one’s inner nature, one’s ‘metal,’ its purity and virtue. The 
further discussion of the questions of rust and travel reveals even more 
dangers:
‘They should wear it off by travel.’ Why, it is true,’ said I, ‘that will go far; but 
then it will often happen, that in the velocity of a modem tour, and amidst the 
materials through which it is commonly made, the friction is so violent, that not only 
the rust, but the metal too is lost in the progress.’5
The dangers of the ‘modern tour’ are thus like the dangers of the French 
vivacity; the latter lead to total scepticism which in turn leads to the denial 
of the ‘metal,’ of the body of unquestionable values and identities, of the virtue 
speaking from the heart of Mr. Silton, for instance, and thus produce 
a nothingness of sorts, erase the core of the friendly, social coexistence. 
Since the rust is unwelcome, the dangers connected with getting rid of it 
can be avoided only either by accepting it as a cover or contamination of the 
internal purity of an otherwise excellent metal (which is the case of Mr. Silton), 
or to aestheticize the rust, make it beautiful and thus slim Mr. Silton’s body 
so as it can speak of its internal beauty by itself. This latter option is offered 
by Mr. Silton himself who punningly translates his rust into encrustation in his 
explanation of the metaphor of tour:
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. 8.
5 Ibid.
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‘Give me leave to correct the expression of your metaphor,’ said Mr. Silton: ‘that is 
not always rust which is acquired by the inactivity of the body on which it preys; 
such, perhaps is the case with me, though indeed I was never cleared from my youth; 
but (taking it in its first stage) it is rather an encrustation, which nature has given for 
purposes of the greatest wisdom.’®
The goodness of human nature is thus an innate ‘encrustation’ which, 
in some cases, might turn into rust, might get covered by it to such an extent, 
that its beautiful pattern is no longer visible, and in extreme cases the corrosion 
devours even the metal upon which it has been ‘encrusted.’ Mr. Silton’s 
pattern is still expressible, discernible through his words. Though he accepts 
his already corroded encrustation, he is still capable of recovering it which is 
possible, paradoxically, due to his sedentary way of life, due to his never 
having been exposed to the ways of the world, to travel which he himself 
suggests as a cure.
An ideal kind of travel is thus one in which one does not really engage, in 
which one does not allow for the corrupt world to corrode one’s originary 
virtue inscribed, or encrusted, within one’s nature. Those who undertake it, 
however, must be endowed with an incorruptible kind of nature. Otherwise, 
they should, like Mr. Silton, stay at home, in Scotland, for instance. In his 
theory of rust, Mr. Silton quite clearly distinguishes between two kinds of 
“bashfulness,” the term which seems to be a synonym of virtue and purity of 
heart for him:
‘there are two distinct sorts of what we call bashfulness; this, the awkwardness of 
a booby, which a few steps into the world will convert into the pertness of 
a coxcomb; that, a consciousness, which the most delicate feelings produce, and the 
most extensive knowledge cannot always remove.’* 7
The first kind of bashfulness confines one endowed with it to living away from 
the world, unless, of course, he desires to become a booby. Mr. Silton’s 
bashfulness is probably of this first kind, the latter being reserved for Harley, 
the exemplary man of feeling, for whose introduction to the reader the 
discussion of “rustiness” prepares the ground. This unremovable sentiment of 
Harley’s, though produced by the most delicate feelings, must thus be very 
strong in the face of the world which, throughout the novel, is presented 
as an opposite of virtue, bashfulness, purity of feeling. What constitutes 
this strength is, as it seems, the simplicity of feeling as opposed to the 
complex, distorted, insincere and fake world of economic exchange, luxury, 
philosophical speculations and, generally evil. In a letter to Elizabeth Rose 
Mackenzie wrote about The Man of Feeling that it was “simple to Excess;
« Ibid., pp. 8—9.
7 Ibid., p. 9.
Ill
tor I would have it as different from the Entanglement of a Novel as can be.”8 
Writing about the book rather than the man Mackenzie sees the novel as 
a genre representing the ways of the world simultaneously rendering his text as 
a presentation of some disentangled simplicity in which reading is but 
a process which obstructs, or complicates the immediacy of the sentiment, of 
the affect which actually exists outside the text and which, as John Mullan 
notices, “belongs to a place outside ‘the world,’ ending the book not with the 
lessons to be drawn from the story of Harley’s demise but with a confirmation 
of the divide between the virtue of the sentimental hero and the purposes of 
that ‘world.’”9
‘That world’ is symbolized in The Man of Feeling by London, by the city to 
which Harley takes a trip having been warned in advance by his aunt that the 
place was “so replete with temptations, that it needed the whole armour of her 
friendly cautions to repel their attacks.”10 11Harley, as we have seen, was 
already armoured with the nature from which delicate feelings could not be 
removed. This nature also allowed him to listen to the sentiments and feelings 
of others without the mediation of words and thus his armour does not only 
protect him from the attacks of the vile world, but it also allows him to see 
better worlds beneath the surface. Having fallen in love with Miss Walton, 
a woman who talked quite a lot, Harley “was remarkably silent in her 
presence. He heard her sentiments with peculiar attention, sometimes with 
looks very expressive of approbation.”11 As it turns out later in the story, his 
listening to the sentiments of others turn out to be complete misreadings, 
vet he does not fall into any .scepticism as to the goodness of human nature 
and displays his own feelings even after his death. If Richardson’s Clarissa 
Harlowe renounced this world in order to display the purity of her heart, 
Marley goes to the world and instead of renouncing it, simply does not 
notice its evils. He sees the world as a “child in the drama of the world”12 
by making it more beautiful than it is, by actually constructing the world of 
feeling seeing it beneath human physiognomy, the discipline in whose study 
Lie believes he is skilful thus clearly displaying the purity of his heart to the 
reader in the simplest possible manner, by showing it rather than, as was 
the case with Mr. Silton, expressing it in some verbal fashion. The evils 
of the world constitute the narrative delivered to the reader by the text of 
Mackenzie’s book which, simultaneously presenting Harley’s purity, renounces 
itself in the way it renounces the world. This double renunciation makes 
8 H. Mackenzie, Letters to Elizabeth Rose of Kilravick, H. W Drescher, ed. (Munster 1967), 
p. 13. Quoted in J. Mullan, Sentunent..., p. 12.
’ J. Mullan, Sentiment..., pp. 120—121.
10 H. Mackenzie, The Man of..., p. 18.
11 Ibid., p. 16.
12 Ibid., p. 17.
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it possible to present Harley not as a figure of misanthrope, but as one who 
actually loves the world though he does not actually see it. He renounces 
it by submerging in it in a journey to London whose task is, as it seems, 
to make others, the reader, pity the world for its lack of sensibility 
simultaneously presenting the world as, potentially, more beautiful and 
sensible than it is.
The display of the beauty of the world is achieved by an aesthetic theory of 
Harley’s which the anonymous narrator of the story finds difficult to define, 
but which he anyway defines as “we” which he posits already away from the 
corrupt ways of the world:
Harley’s notions of [...] the beautiful, were not always to be defined, nor indeed such 
as the world would always assent to, though we could define them. A blush, a phrase 
of affability to an inferior, a tear at a moving tale, were to him, like the Cestus of 
Cytherea, unequalled in conferring beauty.13
Mackenzie sends Harley to London, to the world, in search of the beautiful 
which he knows is not there which he creates by putting the girdle of 
Aphrodite around it and making us see it with Harley’s eyes, endowing us with 
another eye, with some other optics with which creatures like Harley are 
naturally endowed in the way they are endowed with ineradicable encrustation 
rather than with rust.
The optics of some minds are in so unlucky a perspective, as to throw a certain 
shade on every picture that is presented to them; while those of others (of which 
number was Harley) like [those] of the ladies, have a wonderful effect in bettering 
their complexions.14
Seeing the world through blushes and tears Harley does not really partake of 
the ‘unlucky perspective’ of others, of the shade of Hume’s scepticism falling 
across his vision of the world. The ‘bettering’ of the world, from such 
a perspective, is but an illusion, a miracle of enhancing beauty by wearing the 
girdle of Aphrodite. What is thus propagated is a certain blindness to the 
ugliness of the world, to things unwelcome and horrible, uncertain and 
shadowy which attracted Hume, for instance. In order to ‘better’ the world 
we must remain confined to our innate simplicity from which we cannot 
depart to London, for instance, because going there, to the world, we actually 
remain the same, in the same place to which we have always already returned. 
Harley, of course, does leave his home, his locality, but it is impossible for him 
to dwell anywhere else, to accept anything of the world to which he goes.
13 Ibid., pp. 14—15.
14 Ibid., p. 25.
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This impossibility is rhetorically rendered as, in fact, a physiological inability 
to interiorize anything which is away from home. In the very beginning of his 
journey, just after he left his home,
Harley reached the inn where he proposed breakfasting; but the fullness of his 
heart would not suffer him to eat a morsel. He walked out on the road, and gaining 
a little height, stood gazing on that quarter he had left. He looked for his wonted 
prospect, his fields, his woods, and his hills; they were lost in the distant clouds. 
He pencilled them on the clouds, and bade them farewell with a sigh!15
The fullness of his heart, the richness of sentiment he has taken from home is 
the only ‘food’ he can accept. He physiologically feels the world as hardly 
edible and his full heart actually remains in his beloved hills and woods 
(perhaps Scottish) which he redraws despite their invisibility. This agreeable, 
proper (“his”) mental landscape within is the landscape Mackenzie’s story 
wants to display and which it cannot really display unless the reader is 
already endowed with a “feeling heart” and thus with the capability of 
bettering the world in the way Harley betters it. It is in this manner that the 
beauty of sentiment and feeling is raised, or sublimated, into another world 
which is simultaneously referred to as beautiful. This world, the world which 
Mackenzie calls “the world” functions exclusively as a framework which 
confines the true sentiment and contaminates it. The idea of travel to the world 
suggested by Mr. Silton is, in the case of Harley, a way of wearing off the 
frame of the world, of opening it up to the infinity of disinterested goodness 
dwelling in his heart. If, as John Mullan notices, “Misanthropy is the alter ego 
of feeling [...] one of the contrary states in antagonism to which true feeling is 
typically defined [and also] an alternative version of dissatisfaction which, 
somehow has to be executed,”16 then in order to be still benevolent one has to 
(oxymoronically) disinterestedly engage in the ways of the world, go to it and 
stay away from it at the same time.
The step back from the terror of the sublime in order to beautify or better 
it suggested by Burke is quite clearly discernible here. Mackenzie’s “the world” 
is a foreign, unwelcome, wild landscape which must be somehow bettered, 
brought back to its originary beauty dwelling in Harley’s heart in the form of 
an encrustation sensitive to the rust of the world which dangerously surrounds 
and attacks some less rust-proof creatures. Since one cannot really bring 
the hills of the familiar landscape down to London, one can at least ‘pencil’ 
them and then bring them back from a journey there after having displayed 
them to the world in the hope that it will, at least partially, familiarize itself 
with them by the discovery that the sentimental landscapes of Harley’s also 
13 Ibid., p. 19.
16 J. Mullan, Sentiment..., p. 121.
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reside within it. Harley’s return from London and his death on familiar 
ground is the necessary return which saves his purity without contaminating 
him with any attachment with the world to which he goes (the necessity 
inscribed already in the beginning of the story as the second type of 
unconquerable bashfulness) thus rendering the ways of the world unattractive 
and unwelcome because in fact blind to the disinterested sentiments and 
virtues displayed by Harley, but also dwelling within that world which 
only refuses to see them. Simultaneously functioning as the outside of the 
beauty of true sentiment, as its frame, the horrifying ways of the world 
must remain where they are so as not to deprive the beauty of its borders, 
of the territory upon which it naturally ‘encrusts’ itself. The outside is 
naturally dangerous, and it must remain so in order that the simple minds, 
like Harley’s, do not have to philosophize as to decide whether being human 
is a feeling or a principle, a sentiment or a law which, without the natural 
borders, would have to somehow restrict the growth of Harley’s sensible 
heart. Harley fell in love with Miss Walton because (though he did not 
quite realise it, and it is the narrator who tells us about it) “her beneflcience 
was unbounded [...] for her humanity was a feeling, not a principle; but 
minds like Harley’s are not very apt to make this distinction, and generally 
give our virtue credit for all that benevolence which is instinctive in our 
nature.”17 Virtue and beauty are thus instinctive rather than learnt and 
they are equally instinctively given credit by Harley. It is for this reason 
that, unlike in Burke, the sublime is posited “in the world” by Mackenzie, in 
the centre of the English society from whose convoluted ways Harley 
instinctively steps back and returns home to die in the peace of the agreeable 
society of friends. Though Burke’s examples of the sublime were mostly 
natural landscapes of great mountains and endless oceans, the mechanism of 
their correction into the harmony of the socially agreeable beauty is very 
much like that of Harley’s ‘bettering’ of the world the difference being 
that the social is quite explicitly rendered as a matter of some principial taste 
whose principles Burke had problems formulating. Not being a philosopher, 
Harley instinctively ignores the formulation of any principles and actually 
withdraws from their formulation to the grave under a tree whose gestural 
language makes the grave an agreeable space for Harley even before his 
death:
The last time we passed there, methought he looked wistfully on that tree: there was 
a branch of it, that bent towards us, waving in the wind; he waved his hand, as if he 
mimicked its motion. There was something predictive in his look!18
17 H. Mackenzie, The Man of..., p. 16.
18 Ibid., p. 132.
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If the death of Clarissa Harlowe in Richardson’s story was represented as 
a marriage with another world and her cessation of the power to write made 
that world unavailable to any representation, Harley as it were converses 
with his future grave thus seemingly diminishing the social space of virtue, but 
still leaving it within the scope of human communication. The death of the 
man of feeling does not leave the feelings bodiless, but leaves the feelings in 
their utmost purity hovering over the grave thus giving them freedom to 
penetrate the hearts of others, to find new embodiments in other men of feeling 
who visit Harley’s grave:
I sometimes visit his grave; I sit in the hollow of the tree. It is worth a thousand 
homilies! every nobler feeling rises within me! every beat of my heart awakens 
a virtue! — but it will make you hate the world — No: there is such an air of 
gentleness around, that I can hate nothing; but as to the world — I pity the men of 
it.19
There is no trace of terror in Mackenzie’s rendering of Harley’s death and 
grave. The home of Harley’s heart makes any approaches of the sublime 
actually unthinkable as it is exactly in the individual power of virtue that the 
capability of seeing things as always already domesticated resides. Rather than 
the object productive of terror and aversion, the world eventually becomes the 
object of pity, and the terrors and sufferings are the domain of the men of it, 
rather than the domain of the men of feeling. Even the spirit of death is 
a gentle spirit, a different version of the genius of the place which has become 
the agreeable genius of the grave, of the ‘garden of pure feeling.’
Though the image of contemplation upon a grave is thematically close 
to the scenes explored by the Graveyard Poets in the earlier eighteenth century, 
it is exactly the lack of the Burkean terror motivating his idea of the sublime 
which changes the closing scene of The Man of Feeling into a pastoral scene 
of sorts. Sentimentalism in eighteenth-century writings (and I have chosen 
Mackenzie’s story as and extreme example of this genre rather than Sterne 
a digression on whose digressions on sensibility and its inevitable absurdities 
would amount to a volume reminiscent of the text attempting to present 
us the opinions of Mr. Tristram Shandy) is frequently read as an articulation 
of what John Mullan calls “an ‘optimistic’ view of the sociable capacities of 
human beings.”20 This seeming optimism seems to be born from the idea 
of there being a possibility of representing, and thus offering as real, the 
world without any terrors or horrors, a smooth world with smooth roads of 
feeling linking individuals, without any frictions or disturbances, with, and to, 
each other within some space or territory away from the old tracts of the old 
19 Ibid., p. 133.
20 J. Mullan, Sentiment..., p. 198.
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and rusty world. Mackenzie’s mirror of bettering the world is the mirror 
which desublimates to the point, at which paradoxically, the virtue and the 
purity of heart themselves become objects of worship in their infinite 
agreeability hovering over the grave of Harley thus producing an ‘agreeably 
sublime’ sphere of admiration of itself, a sphere which, for Burke, would be 
a tautology comparable to talking of the blackness of white, for instance. 
Beauty should be smoothed and polished in Burke, but it also should be 
agreeably small, confined by some rules or principles. If the only constraint 
imposed on the humanity of feeling is individuality, then it cannot be 
surprising that this pure individuality dissolves to infinity, transgresses even 
the borders of one’s grave and in fact propagates, in much less pathetic style, 
Swedenborg’s populations of angels who can only meet in heaven, or, as seems 
to be the case with Mackenzie, in Scotland naturally separated from the 
lowlands to which her heart will never go. If the sublime of the graveyard 
poetry, as Samuel Monk claims, “sought to turn men’s thoughts from health 
to death, from the cheerful light of day to the horrors of the grave, and in so 
doing it developed into an instrument for awakening the strong emotion which 
the mid-century enjoyed,”21 sentimentalism desublimates this enjoyment in 
order to awaken the spirit of the grave as equally cheerful and healthy 
as light of day or children within us, children disinterestedly basking within 
the graveyard of the world.
♦ * ♦
Il is night; I am forlorn on the hill of storms. The wind 
is heard in the mountain. The torrent pours down the 
rock. No hut receives me from the rain, forlorn on the 
hill of winds!
James Macpherson
A few year after Mackenzie sent his Harley to London (1771), from 
which he soon returned unchanged, Dr. Johnson published his remarks on 
Scotland in A Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland (1775) which he 
toured with Boswell in 1773 (probably trying to wear off some of his rust and 
corpulence resulting from the sedentary kind of life led by lexicographers). 
Probably not being the anonymous narrator of The Man of Feeling, he 
could not visit Harley’s grave under a tree, but if he had, he would have 
probably read Harley’s return from London as a rare exception, an idea 
21 S. Monk, The Sublime..., p. 88.
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which he expressed in a peculiar theory of mountains which he develops in his 
text:
As mountains are long before they are conquered, they are likewise long before they 
are civilized. Men are softened by intercourse mutually profitable, and instructed by 
comparing their own notions with those of others. Thus Caesar found the maritime 
parts of Britain made less barbarous by their commerce with the Gauls. Into 
a barren' and rough tract no stranger is brought either by the hope of gain or of 
pleasure. The inhabitants having neither commodities for sale, nor money for 
purchase, seldom visit more polished places, or if they do visit them, seldom 
return.22
In Dr. Johnson’s eyes the polished places, and thus agreeable places and, as 
places, topographically defined objects, objects not too big to be beautiful 
have already been created. They are places where ideas and money circulate 
without any obstructions or frictions due to a certain softening of man 
which is the result of that ‘intercourse.’ He also quite explicitly identifies 
colonization with civilization. The Highlands are an object of his interest 
only as an object potentially becoming available to culture though only 
little hope for this end reverberates in his words. The British must have 
been seen as soft enough to be generously conquered by the Romans who 
probably saw equally little hope for the softening of the Scots and for this 
reason erected Hadrian’s Wall thus clearly marking the end of civilization. 
The inhabitants within have nothing to offer to the civilization though, 
once allowed to cross the border, they are incapable of resisting its attrac­
tions as if they were naturally theirs, only forgotten through the separa­
tion.
If Mackenzie allegorizes Scotland as the land of the heart, Dr. Johnson 
lives “a life of allegory,”23 a life of the allegory of London as a model for 
“The great community of the world” {Rambler 135), where “Mankind is one 
vast republick” {Idler 19) where one can evade solitude which to him was 
horror, as Sir Joshua Reynolds once wrote.2* “An atmosphere of speech 
irresistibly delivered envelopes Johnson’s London,” says Max Byrd,
its clubs and taverns and debates [...], and makes it to our imagination a city of 
ceaseless conversation. And this atmosphere Johnson [...] breathes hungrily. ‘The 
town is my element,’ he writes to Dr. Brockelsby towards the end of his life; ‘there 
are my friends, there are my books... and there are my amusements.’25
22 S. Johnson, Selected Writings, P. Cruttwell, ed. (Penguin Books 1986), p. 139.
23 Cf. M. Byrd, London Transformed; Images of the City in the Eighteenth Century (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press 1978), p. 117.
24 Cf. ibid, p. 111.
25 Ibid, p. 112.
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A speechless community of sentiments is thus alien to Johnson, a community 
of solitude, as it were, in which there is no room for difference and argument. 
Solitude forces one to face the absence of others, a disengagement from the 
world. London, a place of endless traffic and exchange, a chaotic hubbub of 
fake words expressing fake feelings allegorizing Mackenzie’s “the world” 
is for Johnson a place of disagreeable agreement in which there is nothing to 
fear, where man constructs himself in the exchange of words, ideas or goods 
thus never being simple left to himself facing the Other. During his trip to 
Scotland, Johnson sees nothing attractive in its desolate landscapes, he sees 
them as separated from the world, from the republic of men in which Harley 
saw nothing but himself and from whose polished places he returned, finding 
them rusty and disagreeable, to his hill pencilled on the departure, and to the 
solitude of his grave. Sitting among hills in Scotland, Johnson is forced to 
concentrate on himself because there is nothing to see:
The day was calm, the air soft, and all was rudeness, silence, and solitude. Before 
me, and on either side, were high hills, which by hindering the eye from ranging, 
forced the mind to find entertainment for itself.2*
This “uniformity of barrenness”* 27 is actually nonexistent to the eye, it is 
everywhere, and everywhere the same, the sublime in one of its purest forms in 
Burke — huge and undifferentiated, an infinity of sorts. Despite Boswell’s 
company, Johnson feels absolutely lonely, the only attractive object in this 
rude, desolate space being Johnson’s mind which begins to entertain itself with 
the idea of solitude:
[...] yet the imaginations excited by the view of an unknown and untravelled 
wilderness are not such as rise in the artificial solitude of parks and gardens, 
a flattering notion of self-sufficiency, a placid indulgence of voluntary delusions, 
a secure expansion of the fancy, or a cool concentration of the mental powers. The 
phantoms which haunt a desert are want, and misery, and danger; the evils of 
dereliction rush upon the thoughts; man is made unwillingly acquainted with his 
own weakness, and meditation shows him only how little he can sustain, and how 
little he can perform.28
Solitude in a park or a garden in London is thus a repose, an artificial one, in 
which man can securely ponder over himself or others, but from which one 
can always return (like Hume) to common talk or some less common 
conversation. In the Highlands one cannot resist the dangers of “dereliction,’ 
of reduction to the point of nothingness in the ways of the infinite world. 
2<s S. Johnson, Selected..., p. 316.
27 Ibid., p. 315.
28 Ibid., p. 316.
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The dangers of infinity forcibly remind man of his ‘littlenes’ and they belittle 
him and his actions to the point (even to mathematical point) beyond the reach 
of the beautiful. In the sublime landscape, man sees himself as sublime, as 
inexpressible, as infinitely small. If Thomas Gray, after his visit to the Alps in 
1739, wrote that seeing them “you have Death perpetually before your eyes, 
only so far removed, as to compose the mind without frightening it,”29 
Johnson sees in the mountain scenery a diminished man, an infinitely small 
man which he becomes in the absence of culture, in the absence of the polished 
places of a London, a man incapable of any action, paralysed by the fear of 
infinity so immediate that it makes man not only incapable of composing his 
mind, but of composing anything.30
29 Letters of Thomas Gray (London 1820), p. 70.
30 Dr. Johnson’s well known denial of the existence of the original of Macpherson’s Ossianic 
poems might have something in common with his doubt as to the possibility of anything ‘cultural,’ 
or beautiful, having been created in the ‘deserts’ of the Scottish Highlands. Though he admits that 
“Pleasure and terror are indeed the genuine sources of poetry,” he simultaneously, in the same 
sentence, goes away from this original and says that “poetical pleasure must be such as human 
strength and fortitude may combat.” Rooted in the sublime, the art of poetry must stay away from 
it as approaches of infinity, “the good and evil of Eternity are too ponderous for the wings of wit; 





We returned home beneath a sky the most awfully 
sublime that can be imagined. The deep gloom of clouds 
was rendered the more dismal by a mixture of sullen 
light. [...] Miss Sharpe for all her passion for the 
sublime, which is very strong, was so overpowered by 
the terrifying scenery, that she could not bear to look at 
it. 1 could not resist such a spectacle.
A letter from Mrs. Elizabeth Carter to Miss Catherine Talbot
Miss Sharpe loved the sublime, but she could not look at it. Mrs. Carter 
could not resist the sublime ‘spectacle’ though she herself describes it as awful, 
gloomy and dismal. The sublime can be an object of admiration, for both the 
ladies, only as a ‘spectacle,’ the difference being that Miss Sharpe does not see 
anything spectacular in the gloom for which she has a passion, and which 
seems to be too gloomy for her.
The sublime is thus a paradoxical thing which is either absent to one’s eye, 
or present as already representable. The spectacle of terror, the possibility of 
representing terror within a pleasurable form is inscribed within Burke’s theory 
as the inevitable gesture of withdrawal in its face, of diminishing the impact 
of the approaching infinity. The irresistible passion for the sublime (like 
Mrs. Carter’s, for instance) is actually the passion for resisting it, for facing 
it in order to frame it as a spectacular object, a remembrance of a journey 
to the spheres of which, like Dr. Johnson, we do not want to partake, and 
which actually prove the human power of resisting the irresistible, 
of grasping infinity in the form of a book, a poem, or a picture. Burke’s 
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“spectacularization” of the sublime inscribes philosophising within any 
description or presentation of a terrible object as the necessity of its 
reproduction which also proves the reproducer’s mastery over the sublime. 
The “rise” of Gothic fiction in the 1760s with its notorious visions of haunted 
castles, “of heroines preyed on by unspeakable terrors, of the blackly 
lowering villain, of ghosts, vampires, monsters and werewolves”1 is 
simultaneously the rise of what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick sees as “the con­
ventional genre par excellence.”1 2 It is also the conventionalization of the 
sublime, the implicit inscription of rules and principles of producing the 
sublime which Burke had problems in discovering. David Punter notices that 
many
of the details of Burke’s analysis have relevance to the Gothic writers — in 
particular his emphasis on obscurity, vastness, magnificence as constitutive elements 
of the sublime — but his most important contribution was to confer on terror 
a major and worthwhile literary role.3
In other words, the authority of the philosopher, of philosophy, establishes 
terror as category to be reproduced in literature, in writing, simultaneously 
providing the ‘reproducers’ with a list of ready-made attributes of terror, with 
rules and principles (conventions) of representing the sublime; himself failing, 
as we have seen, to make a clear-cut distinction between the sublime and the 
beautiful.
Terror, however paradoxically it may sound, becomes a terrifying 
thing in the eighteenth century, and its massive reproduction, be it in the 
Gothic fictions or in the Graveyard poetry, serves the purpose of domes­
ticating it within some secure field of writing, and, more generally, aesthetics. 
Since what is at stake is the internalization and naturalization of order and 
law as attributes of man, terror (which Hobbes saw as the necessary, external 
cohesive power of society simultaneously seeing law and order as contrary 
to our natural passions in Leviathan) also has to be domesticated and 
naturalized in order for citizens to act properly by themselves rather than 
from fear of some punishment inflicted by a power external to their tastes 
and actually dictating those tastes to people. As David Jarrett notices, the rise 
of Gothic fiction is an aesthetic extension of the political fears of English 
society:
1 D. Punier, The Literature of Terror. A History of Gothic Fictions from 1765 to the Present 
Day (London and New York: Longman 1980), p. 1.
2 S. E. Kosofsky, The Coherence of Gothic Conventions (New York and London: Methuen 
1986), p. 166.
3 D. Punter, Literature of.., p. 45.
122
Otranto, perhaps, is as much England as it is Strawberry Hills and is built on a fear 
of a return to something like feudal absolutism To many the threat of a return 
to an absolutism that was virtually feudal seemed as real towards the end of the 
century as it had up to the ’45 rebellion, for the sometimes insane George III was 
cast in the role of a potential Gothic tyrant as the Catholic pretender had been.4
The Gothic fiction reproduces the terror and barbarity (the word “Gothic” 
was almost synonymous with “barbarous” still in the first half of the 
eighteenth century5) of the past as a warning against the external terror 
of the absolutist monarchy simultaneously normalizing the terror itself 
normalized by “one of the bloodiest criminal laws in Europe created in 
England over the century” in order to deal with the terror of everyday life 
where “there were more banditti, in the shape of highwaymen and smugglers, 
on the roads and shores of England than in the pages of Ann Radcliffe’s 
romances.”6 A theorization of terror, like Burke’s, posits the ‘terrible terror’ in 
the past as something already done away with simultaneously positing the 
‘delightful terror’ of the sublime as actually expressible, spectacular, be it in the 
form of a gothic ruin, or that of a public execution. “Terror,” David Jarrett 
notices, “was not only the basis of Edmund Burke’s aesthetic of the Sublime 
and the principal engine of much Gothic fiction, it was also the basis of 
English criminal law [...J.”7 Strength and power are also attributes of the 
Burkean sublime, but they are productive of fear and terror provided they are 
‘wild,’ tigers in howling forests rather than some Blakean “horses of 
instruction” we see continually among us, however strong creatures they 
may be.8 We are thus affected only by strength “which is natural power,” 
and with which Burke, interestingly, also endows kings and institutions:
The power which arises from institution in kings and commanders, has the same 
connection with terror.9
This naturalization of power is simultaneously its sublimation, which, 
paradoxically, makes it, say, politically useless as regards social order because, 
as he himself claims, useful strength employed for our benefit is never 
sublime.10 Power is thus posited as an object of awe and admiration outside 
4 D. Jarrett, The Gothic Form in Fiction and its Relation to History (Winchester: King 
Alfred’s College 1980), pp. 10-11.
5 Cf. A. E. Longueil, “The Word ‘Gothic’ in Eighteenth-Century Criticism,” Modern 
Language Notes, xxxviii (1923), pp. 453—460.
6 Ibid., p. 11.
’ Ibid.
8 Cf. E. Burke, A Philosophical..., p. 113.
9 Ibid., p. 116.
10 Ibid., p. 114.
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the society and its pleasures. What Burke’s philosophical inquiry makes 
thus impossible to achieve is complete aesthetization of the sublime which is 
only theoretically posited as the opposite of the beautiful, as a threat 
to the beautiful simultaneously negatively constitutive of it. What we are 
capable of perceiving and mastering are only what phenomenologists could 
call “concretizations” or “actualizations” of the sublime, forms of the sublime 
which, as forms, are always somehow mixed with the beautiful. The terror of 
the sublime is the beautiful’s constitutive outside and, as such, inevitably 
contaminates the beautiful itself never becoming fully domesticated, subjected 
to its orderly sphere. Things are thus neither purely sublime, nor purely 
beautiful, and it is within this undecidable sphere that at the end of the 
eighteenth century the category of the picturesque interferes in order to “give 
those objects which are neither beautiful nor sublime (in Burke’s sense of the 
words) a local habitation and a name,” as Samuel Monk claims.11
There is, I think, a little more to it. Since the sublime and the beautiful 
themselves have no local habitation, since they are names of philosophical 
categories only deducible from the sublime somehow “mixed” with the 
beautiful, the category of the picturesque (propagated mainly by William 
Gilpin) is necessary to legitimize “spectacularization” (in the sense of 
framing and displaying) as a natural gesture of reducing the terror of the 
sublime without simultaneously being enslaved by the dictatorship of the 
rules of the beautiful. Burke as it were opens up a huge territory which now 
has to be explored by topographers who will name its habitable places and 
also mark the inhabitable ones thus clearly marking the limits of the aesthetic. 
It cannot be surprising though, that such an operation could only be done at 
the cost of both the sublime and the beautiful as independent, ideally opposite, 
terms.
The metaphor of the topographer quite accurately describes, I think, 
Gilpin’s endeavor, as the picturesque mind he propagates has to constantly 
carry a pencil and a drawing pad about in order to redraw the borders 
of the beautiful actually sublimating it a little in order to, paradoxically, 
desublimate it. Gilpin achieves this paradoxical effect by naturalizing the 
beautiful, by inscribing the rules which govern and order the beautiful 
(in the Burkean sense, of course) into nature. There are things which are 
beautiful in nature, but there are also “such as are picturesque [...] those which 
please the eye in their natural state', and those, which please from some quality, 
capable of being illustrated in painting.”11 2 Certain natural objects are thus 
naturally marked for human art, naturally different from nature which 
11 S. Monk, The Sublime..., p. 2.
12 W. Gilpin, Three Essays. On Picturesque Beauty; On Picturesque Travel; and on Sketching 
Landscape: To which is added a poem on Landscape Painting (London 1792), p. 3.
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itself is beautiful and pleasing anyway, but which simultaneously lacks 
something which only a picturesque eye can see. The idea of the genius of the 
place is, of course, discernible here, the difference being that Gilpin’s 
picturesque genius in a way demolishes the agreeable spaces of landscape 
gardens as too smooth:
Turn the lawn into a piece of broken ground: plant rugged oaks instead of flowering 
shrubs [...] give in the rudeness of a road: mark it with wheel-tracks; and scatter 
around a few stones; in a word, instead of making the whole smooth, make it rough, 
and you make it also picturesque. All the other ingredients of beauty it already 
possessed.13
Whether the past tense used in the last sentence means that the garden thus 
rearranged still possessed anything of its previous, “non-picturesque” beauty 
is Gilpin’s secret. Interestingly, a similar kind of demolition takes place in the 
sight of a Palladian villa. In order to make Palladian architecture picturesque, 
we have to “from a smooth building [...] turn it into a rough ruin,” Gilpin 
instructs us.14
The chief enemy of Gilpin’s in his search for the picturesque seems to be 
any trace of “smoothness” which, for Burke, was “a quality essential to 
beauty” as regards small objects, and which was actually productive of variety:
Observe that part of a beautiful woman where she is perhaps the most beautiful, 
about the neck and breasts; the smoothness, the softness, the easy and insensible 
swell, the variety of the surface, which is never for the smallest space the same [...J15
Gilpin explicitly refers to Burke as regards his idea of smoothness,16 and 
without criticizing him directly, finds the smooth part of Burke’s contem­
plation uninteresting for the picturesque eye because not rough enough, and, 
as it seems, he would rather paint something on that part:
The smoothness of the surface is only the ground of the colours. In itself we admire 
it no more, than we do the smoothness of the canvas, which receives the colours of 
the picture.17
What is “naturally” beautiful is thus only a background for Gilpin, an object 
too regular in its smoothness as to become nice in a picture. Natural beauty, 
as opposed to its picturesque version, is too close to sublimity which 
13 Ibid., p. 8.
14 Ibid., pp. 7—8.
15 E. Burke, A Philosophical..., p. 216.
16 Cf. W. Gilpin, Three Essays..., p. 5.
17 Ibid., p. 23.
125
is also a version of an infinite smoothness for Gilpin. Finding the distinction 
between the sublime and the beautiful “rather inaccurate,” he says that
Sublimity alone cannot make an object picturesque. However grand the mountain, 
or the rock may be, it has no claim to this epithet, unless it’s form, it’s colour, 
or its accompaniaments have some degree of beauty. Nothing can be more 
sublime than the ocean: but wholly unaccompanied, it has little of the picturesque. 
When we talk therefore of the sublime object, we always understand that it is also 
beautiful.18
It is not quite clear whether Gilpin does not deny “the existence of a sublimity 
other than picturesque sublimity” and simply ignores it, as Samuel Monk 
claims.19 By making sublimity a degree of beauty, he makes use of Burke’s 
distinction by incorporating it within his own theory as its canvas. The sublime 
alone cannot be picturesque, but neither can be the beautiful, and it is human 
assistance, or art, which brings either the sublime or the beautiful to the fore, 
to the foreground. Everything, even the sublimest of oceans, is not infinitely 
smooth and formless, and it contains a little of the picturesque. It is this 
inscription of finitude in all objects which is responsible for Gilpin’s denial of 
the sublime as a philosophical category to which a picturesque eye is blind to 
as its very presence, the act of seeing, is already an act making the sublime 
spectacular, and thus potentially picturesque.
Though usually read as guidebooks for proper painting and drawing, 
Gilpin’s frequent digressions on philosophy and morality make a simple 
classification of the category of the picturesque as a strictly “artistic” category 
questionable. At one point in his Three Essays (1792) he claims that the 
picturesque eye actually “abhors art, and delights solely in nature.”20 In the 
manner the unaccompanied sublime was too smooth to be picturesque, art is 
simply too regular to partake of it, it “abounds with regularity, which is only 
another name of smoothness."21
Art is thus equally unwelcome as the sublime, and what is thus propagated 
is an idea of another nature, of a nature which is always already pleasing 
to the eye, of nature which is neither too natural nor too artificial. Gilpin calls 
this nature, quite ambiguously, “a painter’s nature” which is “whatever he 
imitates; whatever the object be what is commonly called natural, or artificial. 
Is there a greater ornament of landscape, than the ruins of a castle?”22 
“A painter’s nature” is thus, generally, imitability, an imitability inscribed
18 Ibid., p. 43.
19 S. Monk, The Sublime..., p. 224.
20 W. Gilpin, Three..., p. 26.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 27.
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within the landscape as already agreeable with “a painter’s nature.” Since 
nature is already naturally ornamented with ruins rather than, as we have 
seen, with Palladian villas whose smooth shapes are probably unimitable for 
Gilpin (at least for those not endowed with painters’ natures), the roughness of 
such a “sight” is natural rather than conventional as it is the regular 
conventionality of art which the picturesque eye abhors.
The idea of the picturesque seems thus to be a programmatic unregulation 
of the already regulated, a “bold stroke” which Gilpin suggests as a method of 
drawing in which “a part is given for a whole, which it cannot fail at 
suggesting.”23 Suggestive rather than representative, the picturesque imitates 
by way of synecdoche, that is to say, by presenting objects without presenting 
them as closed and regulated totalities whose parts infallibly bring the totalities 
to one’s mind. Since no part can properly represent the sublime which, in its 
ideality, lacks parts, its existence as an object or a philosophical category 
cannot be suggested by any bold strokes. No finished object of art can be an 
object of such a “suggestion,” exactly because of its subjection to the rules of 
art. Hence Gilpin’s love for “the ruined tower, the Gothic arch, the remains of 
castles and abbeys.”24 Such objects, in their incompleteness, can be suggestive 
not only of their former completeness, but also of the completeness of the work 
nature itself, something inconceivable if the sublime is regarded as a natural 
category. Ruins are, says Gilpin, “consecrated by time; and almost deserve 
the veneration we pay to the work of nature itself.”25 The roughness of 
a ruin is a natural bold stroke upon the landscape which, in case of an absence 
of such a ruin, can be “planted” upon it by the stroke of the picturesque 
traveller as a reminder and part of the work of nature itself. Bold strokes, as 
opposed to the free ones in which there is “no appearance of constraint,” 
actually enrich nature by making it rough, by “desmoothing” it which is 
tantamount, as it seems, to creating incomplete parts within it, so as to make 
the work of synecdoche possible.
Thus by inriching the parts of a united whole with roughness, you obtain the 
combined idea of simplicity and variety; from whence results the picturesque.26
The diversification of parts is actually their creation upon the otherwise 
united, whole, simple (generally smooth) surface of things which thus boldly 
drafted leads us back to simplicity and totality via the “inriched” parts. 
Otherwise the smoothness or simplicity of the world cannot be made present 
and such an attempt is actually contrary to the common sense for which 
23 Ibid., p. 17.
24 Ibid., p. 46.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 28.
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infinity, eternity and generally “first principles” cannot be made accessible. 
Blake’s infinity which he wanted to hold in the palm of his hand in its 
simultaneity becomes a mere rhetorical suggestion in the hands of Gilpin, 
a rough object, like a grain of sand, which can tell one only that there is 
a part of a greater whole, perhaps simple and smooth, but whose simplicity 
and smoothness are not commensurable with the common sense which 
tells us that we can see only what we can see. Gilpin’s message is the message 
of the return of common sense both to art and to philosophy as the only 
means of “picturing” the world without falling into the trap of the infinity of 
the sublime and equally terrifying subjection to the rules of art. “If we made,” 
he suggests.
common sense the criterion in matters of art, as well as science, we should be nearer 
the truth. [...] Thus, in our inquiries into first principles, we go on, without end, and 
without satisfaction. The human understanding is unequal to search. In philosophy 
we inquire for them in vain — in physics — in metaphysics — in morals. [...] All is 
uncertainty; a strife of words; the old contest [...]27
The category of the picturesque is thus in fact a commonsensical category. 
The idea of picturesque travel in search of the picturesque whose guidelines 
Gilpin drafts in a quite straightforward manner without too excessive 
use of any rhetorical “bold strokes” becomes, rhetorically, the idea of 
a travel through life with common sense as a guide. With this kind of guide 
in hand one does not really ignore the sublime as one simply avoids it, 
never comes face to face with it. The picturesque, its search, is posited 
as a way of living according to taste whose goodness consists in its being 
socially shared. To Reynolds’ delicately critical suggestion that “perhaps 
picturesque is somewhat synonymous with taste,”28 Gilpin replies that he 
“suspects” that the picturesque and taste are words applicable to “excellences 
of an inferior order; and which are incompatible with the grand stile.”29 
This inferiority does not seem to be really inferior, as the grand stile is the 
kind of art which, as we have seen, the picturesque eye abhors, something 
actually alien to common sense and common taste. The picturesque nature 
is not grand, but natural, that is to say, neither sublime nor confined by 
the stylistic demands of art. Since its nature is basically synecdochic, it is 
not a picture or a painting, but, let us repeat, something “capable of being 
illustrated in painting," a part of an as yet nonexistent picture which we 
commonsensically desire to complete leaving the picturesque objects always 
27 Ibid., p. 31 and p. 33.
28 Ibid., p. 35.
29 Ibid., p. 42.
128
incomplete, drawn by means of the bold stroke in our drawing pad in order 
to supplement our memory.
In his essay on the picturesque travel, Gilpin quite explicitly suggests 
that we should make bold strokes of the picturesque objects supplying them 
with written commentaries in order to fix “the lead idea” because “memory 
must be distrusted.”30 Fixing the leading ideas we do not depict what we see, 
but what we should see, the improved fragments of what Gilpin terms 
“defective nature”31 to be completed in the form of a book of travels as 
a supplement of one’s memory and as a guide addressed to other followers of 
Gilpin’s picturesque who at that time “were a legion,” as Samuel Monk puts 
it.32 We can see more by travelling, but we must constantly remember that 
what appears before our eyes is a variety of new parts which do enrich our 
picture of the world, but which we have to constantly supplement by ourselves 
leaving the completion suspended. Travel books are thus guide books which 
guide us not to where their authors were and what they saw, but which 
guide us to travel, teach us to travel and see the world with the picturesque 
eye, which is also the commonsensical eye of taste. Thus travelling we remove 
the already mentioned “defective nature,” its too smooth and sublime 
background, and remain suspended between the sublime and the artful. 
Rather than ignoring the sublime, Gilpin replaces it with this suspension, with 
the “agreeable suspense” in which the mind of the traveller is constantly 
kept.33
According to Monk, this suspension of the sublime (which he reads as an 
act of ignoring) in Gilpin is a mark of an “advance in sophistication on his 
part and that of his followers,” as well as “temporary loss of interest in the 
immediate, emotional relationship between man and nature” awaiting to be 
revived by “the boy Wordsworth, in the fastness of Cumberland.”34 While the 
“boy Romanticism” will travel to infinity, preferably vertically, the short 
lived career of the idea of horizontal travel in search of the picturesque seems 
to be an attempt at eventual mastering of nature, human nature included, 
so as to make it both natural and aesthetic, to an extent unlimited, but 
simultaneously available as a whole through the variety of its parts in the 
form of a travel book, for instance, a history of the scenes from one’s life. 
The paradox of this kind of life, however, is that it must be led away from 
home. The picturesque mind is a wandering mind, yet it never wonders as to 
what is picturesque or what is not. Hence the lack of the immediacy 
30 Cf. ibid, p. 65.
31 Ibid, p. 67.
32 S. Monk, The Sublime..., p. 224.
33 Cf. W. Gilpin, Three Essays..., p. 48.
34 S. Monk, The Sublime..., p. 224.
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between man and nature Monk writes about. Thus domesticating or familiari­
zing the space, the picturesque mind feels at home away from home. It is only 
here, with home rendered as journey, that the universal metaphor of life as 
journey becomes thinkable.
The paradox of home, however, is, as Ralph Flores notices, that it “is 
needed and can be imagined only when dispossessed or left behind.”35 It is 
exactly this paradox, and inevitable one, which Gilpin’s theory attempts at 
escaping. Living in search of the picturesque is itself an escape from the home 
of, too strict, rules of art toward something already imprinted upon the mind 
of the traveller in the form of picturesque nature. The fact that such a travel is 
productive of Dulicineas of sorts does not go unnoticed, and in 1812 William 
Combe sends a quixotic figure of Dr. Syntax to search for the picturesque in 
the world there.
The motives of Syntax’s tour are not quite disinterested, and he leaves 
home in search of the picturesque for a number of reasons. One of them is 
Syntax’s wife:
Nay, to avenge the slightest wrong,
She could employ both arms and tongue, 
And, if we list to country tales,
She sometimes would enforce her nails. 
Her face was red, her form was fat, 
A round-about, and rather squat; [...] 
Twas not the custom of this spouse 
To suffer long a quiet house: 
She was among those busy wives 
Who hurry-scurry through their lives; 
And make amends for fading beauty 
By telling husbands of their duty.* 34
The oppressive presence of Mrs. Syntax’s voice and nails in order to keep her 
husband to his duty supplemented with the monotony of his daily life and 
work at school which brings very little income bring to Syntax’s mind, like 
a flash (“A sudden thought across him came”) the idea of going for a tour. 
The idea comes to him in a brief moment when his wife is away and the house 
is quiet, his “rumination” being interrupted by the return of his wife who 
becomes furious at the sight of her husband pacing the room around in 
excitement awakened by the idea of travel, rather than quietly sitting, as 
should be, in his chair:
35 R. Flores, The Rhetoric of Doubtful Authority. Deconstructive Readings of Self-Questioning
Narratives, St. Augustine to Faulkner (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 1984), p. 28.
34 W. Combe, The Tour of Doctor Syntax in Search of the Picturesque. A Poem (London: 
Methuen 1903), p. 3.
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Twas at this moment, when inspir’d, 
And by his new ambition fir’d, [...] 
That Mrs. Syntax re-appear’d:
Amaz'd she look’d, and loud she shriek’d, 
Or, rather like a pig she squeak’d,
To see her humble husband dare
Thus quit his sober ev’ning chair,
And pace, with varying steps, about, 
Now in the room, and now without.31
Away from his chair, Syntax is already away from his home, on the threshold 
of the room, both outside and inside. This time, exceptionally, he manages to 
keep his wife silent and listen to his arguments. Unlike Bunyan’s Christian in 
search of eternity, of “Life, life, eternal life,” Syntax does not run away from 
home putting fingers in his ears in order not to hear his wife and children 
crying after him to return,* 38 but silences his wife with a promise of return to 
a different home, well supplied and rich due to the income from the book he is 
going to write:
At Doctor Pompous give a look; 
He made his fortune by a book;
And if my volume does not beat it, 
When I return, I’ll fry and eat it.39
The book is going to be, of course, about his picturesque tour which he is 
going to write in a manner worth quoting here extensively:
■Til make a TOUR — and then I’ll WRITE IT 
You well know what my pen can do, 
And I’ll employ my pencil too: —
I’ll ride and write, and sketch and print,
And thus create a real mint;
I’ll prose it here, 1’11 verse it there,
And picturesque it ev’ry where:
I’ll do what all have done before;
I think I shall — and something more.40
The “something more” is, of course, outdoing “what all have done before.” 
Since the above is a concise version of Gilpin’s principles of the picturesque, 
writing one’s tour according to these principles one enriches one’s life 
simultaneously becoming rich and thus actually changing it in order to, 
31 Ibid., p. 4.
38 Cf. J. Bunyan, The Pilgrim's Progress (Penguin Books 1987), p. 53.
39 W. Combe, The Tour..., p. 5.
40 Ibid., pp. 4—5.
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paradoxically, become a person like everybody else. Syntax posits himself as 
a figure different from everybody else, because he, unlike the “all’ who have 
written their tours, still leads a sedentary kind of life attached to his chair 
by the absolute rule of his wife’s art of talking. It is the very idea of the tour 
which makes him already mobile and vivid, though still within the limits of his 
home.
In the idea of the picturesque there seems to be no escape from home. 
Neither was such an escape possible in the case of Mackenzie’s man of feeling 
who actually went to the world without leaving home, with the familiar 
landscape “penciled” in his mind as an armour against the world’s impurities 
which might contaminate his pure mind. The picturesque mind, or eye, 
familiarizes the world, improves the imperfections of nature out there, 
simultaneously promising the improvement of the already familiar. In the case 
of Bunyan’s Christian, the question of return is actually unthinkable, as 
eternity, the sublimest of tasks, actually does not belong to this world, and 
does not promise any finality in the form of a book, for instance. Christian, 
unlike Harley, never turns back, and goes through the world somewhere else. 
If Harley’s progress means an inevitable return to the same, Christian’s 
progress is a progress to infinity through the vanity fair of which he does not 
want to partake and which he does not actually want to change. A departure 
for a picturesque tour promises a change of this life, making it look nice in 
a picture, and if the picturesque traveller looks back home, he looks at it 
without any nostalgia because a bettering of it is already inscribed within the 
very idea of such travel. Harley’s nostalgia at the departure becomes, in the 
case of Syntax, anger and disgust with what he leaves behind him. Having 
spent his life in the underpaid service of “Mother Church,” he departs from 
the village saying good bye to it with anger:
“[...] But now, on better things intent, 
On far more grateful labours bent, 
New prospects open to my view: 
So thankless Mother Church, adieu!” 
Thus, having said his angry say, 
Syntax proceeded on his wav.41
Having left his home Syntax becomes a picturesque traveller now free to go 
wherever he wants. Though the first thing he does is get lost in the sublime 
wilderness of some “sad, unpeopled world,” it is enough for him to see a guide 
post which “Had ev’ry letter’d mark deface’d” to inspire him to draw 
a picture.
41 Ibid., p. 8.
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But, as my time shall not be lost,
I’ll make a drawing of the post;
And, tho’ a flimsy taste may (lout it, 
Ther’s something picturesque about it: 
Tis rude and rough, without a gloss, 
And is well cover’d o’er with the moss;42
Guided by Gilpin’s principles, Doctor Syntax’s eye beautifies the world around 
and maps it, in the form of drawings, in the book. Doctor Syntax travels 
through the world actually erasing all its horrors and terrors. There are 
unpeopled, sublime landscapes around, but they are momentarily replaced, 
improved by Syntax’s pen and pencil. He also goes through numerous 
unpleasant experiences in the poem, but these terminate in picturesque happy 
ends. Having been robbed by highwaymen and tied to a tree at night, for 
instance. Syntax is set free by two ladies approaching him on “two trotting 
palfreys,” a vision which is compared to La Mancha’s Knight’s first seeing of 
his Dulcinea. The horrors of the night give way to the improved perspective, 
a picturesque sight, and to the possibility of further travel and search of the 
picturesque in order to write a travel, as he had promised his wife. In Syntax’s 
book, unlike in the poem about Syntax’s travel, there is no room for 
descriptions or drawings which are displeasing. The art of life is in fact the art 
of drawing which is accessible only to the traveller, but to such as is equipped 
with the guiding principles which render this travel safe.
Canto XII of the poem begins with a metaphor of life as journey, though 
not quite a safe one:
Life is a Journey, on we go [...]
Like a stream, whose varying course 
Now rushes with impetuous force; 
Now in successive eddies plays, 
Or in meanders gently strays, 
It still moves on, till spreading wide, 
It mingles with the briny tide;
And, when it meets the ocean’s roar, 
The limpid waves are seen no more.43
The ocean’s roar, an example of the sublime for Burke, is rendered as the end 
of the picturesque part of the stream which, first having become wide and 
smooth, joins the sublime of the ocean which also signifies death, the end of 
the journey. This natural course of things translates Syntax’s travel into 
a natural compulsion for movement, though with a different end. Since 
42 Ibid., p. 10.
43 Ibid., p. 89.
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the picturesque eye improves nature (“Whoe’er from Nature takes a view,/ 
Must copy and improve it too”44), picturesque travel is natural, but it is 
also better because there’s no room for the roaring of the ocean in it. Hence 
the necessity of there being a home to return to, of a place from which 
one can depart again and return rather than die in the monstrous ocean 
and see no more. Writing one’s travel, one commemorates one’s life (the 
picturesque part of the stream) as a travel and makes it present in the form of 
a complete book. Only then can one return home, from which one has 
naturally escaped due to the natural compulsion for travelling (life is 
a journey), thus improving the home by making it a task of one’s travel, 
a fragment of one’s life. The improvement of Syntax’s home began, as we 
have seen, the moment he stood up from his chair and started walking about 
his room — it was then that his wife would for the first time listen to him. 
Sitting at home, if life is a journey, means death. Life begins with a journey 
which redefines home as a place of return to the place where one had not 
quite lived, but which now will become more vivid, less monotonous, even, 
say, picturesque. Interestingly, this return to the place where one was 
dead is also a return to a place of destination which, in the case of the 
unimproved natural course of life is the sublime ocean and the end of seeing 
which is the end of living. Home, for the picturesque traveller, also gives 
shelter from death.
The end of Doctor Syntax’s travel is a home enlivened by fame and money 
he expects from writing his tour. The rust of sedentary life he led will be worn 
off and he will lead a comfortable life of others who have already written their 
travels. Having spent three months at a ’Squires “warm mansion,” Syntax, 
probably driven by the compulsion to travel (life is a journey), refuses the offer 
of staying there longer:
“No,” he exclaim’d “I must away: —
I have a splendid book to make, 
To form a Tour, — to paint a Lake; 
And, by that well projected Tome, 
To carry fame and money home: 
And should I fail, my loving wife 
Will lead me such a precious life, 
That I had better never more 
Approach my then forbidden door.”45
There is no return home without “a Tour.” Syntax’s vivid mobility has to be 
completed in the fixed shape of the “tome,” an object of economic exchange, 
44 Ibid., p. 11.
45 Ibid., p. 90.
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which will guarantee the stability of his l^ome which, otherwise, will be 
inaccessible to him.
The stability of home seems to be the idea which motivates the very 
idea of the picturesque. Once a journey of life has been commonsensically 
written or drawn, made picturesque, then one can simply look at his tour with 
pleasure, without the risk of falling into Humean scepticism or vain attempts 
at communicating pure feelings. Metaphysical speculations lead to going on 
without end, as we have seen in Gilpin, to infinity, they destabilize and 
threaten with disorder. Philosophy goes, or travels, too far, and it simply 
cannot write “a tour” because the objects for which it searches are of such 
nature that they do not look nice in a picture. Instead of going into the nature 
of nature, it is enough to improve it a little and thus grant it the agreeable 
stability of nice objects, of souvenirs of sorts, which people thus made tourist 
may bring home and hang on the wall, for instance. A tourist’s eye, unlike 
that of a philosopher, does not explore the world, it only sees things already 
made familiar and nice, things judged as worth seeing, as sights, by guidebook 
writers (such as Gilpin, for instance). Thus equipped, a tourist cannot really 
get lost, even if he encounters, like Syntax, a guide post with all its letters 
defaced as the very presence of the guide post is a mark that the tourist’s route 
is proper. A written tour, which in the case of Syntax also brings economic 
growth, is an object which first of all brings order back home, a handbook of 
the syntax of the world which renders it accessible and learnable in one’s 
armchair without any approaches of infinity, of the sublime landscapes for 
which there is no space in the rules of the picturesque improvement of the 
world.
Illustration from J. C. Loudon, Observations on the Formation and Management of Useful 
and Ornamental Plantationes; on the Theory and Practice of Landscape Gardening; and on Gaining 
and Embanking Land from Rivers or the Sea (Endinburgh: D. Wilson for Archibald Constable 
1804)
IX
“Something fixed where all is moving”1 
(A Postscript)
For almost two thousand years a vast and mysterious austral 
continent beckoned through the mists of terrible and haunted 
seas. Its shifting outlines hover along the southern rim of the 
world in those fantastic old cosmographies and mappemondes 
which record with such vivid fidelity the indomitable struggle 
of the imagination to overlap the barriers which it could not yet 
pierce.
John Livingston Lowes, The Road to Xanadu
Between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe 
this contradictory feeling — pleasure and pain joy and anxiety, 
exaltation and depression — was christened or re-christened by 
the name of the sublime. It is around this name that the destiny 
of classical poetics was hazarded and lost; it is in this name that 
aesthetics asserted its critical rights over art, and that roman­
ticism, in other words modernity, triumphed.
Jean-Francois Lyotard
Besides, he was almost sure that nothing can be really 
“unnamable.” Il didn’s sound sensible to him.
H. P. Lovecraft
To Coleridge a call for correction of nature, like Gilpin’s, probably 
sounded like a blasphemy of sorts, an excitement to artificial feelings which 
1 Walter Pater on Coleridge (1866).
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makes us callous to real ones, as he wrote in Anima Poetae.2 So too 
Wordsworth, Samuel Monk notices,
speaks with impatience of the jargon of the picturesque. To him, such analysis as 
that in which Gilpin indulged must have seemed another example of the use of 
“that false secondary power by which we multiply distinctions.”3 4*
Multiplication of distinctions makes us believe that eventually everything 
can be classified, and thus men become blind to Coleridge’s real, probably 
less strictly categorized feelings. The Romantic primary power of imagination 
is the power of association beyond control, the power of feeling “too general 
an affinity with all things, and though it perceives the difference of things, yet 
is eternally pursuing the likenesses, or, rather, that which is common between 
them,” as Coleridge put it, and whose verbalization frequently made Coleridge 
talk, “as Carlyle heard him, ‘with eager musical energy, two stricken hours, 
his face radiant and moist, and communicate no meaning whatsoever to any 
individuals of his hearers.’”*
Coleridge’s talk leads nowhere, to no discovery of a meaning. Unlike in 
Gilpin’s guided tours, we get lost in a travel of a different kind, in the 
“movement of the imagination across the uncharted spaces of the world,” as 
John Livingston Lowes says about The Ancient Mariner (1798)? This 
movement leads in a sense nowhere because the ship is not bound to discover 
anything. The ship crosses the line of difference, of classification and explores 
the territory which cannot be charted and then conquered. This has already 
been done by others.
Lyotard’s identification of romanticism with modernity verging on the 
problematics of the sublime (cf. the epigram above)6 is an identification 
which also verges on the re-discovery of the uncharted upon the already 
charted, of the absent within the present. Coleridge’s search for something 
fixed where all is moving is the idea of there being a secondary imagination 
which, at least in Biographia Literaria, “dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order 
to re-create; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still, at all events, 
it struggles to idealize and unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects 
(as objects) are essentially fixed and dead.”7 Dissolution which unifies 
2 Coleridge. Poetry and Prose, K. Raine, ed. (Penguin Books 1987), p. 136.
3 S. Monk, The Sublime..., p. 229.
4 Quoted in J. L. Lowes, The Road to Xanadu (New York: Vintage Books 1959), p. 285.
’ Ibid., p. 110.
6 J.-F. Lyotard, The Inhuman. Reflections on Time, trans. G. Bennington and R. Bowlby 
(Cambridge: Polity Press 1991), p. 92.
7 Coleridge... (K. Raine, ed.), p. 191.
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is obviously a paradoxical idea as it renders unity as an unfixed object of sorts, 
a living, vital object as opposed to objects which are “essentially fixed and 
dead.”
The killing of the albatross as the gesture of the refusal to return back 
to the familiar, to return back home, suspends the idea of a secure presence, 
of a fixed totality, by forcing the mariner to be a “witness to the fact that there 
is indeterminacy,” as Lyotard phrases it.8 It is, I think, this being of 
indeterminacy, the being whose being cannot be determined, that makes the 
sublime a living object which escapes theorization, both in romanticism and in 
modernism, exactly as a ‘non-object,’ as the non-absent absence which I have 
already mentioned in the beginnings of this text. The sublime, the discursive 
presence of indeterminacy, of the unpresentable, is the paradoxical presence in 
which the eighteenth-century thinkers did not see any reality, and which they 
offered as the space of potential exploration and theorization so as to absorb 
the approaches of infinity within the capacity of the human mind and thus 
make it finite, determinable. The sublime was real only as difference, a horror 
which promises the pleasure of the eventual discovery which can then be 
mapped upon the determined territory of the human.
With Coleridge, perhaps, the sublime becomes what Lyotard, rightly or 
wrongly, terms “the inhuman,” the cohabitation of the limit with the limitless, 
the properly human with the inhuman.9 It is exactly this paradoxical kind of 
cohabitation that makes the idea of the sublime a synonym of indeterminacy, 
of the suspension of the determining presence of difference as limit in 
Coleridge’s reluctant “definition” of the sublime which he pronounced “to 
consist in a suspension of the powers of comparison.”10 11Such a suspension is 
obviously also the suspension of the possibility of there being a sublime as 
contrary to anything else, “a propaedeutic to the teaching [...] of the inside 
without outside,”11 of the inside which, as boundless, can only be the totality 
of the infinite which cannot be totalized.
The suspension of difference, of the powers of comparison, also means 
putting one’s mind to a stop, an experience so unwelcome to Addison, for 
instance. If for Carlyle, as we have seen, Coleridge’s talk was a total 
suspension of meaning, of the conclusion of his talk as a discovery of its 
subject, it was so because of Carlyle’s having posited the meaning outside 
8 J.-F. Lyotard, The Inhuman..., p. 101.
’ Cf. J.-F. Lyotard, The Inhuman..., p. 2.
10 Cf. R. Holmes, Coleridge. Early Visions (Penguin Books 1989), p. 230.
11 J. S. Cutsinger, “Inside without Outside: Coleridge, the Form of the One, and God,” in 
The Interpretation of Belief. Coleridge, Schleiermacher and Romanticism (London: MacMillan 
1986), p. 69.
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the talk, in the future, as something different from the talk. Suspending the 
powers of comparison, Coleridge does not give one TIME to step back from 
the very production of difference, from the indeterminacy which suspends the 
future revelation of a meaning and the exploitation of the meaning so revealed 
by history as a past event. The meaning can be determined only away from the 
sublime as an inside away from the outside, both in time and space. The 
practice of indeterminacy suspends this movement and becomes a paradoxical 
epistemology of the present which cannot be made present, whose very logic 
renders an attempt at its presentation as a step away form the present which 
makes the present present to history, and absent from the present thus 
reactivating the powers of comparison. Coleridge’s talk (or writing) does not 
promise anything there and then, but arrests us in the face of difference, of the 
as yet unnamed which he will not name by any proper name, and which only 
tentatively can be called, say, after Lovecraft, the unnameable.
Having suspended the powers of comparison Coleridge shifts his gaze to 
the present without any attempt at diminishing it by means of an outside, of 
stopping the movement of the oxymoronic “something fixed where all is 
moving” by means of a limit which is always already the limit of time. 
Coleridge’s ship, manned by an ancient mariner, is a ship which will not take 
us, or lead us, to a new world, to a secure space away from the movement of 
the sea. We must remain on board a ship bound “not indeed in search of the 
New World, like Columbus and his adventurers, nor yet an other world, 
that is to come, but in search of the other world that now is, and ever has been 
tho’ undreamt of by the Many,”12 says Coleridge inevitably returning to the 
marinistic metaphor.
NOW is THE OTHER world, the world of THE OTHER which can only 
be expressed by expressing the inexpressible, the unnamable (Lovecraft), 
the unpresentable (Lyotard), difference (Derrida), from the paradoxical 
position(s) of now and then (now has ever been), here and there ...
12 Coleridge on Logic and Learning, A. D. Snyder, ed. (New Haven 1929), p. 1.
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Tadeusz Rachwał
Zbliżenia nieskończoności. O wzniosłości i społeczności 
Studia o piśmiennictwie osiemnastowiecznym
Streszczenie
Punktem wyjścia pracy jest spojrzenie na rolę pojęcia wzniosłości w teorii poslstruk- 
turalistycznej i postomodemizmie (głównie J.-F. Lyotard). Posługując się takimi kategoriami, jak 
“niewyrażalne”, “nieobecna obecność” czy też “czas poza czasem”, teoretycy postmodernizmu 
wyraźnie podnoszą i wysuwają na czoło te same kwestie, które intrygowały dyskurs osiemnastego 
stulecia; były one jednak traktowane przez czołowych myślicieli tej epoki jako niepożądana sfera 
transgresji, jako sfera niebezpieczna dla porządku społecznego. W części analitycznej autor 
koncentruje się na poszukiwaniu jednostkowych prób przekroczenia granic ustanowionych przez 
zestaw norm społecznych w kontekście usiłującego ¡ograniczyć te przekroczenia dominującego 
dyskursu oświeceniowego (rozdz. I).
Rozdział II pracy stanowi krytyczne omówienie poglądów estetycznych Josepha Addisona, 
zawartych w cyklu esejów poświęconych sile wyobraźni, publikowanych w czasopiśmie “The 
Spectator”. Rozdział III poświęcony jest kwestii sceptycyzmu filozoficznego w obliczu sfer 
nieskończoności. Czytelnik znajdzie tu dyskusję na temat prawa, moralności i porządku 
społecznego na podstawie tez Hume’a i La Mettriego. Rozdział IV zajmuje się osiemnasto­
wiecznym pojęciem “smaku” jako kategorią niezwykle istotną w tworzeniu się dyskursu 
estetycznego, lecz zarazem kategorią ekonomiczną i polityczną dyktującą — poprzez niezwykle 
popularne wtedy pojęcie “geniuszu miejsca” — uporządkowanie świata jako ogrodu i zarazem 
sankcjonujące podbój kolonialny. Rozdziały V i VI poświęcone są kategorii “wzniosłości” w ujęciu 
filozoficznym (Burkę, Kant), estetycznym (Blake), religijnym (Swedenborg) i politycznym 
(Godwin). Przedmiotem rozdziałów VII i VIII jest rola pojęcia “wzniosłości” w rozwoju tzw. 
filozofii sentymentalnej oraz rola tej filozofii w rozwoju myśli estetycznej. Zamykający pracę 
rozdział IX jest omówieniem wczesnoromantycznej przemiany w podejściu do kategorii wznios­
łości oraz próbą wykazania pewnych związków pomiędzy romantyzmem a postmodernizmem, 
związków wynikających z krytycznego podejścia do “wzniosłości” jako kategorii możliwej do 
ogamienia przez dyskurs filozoficzny.
Tadeusz Rachwal
Approches de l’infini. Du sublime et du social 
Recherches sur la littérature du 18e siècle
Résumé
L’étude du rôle de la notion du sublime dans la théorie poststructuraliste et dans le 
post-modernisme (surtout J.-F. Lyotard) constitue le point de départ du présent ouvrage. En se 
servant des catégories telles que “l’inexprimable”, “la présence absente” ou bien “le temps au delà 
du temps”, les théories sus-mentionnées soulèvent et avancent les mêmes questions qui avaient déjà 
intrigué le discours du XVIIIe siècle; pourtant elles furent traitées par les philosophes les plus 
éminents de l’époque comme une sphère indésirable de la transgression, comme une sphère 
menaçant l’ordre social. Dans la partie analythique l’auteur se concentre sur une recherche des 
essais individuels ayant pour but principal de franchir les limites établies par l’ensemble des normes 
sociales dans le contexte du discours dominant du Siècle des Lumières, celui-ci tendant 
à restreindre ces transgressions.
Le IIe chapitre du présent ouvrage constitue une discussion critique portant sur les opinions 
esthétiques de Joseph Addison, contenues dans un cycle d’essais consacrés à la force de 
l’imagination, et publiés dans les colonnes de “The Spectator”.
Le IIIe chapitre aborde le problème du scepticisme philosophique vis-à-vis les sphères de 
l’infini. Le lecteur y trouvera une discussion au sujet de la loi, de la morale et de l’ordre public à la 
base des thèses de Hume et de La Mettrie. Le IVe chapitre s’occupe de la notion du “goût” en tant 
que catégorie particulièrement importante dans la naissance du discours esthétique, mais en même 
temps catégorie économique et politique qui, à travers la notion extraordinairement en vogue du 
“génie de l’endroit”, stipulait la mise en ordre du monde en tant que jardin, tout en sanctionnant la 
conquête coloniale. Les chapitres Ve et VIe sont consacrés à la catégorie du “sublime” perçue 
philosophiquement (Burke, Kant), esthétiquement (Blake), traitée du point de vue de la religion 
(Swedenborg) et de la politique (Godwin). L’objet des chapitres VIIe et VIIIe c’est le rôle de la 
notion du “sublime” dans le développement de la “philosophie sentimentale” et l’importance de 
cette philosophie dans le développement de la pensée esthétique. Le IXe chapitre clôt le présent 
ouvrage et définit le changement, survenu au début du romantisme, de la perception de la catégorie 
du sublime, tout en essayant de démontrer certaines relations entre le romantisme et le 
post-modernisme, celles-ci résultant de l’approche critique du “sublime” en tant que catégorie 
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